



University of Exeter
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Behavioural &
Experimental
Economists UK

**3RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE
NETWORK OF BEHAVIOURAL AND EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMISTS BASED IN THE UK
(BEE UK)**

25 – 26 JUNE 2026

PROGRAM BOOKLET



THURSDAY 25 JUNE

[\[link to abstracts\]](#)

10:00	<p style="text-align: center;">ARRIVAL, REGISTRATION, NETWORKING, AND REFRESHMENTS</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(XFi Study Space)</p>	
10:30 – 11:00	<p><u>Welcome Address: Henderson LT</u></p> <p>Loukas Balafoutas, <i>Head of Department of Economics, University of Exeter</i></p> <p>Lightning introduction by poster presenters</p>	
11:00 – 12:00	<p><u>SESSION 1A: Henderson LT</u> <u>LABOUR</u></p> <p>Yuki Takahashi, <i>Tilburg University</i> Does the Gender Ratio at Colleges Affect High School Students' College Choices?</p> <p>Victoria Prowse, <i>Purdue University</i> Dynamic investment in teamwork skill: Theory and experimental evidence</p> <p>Michael Sanders, <i>King's College London</i> Information provision and university attendance: Evidence from a national field experiment</p>	<p><u>SESSION 1B: Conference Room 1+2</u> <u>COMPLEXITY AND DECISION-MAKING</u></p> <p>Peter Moffatt, <i>University of East Anglia</i> An Ultra-powerful Test for the Validity of Non-incentivised Responses in Experiments</p> <p>Jing Zhou, <i>University of Edinburgh</i> Correlation Neglect in Financial Decision-Making: The Role of Complexity</p> <p>Georgios Gerasimou, <i>University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Business School</i> Distilling models of bounded-rational choice: a constraint programming approach</p>
12:00 – 13:30	<p style="text-align: center;">LUNCH (XFi Study Space)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">PRESENTATION BY PROLIFIC (12.30-13.15 at Henderson LT)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Andrew Gordon</p> <p style="text-align: center;">AI Agent Prevalence and Data Quality Across Multiple Online Sample Providers</p> <p><i>Dr Andrew Gordon will be presenting the results of the largest cross-platform data quality and AI agent prevalence benchmarking study conducted to date. Attend if you want to find out which sample sources show the highest data quality, and whether AI agents really are the threat the field thinks it is.</i></p>	



THURSDAY 25 JUNE

[\[link to abstracts\]](#)

13:30 – 14:30	<p><u>SESSION 2A: Henderson LT</u> <u>GENDER & DISCRIMINATION I</u></p> <p>Claudia Cerrone, <i>City St George's, University of London</i> Project Choice and Social Image Concerns</p> <p>Joel Lamb, <i>University of Exeter</i> Confidence in Job Search: Closing the Gender Gap in Reapplications</p> <p>Andis Sofianos, <i>Durham University</i> Merit, Identity, and Redistribution: Experimental Evidence on Affirmative Action</p>	<p><u>SESSION 2B: Conference Room 1+2</u> <u>BOUNDED RATIONALITY</u></p> <p>David Gill, <i>Purdue University</i> Identifying level-k reasoning in repeated games: Strategies, beliefs, and cognitive ability</p> <p>Santiago Sanchez-Pages, <i>King's College London</i> Performance-Based Assessment of Strategic Reasoning: A Recombinant Estimator Approach</p> <p>Rui Guan, <i>University of Kent</i> A Sound Decision? The Impact of Audio Presentations on Economic Rationality</p>
14:30 – 15:00	COFFEE BREAK (XFi Study Space)	
15:00 – 16:00	<p><u>SESSION 3A: Henderson LT</u> <u>GENDER AND DISCRIMINATION II</u></p> <p>Ashley McCrea, <i>University of Exeter</i> Hiring and Ambiguity: A novel discrimination problem</p> <p>Zahra Murad, <i>University of Portsmouth</i> AI, Gender and Fairness</p> <p>Yung-Shiang Jasmine Yang, <i>University College Dublin</i> Hiring Algorithm, Statistical Discrimination and Willingness to Invest in Self</p>	<p><u>SESSION 3B: Conference Room 1+2</u> <u>CONTESTS</u></p> <p>Laura Harvey, <i>Loughborough University</i> Competition among unequal peers</p> <p>Subhasish Modak Chowdhury, <i>University of Sheffield</i> The Lifecycle of Affirmative Action Policies and its Effect on Effort and Sabotage Behavior</p> <p>Enya Turrini, <i>Royal Holloway University of London</i> Pushing the Limit: The Different Effects of Threshold Proximity and Competitiveness</p>
16:00 – 16:15	SHORT BREAK	



THURSDAY 25 JUNE

[\[link to abstracts\]](#)

16:15 – 17:15	<p><u>PANEL SESSION: Henderson LT</u></p> <p>Topic: Changing the world with experiments</p> <p>Panel Members:</p> <p>Simon Gaechter, Professor of Psychology of Economic Decision Making, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Nottingham</p> <p>Oliver Hauser, Professor of Economics at the University of Exeter</p> <p>Elsbeth Kirkman, Chief Programmes Officer at Nesta</p> <p>Chair: Boon Han Koh, Lecturer of Economics at the University of Exeter</p>
18:30	DINNER (Topsham Brewery)



FRIDAY 26 JUNE

[\[link to abstracts\]](#)

<p>09:30 – 10:30</p>	<p><u>SESSION 4A: Henderson LT</u> <u>SOCIAL PREFERENCES</u></p> <p>Despoina Alempaki, <i>University of Warwick</i> Motivated memory and political polarization</p> <p>Pauline Vorjohann, <i>University of Exeter</i> Reference-dependent Altruism in Distribution Games</p> <p>Derrick Xu, <i>University of Southampton</i> Emotional Appeal and Charitable Giving</p>	<p><u>SESSION 4B: Conference Room 1+2</u> <u>ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE</u></p> <p>Tim Cason, <i>Purdue University</i> Norms in Conflict: Why AI Advisors Fail to Improve Human Coordination</p> <p>Oliver Hauser, <i>University of Exeter</i> Misplaced optimism: Beliefs and behaviours outside AI's jagged technological frontier</p> <p>Siting Estee Lu, <i>University of Edinburgh</i> Large Language Models can Predict Human Strategic Decisions</p>
<p>10:30 – 11:00</p>	<p>COFFEE BREAK (XFi Study Space)</p>	
<p>11:00 – 12:20</p>	<p><u>SESSION 5A: Henderson LT</u> <u>NUDGES AND PUBLIC POLICY</u></p> <p>Till Weber, <i>Newcastle University</i> The Confidence Pill: The Causal Effect of Exposure to Police Social Media</p> <p>Maria Cubel, <i>City University London</i> The Power of Satire to Change Attitudes Towards Refugees</p> <p>Leonhard Lades, <i>University of Stirling</i> Paying More or Hassling Less? Experimental Evidence on Administrative Burdens, Incentives, and Grant Take-Up</p> <p>Jingnan (Cecilia) Chen, <i>University of Exeter</i> When no news is bad news: Information networks, audit belief and tax compliance</p>	<p><u>SESSION 5B: Conference Room 1+2</u> <u>MARKETS & GAME THEORY</u></p> <p>Itzhak Rasooly, <i>City St George's, University of London</i> How manipulable are prediction markets?</p> <p>Paul Schaefer, <i>University of Leicester</i> The Effect of Social Relationships on Market Efficiency</p> <p>Miguel Fonseca, <i>University of Exeter</i> A Natural Experiment in Fair Division: Armageddon Chess</p> <p>Indrajit Ray, <i>Cardiff University</i> Coordination by sunspots: Letter is mightier than colour</p>



FRIDAY 26 JUNE

[\[link to abstracts\]](#)

12:20 – 14:00	LUNCH (XFi Study Space) BEE UK AGM (12:30-13:15 at Henderson LT)
14:00 – 15:00	KEYNOTE: Henderson LT Michèle Belot , Frances Perkins Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations and Professor of Economics at Cornell University Title: The Economics of Open Mindedness Chair: Cecilia Chen , Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, University of Exeter
15:00 – 15:15	CLOSING + AWARD PRESENTATION (Henderson LT)
15:15 – 16:15	PHD SESSION (selected participants only)

POSTER PRESENTATIONS

Venue: XFi Building Study Space

[\[link to abstracts\]](#)

Deepti Bhatia, *University of Leicester*

Task Assignment at the Workplace: Does Gender Matter?

Mert Gumren, *University of Leicester*

Impact of Peer Recommendations on Behavior Change: Experimental Evidence from Children

Rebecca Heath, *University of Cambridge*

How to disrupt a market

George Kinkead, *King's College London*

WhatsApp Got to Do with It? Investigating the impact of group messaging platforms on education outcomes

Marielle Caballero Ng, *University of Portsmouth*

Effects of Social Exclusion: The Role of Input and Acknowledgement on Behavioral Outcomes at the Workplace

Rabbia Tariq, *University of Exeter*

The Withholding Edge: Strategic Sharing of Labour-Market Information

Bastian Westbrook, *Swansea University*

Goal-setting and Overconfidence: Evidence from a Field Experiment

There will be a prize for an outstanding poster presentation, which will be decided based on majority votes by participants at the conference.

The recipient of the award will receive a £500 top-up to their Prolific account (sponsored by Prolific).

Please scan the QR codes located next to the posters or click this [link](#) to cast your votes. Voting will close 14:00 on Friday 26 June (just before the keynote session).



CONFERENCE VENUE

Campus Address

University of Exeter
Streatham Campus
Northcote House
Exeter EX4 4QJ

The conference will be held at the XFi Building

Google Maps: <https://maps.app.goo.gl/XQCwYxPKn76t4H8H7>

Arriving by car

- The M4/M5 links Exeter directly to London, the Midlands, South Wales and the North including Scotland.
- The average journey time from either London or the Midlands is 3 hours.
- Download our [Directions to the Streatham Campus](#)

Sat nav

Use postcode EX4 4QJ.

The University is within easy walking distance of Exeter city centre which is well served by public transport.

By bus/coach

The Streatham Campus is served by the UNI route. The UNI bus route includes St Luke's Campus, the City Centre and Streatham Campus. [Download the UNI Bus Timetable](#) (PDF). [National Express](#) coaches (08705 808080) call at Exeter Coach Station. The Coach Station is a short walk to the High Street where you can catch the local D bus which will take you to the Streatham Campus.

By rail

Exeter has two railway stations – Exeter St David's (main station) and Central. Exeter St David's Station is approximately 10 minutes' walk from the Streatham Campus and taxis are available. The average journey time from London Paddington is 2 hours 30 minutes to Exeter.

Use [National Rail Enquiries](#) to plan your route. For passenger information telephone 08457 484950.

By taxi

[Apple Taxis Exeter](#) (01392 666666) have a dedicated taxi rank on campus. Apple Taxis have offices at both Exeter St David's rail station and Exeter International Airport.

INSTRUCTIONS TO PRESENTERS

SESSION FORMAT

Each session presentation will be 20 minutes, including time for Q&A.

Please bring your presentations on a USB stick.

There will be clickers available in presentation rooms, and a dedicated volunteer will be there to provide any assistance required.

POSTER FORMAT

Poster presentations have to be prepared on 1 x A1-sized poster. The posters will be put up on boards located in the XFi Study Space (where the tea and coffee breaks will be held).

At the beginning of the conference, we will ask all poster presenters to give a 1-minute lightning introduction to their paper.

There will be a prize for an outstanding poster presentation, which will be decided based on majority votes by participants at the conference.

The recipient of the award will receive a £500 top-up to their Prolific account (sponsored by Prolific).

There will be QR codes located next to the posters for participants to cast their votes. Voting will close 14:00 on Friday 26 June (just before the keynote session).

CONFERENCE DINNER

The conference dinner will take place at [Topsham Brewery](#) [[Google Maps](#)]. Please aim for arrival at 18:30, and food should start being served at 19:00.

We have arranged a set buffet menu comprising a selection of food, which is covered by the conference registration.

KEYNOTE SPEAKER



Michèle Belot

**Frances Perkins Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations and
Professor of Economics at Cornell University**

Michèle Belot is Professor of Economics at the Department of Economics and the School of Industrial and Labor Relations. Her research in applied microeconomics uses randomized controlled trials to improve health behaviours – often among children and low-income families – and to support job seekers with better information. Her publications include the *Review of Economic Studies*, *Review of Economics and Statistics*, *Journal of Health Economics*, *PNAS*, and *The Economic Journal*. She is President of the European Association of Labour Economists.

PANEL MEMBERS



Simon Gaechter

Professor of Psychology of Economic Decision Making, Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Nottingham

Simon works at the intersection of behavioural/experimental, organisational and labour economics, and game theory. Using experiments, he studies voluntary cooperation under free-rider incentives and the interplay of material and psychological incentives. His publications include *AER*, *Econometrica*, *Science*, *Nature*, *JEP*, *JLE*, *JPubE*, *JEEA*, *Management Science*, *Nature Human Behaviour*, and *Nature Communications*. He has held two ERC Advanced Grants (2012–17; 2021–26) on the behavioural principles of cooperation at scale.



Oliver Hauser

Professor of Economics at the University of Exeter

Professor Hauser is Professor of Economics and the Deputy Director at the Institute for Data Science & Artificial Intelligence at the University of Exeter, Faculty Affiliate at Harvard University. He is also a Senior Advisor in the Evaluation Task Force in the UK Cabinet Office and H.M. Treasury, and an advisor to several multinational firms, start-ups and charities. He is a Fellow of the Royal Economic Society and holds a UKRI Future Leaders Fellowship. His research has been published in top academic journals, including *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *Science*, *Nature*, *PNAS*, *Management Science*, and *Nature Human Behaviour*.



Elsbeth Kirkman

Chief Programmes Officer at Nesta

Elsbeth is Chief Programmes Officer at Nesta, overseeing mission teams focused on closing income-driven gaps in early childhood development, halving obesity, and reducing domestic emissions to net zero. Previously a senior leader at the Behavioural Insights Team, she established its North American office and led social policy work. She is the author of *Behavioral Insights* (2020) and *Decisionscape* (2024), and holds fellowships with King's College London and the University of Exeter.



ORGANISING COMMITTEE



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We are pleased to have the following sponsors supporting this year's conference.



OPEN SCIENCE TOOLS

Open Science Tools (OST) is a mission-driven company, based at the University of Nottingham, dedicated to facilitating open science through high-quality, low-cost tools. OST is best known for **PsychoPy**, a free, open-source software used by labs worldwide to create and run behavioural experiments. PsychoPy is a flexible python-based tool with a Graphic User Interface, making it possible to create a range of experiments with minimal coding knowledge. Using PsychoPy it is possible to gather a range of response types (including keyboards, microphones, webcams, mouse tracking) interact with a range of hardware (eye tracking, EEG and fMRI and more) and present a range of stimuli that can be manipulated frame-by-frame. We also develop **Pavlovio.org**, a platform for hosting studies and surveys online, making it easy to conduct remote experiments.

Our team of PhD-qualified scientists offers a range of services, including consultancy—where we can design and implement your experiments—and bespoke training tailored to your needs. **If you have an experiment or project in mind, come and talk to us!**

OST representatives will be setting up a booth at the reception area during the conference.

Upcoming Workshop for Behavioural Experiments

Join us for a virtual workshop introducing PsychoPy and Pavlovio—free and low-cost tools for creating and hosting behavioural experiments in lab and online. This hands-on session will guide you through building your own behavioural economics experiment from start to finish.

Sign up here:

<https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/psychopy-and-pavlovio-for-behavioural-economics-tickets-1987815835675>.

SPONSORS

We are pleased to have the following sponsors supporting this year's conference.



PROLIFIC

Prolific is a technology company building the biggest pool of quality human data in the world. And the ultimate platform to access it.

Easily find the participants you need with our pool of 200k+ active, verified, and engaged participants.

Prolific will be hosting a lunch presentation on Thursday 25 June.

Title: AI Agent Prevalence and Data Quality Across Multiple Online Sample Providers

Dr Andrew Gordon will be presenting the results of the largest cross-platform data quality and AI agent prevalence benchmarking study conducted to date. Attend if you want to find out which sample sources show the highest data quality, and whether AI agents really are the threat the field thinks it is.



SONA SYSTEMS

Since 2002, Sona Systems has been a leader in participant pool management software, with a global reach of over 7.2 million users and 56 million study sign-ups. Our platform allows university researchers to build their own participant pools, run lab and online studies, and grant participants payment or credit.

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The screenshot shows the Sona Systems Admin Dashboard in a web browser. The browser address bar shows 'your-university.sona-systems.com/dashboard'. The dashboard has a top navigation bar with 'Studies', 'User Management', 'Set Up', and 'Tasks' menus, and a user profile for 'Samatha Farhill (Administrator)'. The main content area is divided into several sections: 'Overview' with a list of statistics (Total Participants: 35, Total Researchers: 4, Total Studies: 27, Participants Needing Approval: 8, Uncredited Timeslots: 9, Prescreen Status); 'Today's Activity' with four cards showing 3 Active Users, 0 New Users, 0 Active Studies, and 0 Appointments; 'Administrator Tip of the Day' with a tip about Batch Study Delete; and a bottom row of five action buttons: 'Add a New Study', 'Add New User', 'Add New Course', 'Generate Reports', and 'Update User Profile'.



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SESSION PRESENTATION ABSTRACTS

(Thursday 25 June)

[\[link to program\]](#)

SESSION 1A: LABOUR

Yuki Takahashi, Tilburg University

Does the Gender Ratio at Colleges Affect High School Students' College Choices?

Abstract: Why do fewer female students enter STEM despite negligible gender gaps in mathematics and science? Using an incentivized discrete choice experiment with high school students, we show that both females and males prefer gender-balanced college programs and prefer being a majority to a minority, driven by anticipated difficulty fitting in. High-math-ability females show stronger minority avoidance in STEM, while males show the opposite. Combined with STEM's low female share, these preferences lead to inefficient talent allocation: high-math-ability students, especially females, forgo STEM, and low-math-ability students enter. These findings suggest STEM's gender composition itself deters female entry.

Victoria Prowse, Purdue University

Dynamic investment in teamwork skill: Theory and experimental evidence

Abstract: Teamwork and collaboration are increasingly important. To understand the dynamics of teamwork skill formation, we provide the first systematic analysis of dynamic investment in teamwork skill. First, adopting a dynamic game approach, we develop a novel theoretical framework where investment in team skill creates persistent benefits and externalities for teammates, but where investment is risky because the benefits depend on successful team coordination. Second, we take this framework to the laboratory to study empirically the factors that influence dynamic investment in team skill. We find underinvestment compared to the efficient benchmark. However, investment in team skill responds strongly to incentives, in line with specific patterns predicted by our theory. We also find that people's theory of mind and propensity to coordinate predict how much they invest in team skill. We conclude that careful design of team incentives and selection of team members can facilitate the dynamic development of teamwork skills.

Michael Sanders, King's College London

Information provision and university attendance: Evidence from a national field experiment

Abstract: Universities offer bursaries and scholarships for low income students, which vary considerably in terms of their generosity and the range of people who are eligible for them. However, students are unaware of the support they are eligible for prior to attending university, meaning their effect at helping young people decide whether to attend university is limited at best. In this paper, we conduct a national level natural field experiment in 570 institutions, in which schools are assigned at random to receive booklets for their students that give them information about all income contingent bursaries offered by universities, or not to. Variations are also tested in the way information is presented in letters accompanying the booklets, which test whether increasing the salience of high value bursaries with narrow eligibility, or lower value bursaries with wider eligibility are more effective. We find modest positive effects of the intervention on university attendance overall (2.34% points), with no effect detectable for attendance at a selective university, and slightly smaller effects for disadvantaged students. There are no detectable differences as a result of the different letters accompanying the booklets. Economic evaluation of the intervention suggests a cost of £66 per student induced to attend university by the intervention, based on the average estimate of the booklets' effectiveness.

SESSION PRESENTATION ABSTRACTS

(Thursday 25 June)

[\[link to program\]](#)

SESSION 1B: COMPLEXITY AND DECISION-MAKING

Peter Moffatt, *University of East Anglia*

An Ultra-powerful Test for the Validity of Non-incentivised Responses in Experiments

Abstract: We consider an experimental setting in which a typical task consists of a sequence of two elicitations: subjects first choose between two lotteries with real money outcomes; then they report their level of confidence in the choice they have just made. An important difference between the two elicitations is that the first is incentive compatible while the second is not. We estimate a set of preference parameters in two different ways: by applying the binary probit model to the choice data; and by applying the ordered probit model to the confidence data. We then apply the Hausman testing procedure in order to test for consistency between the two sets of estimates. We find no significant difference in estimated preference parameters between incentivised and non-incentivised elicitations. This result should be reassuring to those who use non-incentivised tasks in experiments. We also conduct a power analysis for the test of consistency, and we find that the test has exceptionally high power. This is because the test has the unusual character of a “within-task” test, since it is testing for consistency between different stages of a single task. As such, it provides a sharper comparison than the more conventional “within-subject” and “between-subject” tests.

Jing Zhou, *University of Edinburgh*

Correlation Neglect in Financial Decision-Making: The Role of Complexity

Abstract: Diversification is fundamental to optimal investing, enabling investors to reduce portfolio risk without sacrificing expected returns. Standard theory assumes that investors understand the joint distribution of asset returns and adjust how much to diversify in response to correlation, optimally exploiting the resulting hedging opportunities. However, empirical evidence on whether people do is mixed. I show experimentally that complexity drives both correlation insensitivity and correlation mis-response. I independently vary Cancellation Complexity (identifying decision-irrelevant states), and Tradeoff Complexity (evaluating cross-state tradeoffs) via a series of experiments. I find that both reduce correlation sensitivity, but Tradeoff Complexity additionally pushes negative-correlation allocations off the mean-variance frontier. A structural model identifies distinct channels: Cancellation Complexity operates through choice noise on a flatter evaluation landscape, while Tradeoff Complexity induces an allocation-level complexity penalty. Using U.S. stock data, I find that Tradeoff Complexity amplifies the behavioral, but not the rational, component of the comovement premium, particularly in small stocks.

~~**Georgios Gerasimou**, *University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Business School*~~

~~Distilling models of bounded-rational choice: a constraint programming approach~~

~~Abstract: We introduce constraint programming tools to distil the full explanatory, predictive and welfare-relevant content of two prominent bounded-rational choice models: “shortlisting” and “limited attention”. We apply them on human data where rational choice provides an imperfect fit. The alternative models jointly account for nearly all data, with limited-attention ones explaining better but also being more permissive. However, while the *approximate fits* of the rational model typically point to a unique welfare-relevant preference ordering per subject, the *perfect fits* of the bounded-rational models map to many distinct behavioral primitives. These trade-offs raise challenging interpretation/inference questions.~~

SESSION PRESENTATION ABSTRACTS

(Thursday 25 June)

[\[link to program\]](#)

SESSION 2A: GENDER & DISCRIMINATION I

Claudia Cerrone, *City St George's, University of London*

Project Choice and Social Image Concerns

Abstract: Employees' desire to impress their employer may lead to suboptimal choices, such as performing tasks that are out of their depth. In this paper, we formalise this intuition in a principal-agent setting and we experimentally analyse its practical relevance. Through a theoretical model, we show that an agent's desire to appear competent to their employer (social image concerns), can result in inefficient project selection. We test this prediction using a laboratory experiment and find that social image concerns increase the likelihood

Joel Lamb, *University of Exeter*

Confidence in Job Search: Closing the Gender Gap in Reapplications

Abstract: We explore reapplication gaps to leadership positions and to research assistantships caused by applicants' gender and confidence, respectively. Providing applicants with information that helps them update their beliefs of the likelihood of receiving an offer closes both gaps, suggesting that confidence-boosting messages not only make underconfident but also female applicants more willing to reapply. A mediation analysis corroborates the role of confidence: when (truthfully) informed that they were among the top 20% of applicants and possessed characteristics desired by the employer, beliefs about relative performance and relative fit mediated the treatment's impact on expected likelihood of success and willingness to reapply. Our findings are compatible with a simple model of Bayesian updating, with one exception: in the field experiment, men's likelihood of reapplying decreased when informed of their high relative standing. The paper discusses the importance of employer feedback boosting employee confidence towards closing gender gaps in the labor market.

Andis Sofianos, *Durham University*

Merit, Identity, and Redistribution: Experimental Evidence on Affirmative Action

Abstract: We study whether opposition to affirmative action reflects general aversion to preferential treatment or bias against the social identity of beneficiaries. Using an incentivized online experiment with university students in India, we compare perceptions and behavior toward candidates admitted through caste-based versus income-based affirmative action. Evaluators assessed test-takers' competence and allocated monetary rewards under different selection rules. We find that caste-based beneficiaries from India's historically stigmatized and marginalised groups (Scheduled Castes and Tribes, or SC-ST), particularly from high-income households, are perceived as less competent, while income-based beneficiaries from non-marginalised groups are viewed more favorably. Yet, these negative perceptions do not translate into penalties: caste-based beneficiaries—especially those from low-income households—receive allocations beyond what their grades predict, whereas income-based beneficiaries are rewarded in line with perceived competence. Results highlight a duality: affirmative action elicits both identity-driven stigma and redistributive generosity. These findings show that shifting from caste to income criteria does not eliminate bias, underscoring the persistent salience of social identity in redistributive policies.

SESSION PRESENTATION ABSTRACTS

(Thursday 25 June)

[\[link to program\]](#)

SESSION 2B: BOUNDED RATIONALITY

David Gill, Purdue University

Identifying level-k reasoning in repeated games: Strategies, beliefs, and cognitive ability

Abstract: In this paper, we identify level-k reasoning in repeated games that operates at the level of a supergame strategy. First, we develop a model of level-k reasoning that incorporates choices over strategies as well as beliefs about strategies chosen by others. Then, using data from the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma that includes elicited strategies and beliefs about strategies, we classify a substantial fraction of subjects as level-1 or level-2. Moreover, we show that when level-k reasoning operates at the level of a strategy, cognitive ability and experience both predict higher level reasoning.

Santiago Sanchez-Pages, King's College London

Performance-Based Assessment of Strategic Reasoning: A Recombinant Estimator Approach

Abstract: This paper introduces a novel method for assessing strategic sophistication in two-player games. It diverges from traditional approaches that attribute a level of strategic reasoning to players. Instead, we propose a performance-based measure that evaluates players' ability to best respond to the empirical distribution of strategies among other players. This method calculates the loss incurred relative to a player's optimal strategy using the "recombinant estimator" introduced by Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993). Our measure of strategic sophistication offers two advantages: It is applicable across games, facilitating comparative analysis, and it can inform strategic decision-making and game design. We demonstrate its applicability by leveraging experimental data from over 40 experiments comprising more than 8,000 unique participants. Finally, we validate our measure by showing its association with established metrics of cognitive performance.

Rui Guan, University of Kent

A Sound Decision? The Impact of Audio Presentations on Economic Rationality

Abstract: In the digital era, audio-based information—such as that delivered through virtual assistants and automated systems—increasingly shapes human decisions. Yet most research in economics and decision sciences has focused on visual presentations, leaving the impact of audio largely unexplored. To bridge this gap, this study examines how audio presentations affect human economic rationality using two experiments. The first experiment shows that the audio presentation of information substantially impairs human economic rationality even if it takes longer decision times compared to visual ones. The second experiment reveals that this impairment is largely due to the sequential nature of audio information delivery. And manipulating the speed of audio presentations can causally improve human economic rationality. These findings highlight the importance of incorporating perceptual modality and information delivery speed into decision sciences, with significant implications for optimizing presentation strategies in various real-world decision environments.

SESSION PRESENTATION ABSTRACTS

(Thursday 25 June)

[\[link to program\]](#)

SESSION 3A: GENDER AND DISCRIMINATION II

Ashley McCrea, *University of Exeter*

Hiring and Ambiguity: A novel discrimination problem

Abstract: We propose a novel explanation for the under-representation of certain social groups in labor markets. Employers often have limited direct experience with under-represented groups, meaning their ability distributions is partially or entirely unknown. Therefore, hiring decisions are made under ambiguity, and depend on employers' ambiguity in beliefs and their ambiguity attitudes. We test this claim experimentally, with a focus on gender, across two studies. In a stylized hiring experiment, the probability of hiring from a group rises as ambiguity about its ability distribution falls. Female recruiters display greater ambiguity aversion toward male than female applicants, while male recruiters show no such asymmetry. In a second experiment, we elicit beliefs about men's and women's abilities across occupations and find pervasive ambiguity in beliefs for both genders. Importantly, ambiguity about women's ability is negatively correlated with their representation in an occupation, but no such relationship exists for men

Zahra Murad, *University of Portsmouth*

AI, Gender and Fairness

Abstract: How does access to assistive AI affect judgments of desert? We run a two-stage online experiment with mixed-gender pairs. In a symmetric benchmark, neither worker has access to Smart Tools (ST); in an asymmetric condition, one worker is randomly given ST with known accuracy. Workers first work on a task with or without access to ST and are assigned an initial bonus according to their relative performance; they then request a split of bonus. Independent spectators then reallocate the bonus, before and after observing requests. When technology is symmetric, male losers are penalized (by receiving lower transfers) relative to female losers. When ST is salient, this gender gap collapses and is replaced by a robust technology discount against ST users. Requests attenuate but do not eliminate the penalty. The results bridge gendered evaluation and fairness under unequal opportunities created by differential AI access, and motivate technology-neutral evaluation rules and equalized or randomized access within cohorts.

Yung-Shiang Jasmine Yang, *University College Dublin*

Hiring Algorithm, Statistical Discrimination and Willingness to Invest in Self

Abstract: We study how individuals respond to algorithmic hiring environments featuring statistical discrimination and uncertain returns to self-investment. In a pre-registered online experiment (N = 553), participants are randomly assigned to an advantaged or disadvantaged identity group and choose how much to invest to improve their chances of being hired by an algorithm with group-based prior beliefs. We find that participants in the disadvantaged group invest 17.7% more than their advantaged counterparts. We also test three interventions to encourage investment: two "Role Model" treatments showing in-group peers who either succeeded or failed after investing, and a "No Risk" treatment that eliminates the financial penalty of investing if not hired. While the role model interventions show limited effects, the "No Risk" treatment significantly increases investment among disadvantaged participants by 24%. Our findings suggest that reducing financial risk, rather than emphasizing representation, may be more effective in motivating self-investment under algorithmic bias.

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(Thursday 25 June)

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SESSION 3B: CONTESTS

Laura Harvey, *Loughborough University*

Competition among unequal peers

Abstract: Individuals often encounter situations where they compete for various opportunities like jobs, promotions, or scholarships. In such scenarios, success is not only determined by one's abilities and efforts but also by those of their peers. Thus, being mindful of competitors' traits significantly impacts the effort exerted in competitions. In this study, we experimentally explore the interplay between different competition costs and knowledge about competitors. We find evidence suggesting diminishing returns to additional information. Surprisingly, even a single additional piece of information about a competitor can alter behaviour relative to complete information. However, this effect is mitigated when one's own costs are substantial.

Subhasish Modak Chowdhury, *University of Sheffield*

The Lifecycle of Affirmative Action Policies and its Effect on Effort and Sabotage Behavior

Abstract: One of the main goals of affirmative action (AA) policies is to enable disadvantaged groups to compete with their privileged counterparts. Existing literature documents that AA can result in both more egalitarian outcomes and higher exerted efforts in competition. However, the direct behavioral effects of the introduction and removal of such policies are still unexplored. It is also unclear how specific AA tools, such as head-start for a disadvantaged group or handicap for a privileged group, affect behavior. We investigate these aspects in a laboratory experiment incorporating a real-effort tournament and sabotage. We find that AA does not necessarily result in higher effort. High performers who have already experienced an existing AA-free tournament reduce their effort levels after the introduction of the AA policy. Additionally, we observe less sabotage under AA when the tournament begins directly under the AA regime. The removal of AA policies, however, significantly intensifies sabotage. Overall, there are no systematic differences between handicap and head-start in terms of effort or sabotage.

Enya Turrini, *Royal Holloway University of London*

Pushing the Limit: The Different Effects of Threshold Proximity and Competitiveness

Abstract: This study examines how performance thresholds interact with competitiveness and gender to influence effort and goal achievement. In a laboratory experiment, participants complete a baseline task, reveal their willingness to compete through an incentive-choice decision, and then face a personalized performance target of varying difficulty. The results show clear gender differences: men are more likely to choose competitive incentives, respond more strongly to the introduction of a goal, and achieve targets at higher rates than women. More attainable goals independently do not necessarily increase effort and success for participants compared to less achievable targets. However, goal achievement is not affected by gender and confidence directly, but only indirectly through competitiveness, which instead affects directly the likelihood of reaching the goal. Overall, the findings demonstrate that performance thresholds are only affected by competitiveness but not gender directly.

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SESSION 4A: SOCIAL PREFERENCES

Despoina Alempaki, *University of Warwick*

Motivated memory and political polarization

Abstract: A growing body of evidence suggests that people selectively retrieve past experiences in self-serving ways, systematically misremembering their own behaviour to protect their moral self-image. Little is known, however, about whether similar distortions extend to the behaviour of others who share one's group identity. This paper investigates this question in the political domain. Using a controlled experiment, we test whether individuals are more likely to forget the lies of political in-group members than those of out-group members, and whether they update their beliefs about the honesty of in-group and out-group members selectively. Our findings have implications for political accountability and the persistence of polarization.

Pauline Vorjohann, *University of Exeter*

Reference-dependent Altruism in Distribution Games

Abstract: Why do people give when asked, avoid being asked, and take when possible? We propose a model of reference-dependent altruism for distribution games. Dictators care about recipients' well-being, but well-being is evaluated relative to benchmarks generated by defaults and feasible protected payoffs. The resulting S-shaped utility is locally CES yet globally nonconvex, generating incomplete crowd-out, reduced giving under taking opportunities, and reluctant sharing within a single specification. Reanalyzing nine classic experiments, we compare out-of-sample predictions with CES altruism, warm glow/cold prickle, and envy/guilt. Reference dependence improves portability and organizes stable heterogeneity across contexts, subjects, and settings.

Derrick Xu, *University of Southampton*

Emotional Appeal and Charitable Giving

Abstract: This paper provides novel evidence on the real-world use of emotional appeals. I examine two complementary hypotheses for why charities use negative framing in their communication. First, charities may adopt a permanent emotional position to engage donors with specific emotional preference. Second, they may use shock tactics, delivering sudden and unavoidable negative emotions to boost donations. To test these hypotheses, I collected three million images from top charities' Twitter posts and trained a deep learning model to predict the emotions they evoke. I find that charities vary in their emotional tone in ways not explained by their missions. Additionally, donors' preferences for emotional content differ, correlating with their socioeconomic backgrounds and moral values. For example, better educated donors and moral universalists favour charities that use negative emotional appeals. As a result, charities have an incentive to maintain a specific emotional tone to differentiate themselves and attract certain donors, supporting the first hypothesis. To support the second hypothesis, I show that negative emotional shocks increase donations immediately, but their repeated use diminishes effectiveness. Thus, charities must balance short-term impact with long-term donor fatigue, incentivising them to use shock tactics sporadically.

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SESSION 4B: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Tim Cason, *Purdue University*

Norms in Conflict: Why AI Advisors Fail to Improve Human Coordination

Abstract: Cooperation failures in social dilemmas persist because individually rational behavior yields inefficient collective outcomes. Advances in Artificial Intelligence may improve outcomes by advising humans or by acting autonomously, which we study in a repeated, heterogeneous value, threshold public-goods experiment. Such threshold games model a broad class of burden-sharing problems (crowdfunding, shared infrastructure, multilateral agreements) in which efficiency requires not only coordination but agreement on a cost-sharing norm. We compare a human-only benchmark to treatments with an AI advisor (OpenAI's GPT-5) and to treatments in which AI agents make allocations directly. AI Only groups outperform human groups. AI agents contribute equally and independent of valuations, whereas humans scale contributions with valuations. AI advisors do not improve human-only outcomes. Although AI helps overcome an information bottleneck regarding calculations needed to condition on others' behavior, it fails to address a legitimacy bottleneck, because individuals reject cost-sharing rules that conflict with their fairness norms.

Oliver Hauser, *University of Exeter*

Misplaced optimism: Beliefs and behaviours outside AI's jagged technological frontier

Abstract: This paper examines how managers form beliefs about AI effectiveness and how these beliefs shape resource allocation decisions in organizations. Firms invest heavily in AI, but adoption is uneven because AI helps some tasks and workers more than others — characterised as the “jagged frontier” of this emerging technology. We propose a theoretical model, in which managers do not recognize the jagged AI frontier, predicting that managers will initially view AI's impact as uniform and update beliefs inefficiently when reality sharply contradicts their optimism. We test these predictions using a set of experiments involving workers and managers. First, measuring worker performance across ten diverse tasks, we confirm a jagged technological frontier: AI increases accuracy by 25.8 percentage points (pp) on tasks “inside” the frontier but decreases accuracy by 12.2 pp on tasks “outside” it. Second, we find that managers fail to anticipate this jaggedness. Consistent with our model, managers hold smooth, overoptimistic priors, expecting an average gain of 21.8 pp on the accuracy rate (vs. a realized 6.8 pp). This miscalibration is most severe for outside-frontier tasks: managers expect an 11.1 pp gain when AI actually lowers performance. These miscalibrated beliefs have costly consequences for managers: in incentivized willingness-to-pay allocation tasks, we show that managers inefficiently allocate resources when assigning AI capability to workers. However, performance feedback reduces estimation errors and reallocates resources away from outside-frontier tasks, although residual optimism persists.

Siting Estee Lu, *University of Edinburgh*

Large Language Models can Predict Human Strategic Decisions

Abstract: We study whether large language models (LLMs) can predict human strategic behavior from pre-play communication. Using three canonical laboratory games that vary in incentive alignment and communication structure, we provide LLMs and incentivized human forecasters with identical transcripts and ask them to predict players' subsequent actions. Using GPT-5 as our main model, we find that it consistently outperforms humans and achieves



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accuracy well above chance, especially when incentives are aligned and communication is bilateral. The performance gap arises almost entirely from correctly forecasting cooperative actions, while both humans and GPT-5 struggle to anticipate defection. These results suggest that strategic communication contains systematic information about future behavior that humans underutilize and that LLMs are able to exploit more effectively.

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SESSION 5A: NUDGES AND PUBLIC POLICY

Till Weber, *Newcastle University*

The Confidence Pill: The Causal Effect of Exposure to Police Social Media

Abstract: This paper studies how police communication on social media affects public confidence in the police and short-run well-being. We run a large-scale online experiment in which UK participants are randomly exposed to real Instagram Stories posted by English police forces or to neutral content. We distinguish between three communication styles: enforcement outcomes, community engagement, and requests for public assistance. Exposure to police content increases confidence in the police and willingness to support policing in an incentivised donation task. However, it also produces large immediate declines in self-reported happiness and does not shift crime concern, perceived police effectiveness, reporting intentions, or spending preferences. Effects differ sharply by content type: community-engagement posts deliver confidence gains comparable to enforcement-focused posts while generating substantially smaller well-being costs. Overall, police social media operates as a confidence pill—raising confidence but with meaningful emotional side effects.

Maria Cubel, *City University London*

The Power of Satire to Change Attitudes Towards Refugees

Abstract: This paper studies whether satirical cartoons can shift public attitudes toward refugees. We run a pre-registered survey experiment with 877 French participants recruited through Prolific and randomly assigned to a satirical cartoon, a factual text, both stimuli combined, or a control. The design exploits the contrast between sympathy for Ukrainian refugees and skepticism toward other refugee groups. Exposure to the cartoon improves attitudes toward refugees in general, reducing perceived threat and increasing solidarity. However, the cartoon backfires when respondents evaluate Ukrainian refugees, producing a significant increase in perceived threat. The factual text improves perception of refugees' contribution to society without triggering any backlash. This suggests the two interventions operate through different channels. Combining the two stimuli eliminates the effects of each. The heterogeneity analysis suggests that satire reinforces existing sympathies rather than persuades. Attitude change is driven by appreciation and acceptance of the cartoon's message rather than by perceived humor. Overall, our results show that satire can influence refugee attitudes, but its effects depend strongly on audience characteristics and framing.

Leonhard Lades, *University of Stirling*

Paying More or Hassling Less? Experimental Evidence on Administrative Burdens, Incentives, and Grant Take-Up

Abstract: Applying for benefits and programs can be so onerous that take-up is low even when support is available. This study investigates how administrative burden and financial incentives influence the completion of administrative work using an incentivized real-effort task. The experiment, with a sample of 1002 UK participants, asked individuals to identify key information from hypothetical grant descriptions that varied in administrative complexity to complete an incentivized quiz for either a low or a high potential prize. Higher administrative burden significantly reduced the quality of the administrative task completion, while higher monetary incentives produced only modest improvements. These

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findings suggest that reducing administrative burden, rather than increasing financial incentives alone, may be a more effective way to improve administrative performance and increase take-up across grants, benefits, and similar programs.

Jingnan (Cecilia) Chen, *University of Exeter*

When no news is bad news: Information networks, audit belief and tax compliance

Abstract: This paper studies how social network structure affects tax compliance by shaping taxpayers' subjective beliefs about audit probability. In a laboratory experiment with 420 participants, individuals repeatedly choose how much income to declare under two unannounced audit probabilities, high and low. Participants are randomly assigned to one of three information environments: a Control condition with no social information, a Chain network with information on direct neighbours' audit outcomes, and a Complete network with information on all group members' audit outcomes. Incentivized belief elicitation in every round allows us to examine both compliance decisions and the belief mechanisms underlying them. We find that network effects on compliance are conditional on the audit environment. Under high audit probability, compliance is highest in the Chain network. Under low audit probability, compliance is lowest in the Complete network, even below the Control condition. The results indicate that social networks can either strengthen or weaken compliance depending on the signals they transmit. Mechanism analyses show that the Complete network reduces perceived audit probability and overestimation bias, particularly when the true audit probability is low, and that these belief changes are associated with lower compliance. We also show that greater information exposure reduces belief uncertainty, creating an additional pathway through which networks influence behaviour. These findings contribute to the tax compliance literature by demonstrating that social networks matter not only through peer effects, but also through belief formation under enforcement uncertainty. The paper highlights that denser information networks do not necessarily improve compliance and may instead undermine deterrence when observed audit signals are sparse.

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SESSION 5B: MARKETS & GAME THEORY

Itzhak Rasooly, *City St George's, University of London*

How manipulable are prediction markets?

Abstract: In this paper, we conduct a large-scale field experiment to investigate the manipulability of prediction markets. The experiment involves randomly shocking prices across 817 separate markets; we then collect hourly price data to examine whether the effects of these shocks persist over time. We find that prediction markets can be manipulated: the effects of our trades are visible even 60 days after they have occurred. However, as predicted by our model, the effects of the manipulations somewhat fade over time. Markets with more traders, greater trading volume, and an external source of probability estimates are harder to manipulate.

Paul Schaefer, *University of Leicester*

The Effect of Social Relationships on Market Efficiency

Abstract: How do social relationships affect imperfectly competitive markets? I conduct a controlled laboratory experiment using real-world friendships to answer this question. Social relationships among sellers of complements lower prices and boost efficiency, while those among sellers of substitutes do the reverse. This effect occurs because friends internalize externalities more than strangers (directed altruism). Participants value their friend's profits at approximately 30% of their profits. Overall, results suggest that, in this context, social relationships act similarly to common ownership and mergers.

Miguel Fonseca, *University of Exeter*

A Natural Experiment in Fair Division: Armageddon Chess

Abstract: We use data on bids and game outcomes from Armageddon chess to test the Minimax Hypothesis. Armageddon games break ties in chess tournaments, with Black winning an Armageddon game either on a draw or by winning outright. The players bid for the right to play Black. The player who bids the smaller number of minutes plays Black, with an amount of time on their clock equal to their bid; the other player plays White with a full clock. We develop a simple model of bidding in Armageddon games. We find that bids and game outcomes are consistent with the Minimax Hypothesis. In particular, each player is equally likely to play Black or White, and a player's probability of winning the game is the same whether playing Black or White. In this latter respect, Armageddon bidding fairly divides the probability of winning the game.

Indrajit Ray, *Cardiff University*

Coordination by sunspots: Letter is mightier than colour

Abstract: We set up an experiment to test whether players use a payoff-irrelevant public message (BLUE or RED) as a possible sunspot to coordinate in a Battle of the Sexes game in which the strategies are labelled X and Y. We find that players do not play a sunspot equilibrium, instead learn to coordinate on a particular focal point (strategy X) in the game, even in the presence of the public signal (colour) and stick to this focal point, after the public signal is withdrawn.



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KEYNOTE

Michele Belot, *Cornell University*

The Economics of Open Mindedness

Abstract: Open-mindedness—the willingness to reconsider beliefs, habits, or choices—is central to adaptation in a rapidly changing world. This keynote examines behavioral obstacles to consider other options across a range of domains such as lifestyle, political opinions and careers. Evidence from three recent experimental studies documents the effects of interventions designed to reduce these barriers. The findings show that light-touch interventions can meaningfully increase openness to change, with implications for policies aimed at encouraging healthier behaviors, more constructive dialogue, and labor market transitions.

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Deepti Bhatia, *University of Leicester*

Task Assignment at the Workplace: Does Gender Matter?

Abstract: Through a lab experiment, this paper investigates how employers allocate challenging and routine tasks among employees and whether gender discrimination exists in task assignment within organizations. The experimental design further allows for the examination of gender stereotypes not only in a static context but also in a dynamic setting where learning and task allocation interact. As experience in performing challenging tasks is typically considered crucial for career advancement, I analyze employers' promotion decisions under three information conditions. I find that, in aggregate, male employers display in-group bias by assigning fewer challenging tasks to females, while female employers have a positive but insignificant effect on assignment of challenging tasks to females. Over time, employers learn about the abilities of workers and their task assignment decisions are significantly shaped by their experience gained during the course of the experiment. Employers accurately integrate the information provided to them in their promotion decisions, but in the treatment where they observe only the number of challenging tasks assigned to workers, male employers exhibit a preference for promoting male workers over female workers. The results reiterate the need and importance of unbiased assignment of challenging tasks at the workplace and highlight the potential long-term impact of such gender biases on career advancement.

Mert Gumren, *University of Leicester*

Impact of Peer Recommendations on Behavior Change: Experimental Evidence from Children

Abstract: This paper studies how peer recommendations influence behavior among elementary school children. Using a lab-in-the-field experiment, I examine three domains: grit (perseverance after failure), risk-taking, and other-regarding preferences. After making initial decisions, children can purchase a costly recommendation from a peer in another school who previously completed the same tasks, and then revise their choices. On average, children are willing to pay a positive amount for peer recommendations. While most children do not adjust their initial choices, revision rates are highest in the risk domain. Exploiting exogenous variation in recommendation content relative to initial decisions, I estimate the causal effect of peer recommendations on behavior change. When children revise, adjustments systematically move toward the recommendation, partially incorporating peer signals. Responses are broadly symmetric in risk-taking and altruism, with suggestive evidence of stronger upward than downward adjustments in the performance task. I also assess the optimality of these adjustments through simulations.

Rebecca Heath, *University of Cambridge*

How to disrupt a market

Abstract: Market design research in economics naturally focusses on how to improve market efficiency. Our objective here is exactly the opposite - how to design interventions that make a market less efficient. Our research is inspired by the growth of illicit markets online where reducing their efficiency may reduce societal harm. Using an online experiment, we find that a partial disruption to delivery is an effective method to decrease market efficiency. The decrease is borne by sellers who sell fewer goods and have lower earnings. A consequence of a disruption to delivery, however, is an increase in market concentration because it facilitates the emergence of a dominant seller. In contrast, we find that attacks on seller ratings are ineffective at reducing market efficiency. This study paves the way for evidence-based, causally driven investigations to aid policies to disrupt cybercrime and other illicit markets.

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George Kinkead, *King's College London*

WhatsApp Got to Do with It? Investigating the impact of group messaging platforms on education outcomes

Abstract: This paper examines whether behaviourally informed messaging interventions can be strengthened by embedding student support within virtual group environments. While low-cost messages via email, SMS, and platform notifications are widely used to encourage academic engagement, their effects are often modest, partly because they treat students as isolated recipients. Group messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Microsoft Teams may alter this dynamic by making engagement visible, interactive, and socially meaningful. Drawing on a survey experiment and field experiments with GCSE mathematics resit students in UK further education colleges, the paper tests whether small, intentionally designed groups can reproduce some of the social affordances of communal learning environments. Survey evidence shows that WhatsApp messages generate higher reported engagement than email, but only when visible peer interaction is present. Field evidence suggests that embedding revision prompts within WhatsApp groups substantially increases uptake of optional revision support. The findings highlight group messaging as a promising, scalable tool for improving educational engagement.

Marielle Caballero Ng, *University of Portsmouth*

Effects of Social Exclusion: The Role of Input and Acknowledgement on Behavioral Outcomes at the Workplace

Abstract: The purpose of this study is to investigate whether specific characteristics of an exclusion/rejection episode can affect excluded employees' behaviors as well as excluders' behavior in subsequent tasks. Specifically, I aim to explore whether employees having an input or not in an exclusion episode can impact excluded workers' and excluders' behaviors at the workplace; and whether acknowledgement by the excluders influences the excluded participants' and excluders' behaviors. This project also examines the interaction between the excluded participants' input or lack of input with the presence or absence of acknowledgement on behaviors from the excluded coworkers towards the excluders. Similar analysis will be conducted on behavior from the excluders towards the excluded participants. Behavioral outcomes after the exclusion episode are assessed in terms of preferences to join a subsequent task with excluders as well as decisions to adjust excluders' and excluded subjects' earnings. Preliminary results on the effects of input and acknowledgement on excluded participants' behaviors will be discussed.

Rabbia Tariq, *University of Exeter*

The Withholding Edge: Strategic Sharing of Labour-Market Information

Abstract: In labour markets characterised by high competition, vacancies are increasingly public, but the performance-relevant process information remains held privately within peer networks where peers are also rivals. Using a lab-in-the-field experiment with university students in Islamabad, Pakistan, this paper studies how people share information about real paid data-analysis jobs when sharing strengthens a competitor. Participants were randomly given an information advantage (access to help material), and the design varied the observability of the sharer's identity and the salience of competition. Holding an advantage significantly reduces the vacancy sharing by 10pp, and process information is withheld far more than the vacancy itself. The advantaged sharers pass the vacancy to roughly 6.7 peers but the help material to only 4.2. Greater observability raises sharing, especially when no advantage is at stake, while competition salience selectively suppresses process-information sharing without affecting vacancy sharing. Dyadic evidence suggests that sharing is concentrated within friendship ties, while less central and higher-ability peers are less likely to receive information. The results show that visibility is not access; decentralised sharing reproduces existing advantage and can exacerbate labour-market inequality.

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Bastian Westbrook, *Swansea University*

Goal-setting and Overconfidence: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Abstract: Goal-setting is widely perceived as an effective self-regulation tool, yet it often yields underwhelming results. One explanation is that individuals set overly ambitious goals to maintain a positive self-image. We show in a series of field experiments that the motivational value of goal-setting declines with goal-setters' self-confidence, a manifestation of image concerns. This relationship is so strong that highly confident goal-setters even perform worse than their counterparts in a no-goal control group, providing a potential explanation for the overall null effect documented in many previous goal-setting interventions. Finally, we evaluate several remedies to this problem, one of which proves particularly effective: extrinsic rewards for goal attainment lead overconfident individuals to set more realistic goals and eliminate the detrimental effects of goal-setting.