Posted by ccld201
5 December 2025Respect for human dignity is continually presented as one of the fundamental values of the Council of Europe. A recent example is found in the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) judgment in Ukraine and The Netherlands v. Russia in July 2025.[1] A more surprising recent example is found in the open letter in May 2025 by nine of the Council of Europe’s States Parties, criticising the ECtHR’s interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The signatories, in the first paragraph, state that they “believe deeply in the inviolable dignity of the individual […].” Their assertion is suspect given that before we arrive at the end of the first page, the tone shifts, underpinned by notions of deservingness and individual responsibility, towards a claim that the ECtHR case-law is protecting “the wrong people”. The letter targets the ECtHR interpretation of the ECHR cases concerning “expulsion of criminal foreign nationals”. A core message is that the signatory states would prefer to be able to expel individuals despite a real risk of them being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, which are absolutely prohibited under Article 3 ECHR. While the notion of dignity is relevant in some way across the range of ECHR rights, this narrative attacks Article 3, the very right that symbolises most strongly a deep belief in and commitment to inviolable human dignity in the Council of Europe. The letter was described at the time as sounding an “alarm bell” and many scholars responded by unpacking the claims and offering factual clarity (such as Ní Chinnéide and Sevrin, Hipold, Coen and Magioglou, and Adelmant, Donald and Çali). I cite it here to reflect on whether it may be helpful to engage more directly with the meaning of human dignity, and thus the import of respecting this fundamental value and commitment, in ongoing debates about the future role of the ECtHR.
Engaging with the meaning of human dignity: looking inward and outward
Through my own research on Article 3 ECHR, I have found that engaging with the substantive meaning of dignity is not straightforward. The principal difficulty is that, in the case-law, we will never find a complete picture of what respect for dignity means. This is because conceptualisations of human dignity in law, including human rights law, are enmeshed with the concept’s social and moral ‘life’ outside of the law. Judges do not have the freedom of social or moral philosophers.[2] Building a substantive conceptualisation of human dignity is not a task that can be reasonably expected of a judicial body.
At the same time, we must decipher a fuller understanding if we seek to contribute to discussions about what dignity means and why it matters. By ‘we’, I mean scholars primarily, as well as potentially legal practitioners and others on the outside looking in, interested in making claims about future doctrinal trajectories or contributing to discussions on the future of the ECHR system. A question we must ask is, how should those who seek to work constructively with human dignity in the case-law go about discerning what this concept means in this context? This is a methodological concern that is often overlooked.
I have noted in previous work that if we simply take meanings of dignity from outside of the case-law, we are confronted with a dizzying array of theoretical conceptualisations, most of which will not follow the same path as the doctrine. Such conceptualisations of dignity sit across a range of academic discourses and disciplines and dignity’s range of meanings and functions are made up of complex, overlapping dimensions.[3] When we look outside of the case-law and venture into the wider world of dignity it is easy to get lost, and if we do find useful avenues to pursue, how should we decide which ones are the most appropriate?
A constructive approach to Strasbourg case law under Article 3
I argue that the starting objective should be to engage in an explicitly interpretive exercise that develops the meaning of dignity in a way that is reflected and anchored in Strasbourg case-law. This case-law provides an extremely rich picture of the range of experiences understood by the ECtHR to both undermine and promote respect for human dignity. Asking what dignity means in the case law differentiates this enquiry from broader explorations of dignity’s meaning in contexts beyond the ECHR, or even beyond law. I advocate a limited aim of looking inwards to help discern a meaning of dignity that makes sense within the confines of the Strasburg case-law. This demands a ‘constructive’ approach, which means bridging communication between dignity jurisprudence and dignity’s broader social meanings in a way that is enlightening but pragmatic.[4] In the context of Article 3 ECHR, I have argued that this approach, in brief summary, leads us to understand dignity as “an elemental status that can be negatively suppressed (can be the object of suppression) by, for example, injury to a sense of self-worth/destruction of a capacity for self-direction/denial of basic goods.”[5]
When we see that Article 3 interpretation by the ECtHR has applied to situations which undermine such a basic sense of dignity, it highlights that torture, inhuman and degrading treatment are constituted by the gravest of experiences. Article 3 expulsion-related cases bring these high stakes into sharp relief juxtaposed with issues of accountability. Landmark expulsion-related Article 3 judgements, right from the early cases such as Soering v. UK (1989)[6] on extradition and detention conditions while awaiting the death penalty, and D v. UK (1997)[7] on living conditions subsequent to expulsion and removal of life-sustaining medical treatment, have been most contentious because they expose “points of tension around the threshold of state responsibility, and/or the threshold of dignity’s meaning and influence”.[8] I have argued previously that the Strasbourg Court’s transparency of interpretation of Article 3 is critical to sustain perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy, noting that challenges to Article 3 can surface questions that shake the foundational integrity of the human rights system.[9] Judging from the open letter, this is not a hypothetical risk.
It may therefore be useful to render more transparent the meaning of human dignity within the body of Article 3 case-law as a way of urging reflection on why these protections matter concretely, calling on the power of the idea of dignity. Not everyone will agree that this approach has positive potential. Professor Andrea Pin, writing in this blog for example, observes rightly that “[w]ithin a polity, different people may have profoundly different views of what dignity means and entails under a certain circumstance”, making it difficult to see how useful this idea is as a focal point for debate. But that is precisely why it matters to be clear about the parameters and methodology for deciphering dignity within Article 3 ECHR case-law. We should not try to escape the fact that interpretation of Article 3 is especially important because of its close conceptual and linguistic connection to the idea of dignity. How we – and other audiences – see the meaning of dignity matters for understanding this right. And as we and others appraise the contribution of the ECHR, we should consider seriously whether more openly and consistently amplifying respect for dignity as a fundamental value, in relation to but also beyond Article 3, could be one useful way of focusing minds on what is really at stake.
Dr Elaine Webster (LLB Hons, M.A., M.A., PhD) is Reader in Human Rights Law at the University of Strathclyde. Elaine researches interpretation of rights by diverse actors and has particular interests in the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, and in environmental governance. A cross-cutting theme relates to the meaning and interpretive impact of the principle of respect for dignity, at the level of theory and practice.
[1] Ukraine and The Netherlands v. Russia [Grand Chamber] (Application nos. 8019/16, 43800/14, 28525/20, and 11055/22), 9th July 2025, para. 177.
[2] Aharon Barak, Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right. (Cambridge University Press, 2015), xvii-xviii.
[3] E Webster, ‘Interpretation of the prohibition of torture: making sense of ‘dignity’ talk’ (2016) 17 Human Rights Review, 371-390. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-016-0405-7
[4] Webster (2016).
[5] Webster (2016), 385.
[6] Soering v. United Kingdom (Application no. 14038/88), 7th July 1989.
[7] D v. United Kingdom (Application no. 30240/96), 2nd May 1997.
[8] E Webster, Dignity, Degrading Treatment and Torture in Human Rights Law: The Ends of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Routledge, 2018) 122.
[9] E Webster, ‘The Maximum Level of Transparency: Article 3 Interpretation and the Future Legitimacy of the Strasbourg Court’ (2024) 3 European Human Rights Law Review, 220-227, 224.