Dignity & Democracy
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  • Human dignity as a value and an actionable constitutional right, by Schnutz Rudolf DÜRR

    Posted by ccld201

    5 January 2026

    Human dignity is the foundation of human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[1], replacing natural law in times of positivism. It is an important part of almost all constitutions of Council of Europe member States. Human dignity is key to protect human beings throughout their lives and beyond. Because of this common origin in the Universal Declaration, the European Convention on Human Rights and national Constitutions, this post argues that human dignity should not remain an abstract concept, used only to reinforce other human rights; but human dignity should be seen and used as an actionable right before the national courts, throughout Europe.

    Due to its wide scope[2], human dignity is sometimes hard to grasp. There seems to be agreement that human dignity is inherent to all human beings and that it is inalienable, but there is no unique definition of the right to dignity. ‘Human dignity’ differs from ‘dignity’ when this refers to the dignity of an office, or an institution[3]. Even if the office is exercised by an individual, it does not originate in the dignity of that individual. This also explains the wider limits of acceptable criticism for State bodies and civil servants[4].

    Human dignity in European constitutions and case-law: diversity in approaching a common principle

    The notion of dignity and the right to dignity vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction[5] . In order to grasp the breadth of the concept, we can look into some European constitutions, where human dignity is more cohesive. Only few – mostly older – constitutions do not refer to dignity (Cyprus, Denmark, France, Iceland, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, San Marino). Thus, expressing its importance, a number of constitutions refer to dignity in their preamble (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Moldova, Poland). Several constitutions refer to equal treatment in dignity (Bulgaria, Czechia, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia) or specifically as concerns punishments which must not violate dignity (Albania, Austria, Greece, Finland, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine, Turkey). The German Basic Law obliges all public authorities to respect and protect dignity and defines it not only as the basis of all human rights, but even of peace and justice in the world (implying that all States should protect human dignity). Some constitutions make a direct link with the right to honour or reputation (Azerbaijan, North Macedonia, Slovakia), sometimes limiting the freedom of expression if the dignity of others is infringed (Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania Romania). Interestingly, a few constitutions state that property must not be used to violate human dignity (Azerbaijan, Greece, Italy, Ukraine). Montenegro and Switzerland expressly refer to dignity in relation to biomedicine, and gene technology respectively.

    Moving from constitutions to national constitutional case-law, we can try to gauge the scope of application of dignity, looking at a few cases in the Venice Commission’s CODICES database, which is fed by liaison officers appointed by constitutional and supreme courts. The selection of examples below does not intend to give a full picture of the use of dignity; it only tries to show the wide range of its application, starting before birth and continuing after death. In most cases, dignity is used in conjunction with other human rights, often as an element in balancing between rights, and generally gives additional weight when characterising state interference as a human rights violation.

    Starting at the beginning of life[6], cases relate to biomedicine and notably embryos (Irish right to life of the unborn Ireland:IRL-2009-3-004, also Portugal:POR-2009-1-001). Dignity is also relevant for the adoption by unmarried persons or persons in a civil partnership and their private life Lithuania:SLO-2025-1-002, Czechia:CZE-2016-2-005 or single persons Italy:ITA-2025-2-006. A series of cases relates to abortion, the right to private life and women’s rights, including balancing with the rights of the woman carrying the embryo (Croatia:CRO-2017-1-001, France:FRA-2001-2-006, Germany:GER-1993-M-001, Hungary:HUN-1991-S-003, United Kingdom:GBR-2022-3-007, Portugal:POR-2006-3-002).

    During lifetime, healthcare and the right to private life is a frequent topic (obligation to wear masks Croatia:CRO-2020-3-009, retention of medical data Slovenia:SLO-2016-3-001). A series of cases relates to gender identity and LGBTI rights (decriminalisation of sodomy Hungary:HUN-2002-3-004, right to personality and right to change the name for transsexuals Germany:GER-2006-1-002). Human dignity is also relevant in the field of criminal law. Criminalisation of prostitution and occupational freedom in Portugal:POR-2016-3-016, personal freedom and criminalisation of clients of prostitution France:FRA-2019-1-001. In light of the absolute prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, dignity is relevant for conditions of detention and imprisonment, e.g. right of personality and physical restraints Germany:GER-2023-1-005, overcrowding Türkiye:TUR-2023-2-012. In this context, asylum is also seen from the angle of dignity (freedom of movement Lithuania:SLO-2023-2-002, photographic proof of sexual orientation Finland:FIN-2018-1-002, danger of torture in case of expulsion: United Kingdom:GBR-2002-2-003, Germany:GER-2018-1-002). The right to social benefits is also discussed from the angle of dignity, e.g. foreigners Belgium:BEL-2015-3-010, minimum income Germany:GER-2010-1-003. Importantly, dignity is also a yardstick for labour relations[7]: right to work Italy:ITA-2021-2-007, attachment below minimum wage Portugal:POR-2010-2-010. Moreover, in the context of labour relations, in case of racist statements, the freedom of expression finds its limits: Germany:GER-2020-3-027.

    At the end of life, the right to life and private life are discussed in cases of assisted suicide Austria:AUT-2020-3-004, Hungary:HUN-2003-2-003, Ireland:IRL-2013-1-001, Czechia:CZE-2025-2-003 and of course the death penalty violates human dignity Hungary:HUN-1990-S-003, Lithuania:SLO-1999-1-003, Albania:ALB-1999-3-008.

    Finally, dignity has also post-mortem effects, for instance relating to the reputation of the deceased vs. freedom of expression Germany:GER-2022-3-024, graves of enemies North Macedonia:MKD-2000-2-006, reputation and criminal proceedings against the deceased ARM-2017-1-002.

    Despite this wide-ranging relevance, the absence of a single definition of dignity and its nature as the ‘mother of all rights’ may have resulted in judges shying away from applying the right to dignity directly on its own merits, rather than referring to it to reinforce conclusions reached on the basis of other ‘more concrete’ rights.

    Human dignity as a stand-alone actionable right

    Using human dignity as an actionable right may bring the law closer to people because dignity is an inherently relatable value and ideal. Dignity resonates with individuals on a personal level, as it includes notions of respect, autonomy, and the value of the individual. This can help establishing trust between individuals and legal institutions, enabling people relate to the judiciary as providing ‘justice’, which is important of times of populism and democratic backsliding, and for instance Dupré offers the discussion of human dignity as a diagnostic tool to assess constitutional crises[8]. Basing judgments on human dignity, where appropriate, provides added legitimacy and helps maintaining democracy, the protection of human rights and the rule of law.

    This post therefore argues that there are good grounds for applying the right to dignity in judicial practice. How can national judges operationalise the right to dignity? Within the limited space, I would just offer the following ideas:

    1. In case of a conflict between human rights, a useful test may be to look at the link between the conflicting rights and dignity; the closer a right is related to dignity, the higher we can consider its ‘relative value’ (the right to property may be an obvious victim in this balancing exercise, but not necessarily).
    2. Approaching a new case, it may be interesting to look at it first from the angle of the dignity of the person(s) concerned, before looking into the other rights or considerations deriving from the law – those arguments are essential, but looking at a case first from the angle of dignity may help placing claims into a human perspective; this may enable a better understanding of the purpose of the law.
    3. In view of its strong legitimacy, at the origin of human rights, judges can build their arguments directly on the right to dignity, as a ‘standalone right’ rather than referring to it to reinforce a conclusion reached via another right, referring to it nearly as an obiter dictum.

    In any event, the content of dignity will not depend on a single, universal definition, but on constitutions and the case-law of the national courts building on it. International dialogue and exchanges between courts, possibly in the framework of regional or language-based groups of courts, such as the Conference of European Constitutional Courts, the Superior Courts’ Network or even the World Conference on Constitutional Justice, may allow building bridges between the various interpretations of dignity and lead to cross-fertilisation.

    Schnutz Rudolf DÜRR is the Head of the Programming Department of the Council of Europe; former Secretary General of the World Conference on Constitutional Justice, former Deputy Secretary of the Venice Commission. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the Council of Europe.


    [1] Dworkin, Ronald, Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), .330.

    [2] Becchi, Paolo, Human Dignity in Europe: ‘Introduction’, in: Becchi, Paolo, Mathis, Klaus (eds), Handbook of Human Dignity in Europe (2019).

    [3] Contrary to Waldron, Jeremy, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, EUI 05/2010, 43 Arizona State Law Journal, 2012.

    [4] ECtHR, references in the Guide on Article 10 of the ECHR, 31/08/2025, par. 256 ss.

    [5] McCrudden, Christopher, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’, EJIL (2008), Vol. 19 No.4, 655-724. For a brief discussion on the entwicklungsabhängiger Würdeschutz, see Reiter, Johannes, Menschenwürde als Maßstab, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Nr. 23-24 2004.

    [6] Following the structure in Christian Walter, ‘Human Dignity in German Constitutional Law’, in Venice Commission, CDL-STD(1998)026.

    [7] Dupré defines the dignity of the worker as one of the three constitutional identities, as a biological individual, as a citizen and as a worker: Dupré, Catherine, The Age of Dignity, Human Rights and Constitutionalism in Europe (2015), 83.

    [8] Dupré, Catherine, ‘Hungary’s attacks on human dignity: Article 2 TEU and the foundations of democracy in the European Union’ (2024) European Law Journal, Volume 30, 260-283.

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