Posted by ccld201
23 February 2026While the first post-independence leaders like Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo articulated human dignity as the moral and political foundation of Nigeria, the translation of this vision into enforceable law only emerged gradually. From Africa’s early champion of human rights to a nation marked by authoritarian control, Nigerians continue to face widespread human rights abuses including currently from terrorism, internal displacement, gender-based violence to homophobic discrimination.
Embedding Human Dignity in Law: Constitutional and Regional Protections
During Olusegun Obasanjo’s military regime (1976 – 1979), the 1979 Constitution was enacted. For the first time, Section 31(1) of the Constitution explicitly recognized the right to human dignity, stating: “Every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his person.”
Since the collapse of the brutal military dictatorship under General Sani Abacha in 1999, Nigeria has reaffirmed human dignity in its constitution. Section 34 of the 1999 constitution reiterates section 31(1) of 1979 constitution. Additionally, the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights has been domesticated as federal law in Nigeria since 1983 under the civilian president Shehu Shagari[1]. The African Charter reinforces human dignity with Article 5 declaring, ‘Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status.’ In Nigeria, it can be invoked in civil proceedings under the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules to bring actions against both public and private actors.
As a result, dignity is not only pivotal within the jurisprudence of the African Charter.[2] It is also central to Nigerian constitutional law, serving as a constitutional right and a value that informs the interpretation of rights.[3] This is seen through the explicit reference to the right to the respect of dignity and the link to degrading treatment and torture. Section 34 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (CFRN 1999) exemplifies this by outlining that, out of respect for dignity, ‘no person shall be subject to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment; no person shall be held in slavery or servitude; and no person shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.’ This is in line with the African Charter which states that ‘all forms of exploitation and degradation of man, particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.’ (Article 5)
Nigeria has historically adopted a narrower approach to human dignity than South Africa, considering it as a distinct right and interpreting it primarily in terms of protection against the most egregious abuses but not the death penalty. In cases like Kalu, Nigerian courts held that the constitutional right to dignity does not prohibit the death penalty and explicitly allowed an exception to the right to life under Section 33(CFRN 1999), a position sharply at odds with international human rights standards.
In 1991, in the case of Uzoukwu v. Ezeonu[4], the appellants challenged actions by traditional rulers in their community, claiming these actions violated their constitutional rights. The dispute centred on whether the imposition of sanctions and interference by the rulers constituted a breach of the right to human dignity under the Nigerian Constitution. Taking a narrow approach to dignity, the court recognized that while the conduct met the threshold for discrimination, it did not reach the threshold for violating human dignity. The Nigerian Court of Appeal outlined, in the 1991 case of Uzoukwu v. Ezeonu that the ‘indignity to a person’ has been defined to include ‘mental harassment, physical brutalization, while inhuman treatment typifies the lack of human sentiments, belittling of one’s societal status or character, and the degradation of one’s value or position of a .’
Although Nigerian law interprets human dignity narrowly, South African, British and international jurisprudence remain persuasive authority in Nigerian courts guiding the interpretation of human dignity. This is especially seen through how Nigeria’s Constitution underscores the prominence of human rights and dignity in two ways: through the difficulty of amending fundamental rights and the exclusion of human dignity from the limitations on fundamental rights under section 45. Section 9 of the Constitution outlines that an Act of the National Assembly for amending fundamental rights requires the approval of not less than a four-fifths majority of all members of each House, as well as the resolution of the House of Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all States. Section 45 of the Nigerian Constitution allows for the curtailment and certain limitations on fundamental rights; however, the right to dignity cannot be circumvented under this provision. As Section 45 states:
“Nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of this Constitution shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society (a) in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health; or (b) for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons.”
This represents the view that dignity exists partially outside of the law, is inviolable, and forms the moral and constitutional foundation of modern constitutionalism. This principle reflects the influence of international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, from which both the 1979 and 1999 Nigerian Constitutions drew their provisions on human dignity, affirming that respect for dignity is universal and a foundational obligation of the state.
Human Dignity in Nigeria: The Promise and the Persistent Gap
Despite constitutional recognition since 1999, in 2019 ‘Human Dignity and Human Rights: The Nigerian Question’, Okene and Akani noted that human dignity in Nigeria suffers not from the law itself, but from weak enforcement through extrajudicial imprisonment and killing, bribing judges. For example, the 1999 constitution allows people to sue for the infringement of their rights under Section  and killing, bribing judges (with the system of selecting judges and ministers incentivising corruption and impunity), and utilising the different provisions in various laws to stifle constitutional rights. (with the system of selecting judges and ministers incentivising corruption and impunity), and utilising the different provisions in various laws to stifle constitutional rights.
Closing the Dignity Gap
Nigeria must close its dignity gap. Access to justice is essential; without it, dignity remains an empty promise. Closing the gap requires legal reform to remove laws that violate rights and domestically incorporate international instruments, such as the Maputo Protocol, ensuring global human-rights norms are enforceable. Civic education is equally vital, through advocacy by legal practitioners, human-rights defenders, and engagement with elected representatives, so citizens know and demand their rights. Although laws affirm human dignity, without enforcement it remains aspirational. As the Venice Commission noted in 2025, the rule of law, human rights, and democracy are interdependent and must be embedded constitutionally.
Ayobami Ruth Olufemi-White. Esq LLB, BL is a lawyer, writer, political commentator and human rights advocate focusing on the intersections of international law, dignity law, legal theory, feminist theory and critical race theory. She earned her LLB with First Class Honours from the University of Exeter, receiving the Peter English Dissertation Prize. She was called to the Nigerian Bar in September 2025 and is a qualified Barrister and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Nigeria.
[1] This Act came into effect on 17 March 1983 and is now contained in Cap 10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990.
[2] TA Gelaye ‘The role of human dignity in the ‘human rights’ jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’(2021) 5 African Human Rights Yearbook 116,120.
[3] E.S. Nwauche, ‘A Bill of Rights as the Basis of a Common Law in a Pluralist Nigeria’ (2007) 1 African Journal of Legal Theory 45, 56.
[4] Uzoukwu v Ezeonu II, (1991) 6 NWLR (pt 200) p. 708.