Posted by ccld201
7 January 2026One of the distinctive features of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is the absence of any explicit reference to human dignity in the text of the Convention itself. Human dignity is neither guaranteed as an autonomous right nor expressly mentioned in the Preamble. Nevertheless, dignity played a significant role during the travaux prĂ©paratoires of the Convention and was repeatedly invoked as a foundational value.[1] Moreover, the Preamble to the ECHR explicitly refers to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which proclaims that âall human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rightsâ. The ECHR is therefore animated by the same normative spirit as the UDHR and stands in a clear relationship to the legal concept of human dignity. Consequently, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has also defined human dignity and freedom as âthe very essence of the Conventionâ, which establishes a fundamental orientation for the entire system.[2]
What the protection of human dignity substantively requires, however, is not self-evident. It is through its case-law that the European Court of Human Rights has progressively sought to articulate the contours and normative implications of this principle.[3]
Human Dignity as an Open Norm
In the ECtHRâs jurisprudence, human dignity has developed into a functionally open concept. Depending on the factual constellation, it is attributed different normative roles. This plurality resists rigid doctrinal classification. Human dignity does not function as a directly enforceable subjective right, but primarily as a fundamental norm that guides interpretation within the Convention system, limits state power, and sets absolute limits. The focus consistently lies on the individual at the heart of the case and on situations of heightened vulnerability and basic human needs.
The question remains: what constitutes human dignity in the ECHR, and what is its normative effect?
The Abolition of the Death Penalty as a Dignity-Based European Achievement
One of the most notable human rights developments after the millennium, which was decisively driven forward by arguments based on human dignity, was the abolition of the death penalty. Human dignity was expressly codified within the Convention framework in 2002 through Additional Protocol No. 13 abolishing the death penalty âin all circumstancesâ. The Protocol affirms that abolition is essential for the âfull recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beingsâ. Human dignity thus underpins one of Europeâs most significant legal-civilisational achievements: the categorical rejection of State-imposed killing as a form of punishment.
In line with its methodology of identifying a European Consensus, the ECtHR has characterised the death penalty as incompatible with Article 3 ECHR. Capital punishment violates human dignity in a dual sense. First, it gives rise to intense psychological suffering, which the Court has classified as inhuman treatment in the 1989 Soering case (para 111). Secondly, it reduces the individual to a mere object of State punishment, thereby negating his or her status as a moral subject. As the ECtHR has repeatedly emphasised, punishment that instrumentalises the individual in this manner is irreconcilable with respect for human dignity.[4]
This reasoning reflects a core theme of the Courtâs dignity-based jurisprudence: the intrinsic worth of the human being and the corresponding prohibition of instrumentalization.
Prohibition of exploitation
In the 2010 case of Rantsev, the ECtHR classified human trafficking in Europe as a violation of Article 4 of the ECHR, invoking the principle of human dignity, even though this article does not expressly contain this prohibition, but is still based on old forms of slavery. Human trafficking threatens the human dignity and fundamental freedoms of its victims (para 282). It violates the intrinsic value of human beings by denying them their fundamental freedoms.[5]
In the Rantsev case, the Court decided to extend the scope of protection beyond the wording of Article 4 of the ECHR (prohibition of slavery) by focusing on exploitation. The term âexploitationâ clearly refers to the objectification and prohibition of the instrumentalization of human beings. However, this applies not only to the relationship between citizens and the state, but also to the relationship among human beings, which is why the state party is obliged to prevent such forms of exploitation.
Here, too, the ECtHR referred to human dignity and international standards that guarantee its protection. In this respect, dynamic and evolving case law is always based on a systematic link to internationally recognized rules and a European understanding of basic human rights.
Life Imprisonment and the Right to Hope
Following the effective abolition of the death penalty, the human rights focus increasingly shifted towards the situation of prisoners serving life sentences (without the possibility of parole). This situation raised fundamental questions relating to detention conditions, future prospects and the possibility of personal development in custody. In 2013 in Vinter, the Court examined the compatibility with Article 3 ECHR of âwhole life ordersâ that excluded any realistic possibility of release. While release could theoretically be ordered on compassionate grounds, such as terminal illness, the Court found this framework insufficient. It held that a life sentence must be reducible both de jure and de facto and that prisoners must have âa prospect of release and a possibility of review.â[6]
Since Vinter, the Court has explicitly grounded the principle of rehabilitation in human dignity, thereby anchoring it within Article 3 ECHR. In the Courtâs view, contemporary European standards require that respect for human dignity entails a genuine opportunity for rehabilitation and the preservation of hope. Human dignity thus safeguards not only the intrinsic worth of the individual, but also a minimum degree of self-efficacy and existential meaningfulness during detention.
Conditions of Detention
Human dignity further imposes an obligation on Contracting States to organise detention conditions and prison regimes in a manner compatible with the objective of human dignity and thus rehabilitation. This obligation is conceived as an obligation of means. Dignity protection extends beyond physical integrity to encompass personal autonomy, self-respect and subjective agency.
Typically, the Court has repeatedly held that prison overcrowding, inadequate hygiene, insufficient access to light and air, poor nutrition and lack of privacy may reach the threshold of degrading treatment and can be an infringement of human dignity.[7] The Court does not invoke dignity in an abstract manner. Rather and importantly, it relies on international standards and penological research to develop its own evaluative framework. Respect for the dignity of prisoners requires the State to create conditions under which detainees are capable of maintaining self-respect and exercising a minimum degree of autonomy.
The sensitive area of detention exemplifies that it is hardly possible or expedient to attempt to encapsulate detention conditions in a mathematical formula and draw âred linesâ on the basis of this. It is more important to keep the overall context in mind and to take into account the cumulative effects on the mental and physical suffering and restrictions personal autonomy of the prisoner. By not setting rigid limits, the Court retains a great deal of leeway, but this comes at the expense of legal certainty and predictability as to when prison conditions become inhumane within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR.
A Compass for Developing ECHR Case Law
The Court delineates the scope of dignity through negative determination, by assessing whether State conduct violates the dignity of the human person or not. This approach reflects the nature of dignity as a principle whose content emerges through its application to concrete cases rather than through abstract definition.
For this reason, the Court must avoid developing dignity protection in a normative vacuum. To preserve its legitimacy and persuasive authority, it must rely on identifiable European trends, a sufficient degree of consensus and normative developments (especially) within the Council of Europe framework. Otherwise, there is a risk of dilution or banalisation of the concept. For human dignity must not mean everything and nothing at the same time.
A restrained yet consistent reliance on human dignity, focused on its normative core, safeguards the coherence of the ECHR system. Without dignity, the ECHR would lose a central point of orientation: the intrinsic worth of the human being and the right to respect for every person, the equal value of all persons, the prohibition of instrumentalization, the right to personal autonomy and identity in the sense of self-respect and self-development, and the status of every human being as a subject before the law and in the state flow from human dignity and thus also form guiding principles for the interpretation of the individual articles of the ECHR, representing a normative framework that can structure and limit state power. This goes hand in hand with the normative insight that the state must not be an end in itself but should always place the individual human being at the center of its actions. Their interests must be taken into account and weighed up. These are lofty words, but only when they are taken seriously can a human rights state be seriously conceived.[8] That is not insignificant, but it does not mean that all human rights issues can be addressed with human dignity. On the contrary, human dignity should (in the future) not be invoked excessively, but only where it makes a clear normative statement and sets clear boundaries. In order to carry this concept into the future of jurisprudence and legal practice, and to make it effective, both convincing, transparent interpretation and clear areas of legal protection are necessary. Otherwise, one should refrain from rhetorical recourse without tangible legal effect, so as not to trivialize it.
Dr. Pascal Ronc is an attorney at law specializing in criminal law, migration law, and human rights. He is a lecturer in criminal law at the University of Zurich and the author of Die MenschenwĂŒrde als Prinzip der EMRK [Human dignity as a principle of the ECHR] (Duncker und Humblot, 2020).
[1] Pascal Ronc, Die MenschenwĂŒrde als Prinzip der EMRK, (Duncker und Humblot, 2020), 53 ff.
[2] See also Goodwin vs. United Kingdom, ECHR 2002, no. 28957/95, § 90.
[3] Ronc, Die MenschenwĂŒrde als Prinzip der EMRK, 2020.
[4] Vinter a.o. v United Kingdom (GC), no 66069/09 a.o., ECHR 2013, § 113.
[5] Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, ECHR 2010, no. 25965/04, § 282; Chowdury vs. Greece, no. 21884/15, ECHR 2017, § 93.
[6] Vinter a.o. v United Kingdom (GC), no 66069/09 a.o., ECHR 2013, § 113:
«A life sentence without any prospect of release or the possibility of review is incompatible with Article 3.»
[7] MurĆĄiÄ v Croatia (GC), no 7334/13, ECHR 2016, §§ 96 â 101.
[8] Ronc, Die MenschenwĂŒrde als Prinzip der EMRK, 360 â 381.