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2 July 2026Human dignity is about human life. However, explaining in detail the meaning of human dignity as a legal concept is difficult since it is hard to pinpoint exactly what is most salient in human life, and what aspects of that are recognized in the sphere of law. The methodology of clarifying the legal concept of human dignity is discussed for example by Elaine Webster in this Blog. In line with Webster, I see much promise in trying to bridge the jurisprudence on human dignity and the broader social meanings of dignity. This approach is apt to increase the understanding of dignity in both social and legal spheres. Because of its high authority and progressive style of interpretation, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR; the Court) is important when fleshing out the meaning and scope of human dignity. In this post, I present illustrative cases from the ECtHRâs jurisprudence that examine human life and dignity within their social context, taking into account the intersubjective dimensions of human dignity.
Human dignity in ECtHR case law beyond personal autonomy
From the case-law of the ECtHR emerges a multifaceted picture of human dignity, despite the atypical formulation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which lacks explicit references to human dignity in its main text. The Courtâs interpretations also appear to fit well with some traditional theoretical conceptions of dignity. The central themes of both include upholding personal autonomy, fundamental rights and self-respect, and banning forced labour (Article 4 ECHR), denial of basic goods, as well as humiliation or debasement of an individual (Article 3 ECHR). These themes reflect the way in which the law typically sees human beings: as capable, free, and rational individuals with equal status.
In reality, our humanity is of course much more complex than that. In my recent work, I have argued that based on both theoretical accounts of dignity and the conceptâs application in the legal sphere there is a need for a more holistic picture of humanity and dignity.[1] The central need is to increase awareness of the intersubjective elements of human dignity. These elements include social relationships and hierarchies that reflect the equal worth of all persons as members of the human community. An intersubjective perspective also means recognising that human behaviour is always influenced by its social context. For example, social norms affect the interpretation of different actionsâsome acts are viewed as demeaning, while others are interpreted as respectful. These intersubjective elements are often deeply meaningful for us humans and can arouse intense feelings and experiences.
Intersubjective elements of human dignity in the ECtHR case-law
The ECtHR seems to have increasingly issued judgements that focus on the societal and relational nature of human experiences regarding human dignity. An illustrative case in this regard is Bouyid v. Belgium (2015). There the Court held that even a single slap on the face, inflicted by a police officer during a police interview, can be seen to diminish the human dignity of the individual and to constitute a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR (prohibition of degrading treatment). This type of situation highlights the uneven position between the police and the individual. Also, when a victim of abuse is aware of the legal rules, professional ethics, and basic moral expectations that apply to law enforcement officers, unfair treatment can feel even more striking, which can strengthen feelings of injustice, arbitrariness, and powerlessness in the situation.[2] The wrongdoing committed by the police officers is therefore assessed in qualitative terms, by considering what kinds of relations and actions between individuals and authorities reflect appropriate social standards and the proper standing of persons in society, rather than by focusing solely on the concrete injury (i.e. the slaps to the face).[3]
Similarly, the Court held for example in the case Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia (2014) that holding defendants in a metal cage during a trial constitutes an affront to their human dignity. The Court pointed out (at para 138) the practiceâs âobjectively degrading nature which is incompatible with the standards of civilised behaviour that are the hallmark of a democratic societyâ. It also examined the experiences of the caged applicants and concluded that âthe applicantsâ exposure to the public eye in a cage must have undermined their image and must have aroused in them feelings of humiliation, helplessness, fear, anguish and inferiority.â[4] Here, again, it is the socially constructed meaning of being caged and its effects on the status and feelings of the individual that are at stake rather than any concrete physical harm.
The manner of action (rather than the action alone) can be significant too. For instance, it has also been found incompatible with human dignity when the police raided the office of a LGBT organization and simultaneously insulted, threatened and put the workers of the organization through humiliating strip searches not justified by the police. In Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia (2020) the Court also quite strongly formulated that a discriminatory intent in general makes an enormous difference regarding the message that an action sends: The Court emphasised that âtreating violence and brutality with discriminatory intent, irrespective of whether they are perpetrated by State agents or private individuals, on an equal footing with cases that have no such overtones would be to turn a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rightsâ. [5] The Court has also previously held that discriminatory treatment as such can offend human dignity.[6]
The equal dignity of individuals and avoiding stigmatization in the eyes of the community in which they live were also important in Fedotova and Others v. Russia (2023) when the Court required a legal framework that allows an adequate recognition of same-sex relationships based on Article 8 of the ECHR (the right to a private and family life). If same-sex couples are denied any form of legal recognition and protection for their relationships, this sends a derogatory message. Accordingly, the Court held that the legal recognition and protection of same-sex relationships serve the ideals and values of democratic society: âThe Court emphasises that a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention rejects any stigmatisation based on sexual orientation [âŚ]. It is built on the equal dignity of individuals and is sustained by diversity, which it perceives not as a threat but as a source of enrichmentâ.[7] The Court also stated that âgaining official recognition for their relationship has an intrinsic value for the applicants. Such recognition forms part of the development of both their personal and their social identity as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Conventionâ. Even though the recognition has âan intrinsic value irrespective of the legal effectsâ the Court also sees that âthe recognition and the protection of a couple are inextricably linked.â[8] This shows how the societal recognition and more formal legal requirements are often dependent on each other.
As the case examples above illustrate, paying due attention to the intersubjective dimensions of human life that connect to dignity â such as social hierarchies, social norms and recognition of social status â can make a significant difference in the Court. Dignity can be especially powerful in upholding the rights of people who are looked down upon or are marginalized in society for different reasons. This recognition of intersubjective elements of human dignity does not necessarily, in itself, produce a high level of protection, nevertheless it is often the first step to take. Taken together, the cases discussed here indicate a shift towards a more holistic understanding of humanity and of human dignity as a legal concept within the ECtHR. This should be duly considered also in future conceptualisations of dignity in the scholarship.
Hanna-Maria Niemi is a researcher and university teacher at the University of Eastern Finland (UEF) Law School. Her doctoral thesis, that includes articles published both in Finnish and in English, focuses on clarifying human dignity as a legal concept. The thesis âIhmisarvo oikeudellisena käsitteenäâ (Human dignity as a legal concept) is currently in print and will be published In the UEFâs publication series Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies in August 2026.
[1] Hanna-Maria Niemi, The intersubjective dimension of human dignityâfrom philosophical theorizing to case law examples from the European Court of Human Rights, Human Rights Law Review 26 (1) 2026.
[2] Bouyid v. Belgium [GC] (Application No 23380/09), 28th September 2015, paras 100â106.
[3] The meaning of a slap is further discussed by the Court at para 104: âA slap has a considerable impact on the person receiving it. A slap to the face affects the part of the personâs body which expresses his individuality, manifests his social identity and constitutes the centre of his senses â sight, speech and hearing â which are used for communication with others.â
[4] Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia [GC] (Applications Nos 32541/08 and 43441/08), 17th July 2014, para 129. The practice can also affect the upholding of the presumption of innocence, see para 133.
[5] Aghdgomelashvili and Japaridze v. Georgia (Application No 7224/11), 8th October 2020, para 44. For the evaluation of the conduct of the police officers see paras 47â49.
[6] See Niemi (2026), 19.
[7] Fedotova and Others v. Russia [GC] (Applications Nos 40792/10, 30538/14, 43439/14), 17th January 2023, para 180.
[8] Fedotova and Others v. Russia 2023, paras 200-202.