Posted by ccld201
4 March 2026Across the world, judges have been instrumental in making human dignity happen[1]. They have bridged the gap between the solemn promise of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that
‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and in rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’ (Article 1)
and those seeking justice for being treated as less than human. The death of Sir James, former president of the High Court Family Division, on 1 January 2026 represents an enormous loss for his family and friends, as well as for his colleagues from the judicial system and legal profession. Sir James was known for his wide-ranging expertise and gave countless judgments as a family judge who heard the stories of people in very vulnerable situations. More than once, his outrage at how people were treated could not be contained within his judgments. Sir James’ death is also a sobering reminder of the fragility of human dignity in the UK where its protection has depended almost entirely on judges[2].
Like many, I first came to know Sir James by reading his judgments. I was so intrigued by his ruling in R (on the application of A, B, X and Y) v East Sussex CC (No2) [2003] EWHC 167 (Admin) that I got in touch with him to discuss it further. Making the most of his generosity and open-mindedness, I invited him to collaborate on a small ESRC-funded research project on human dignity in the UK[3]. Below, I highlight two important dimensions of his contribution to developing human dignity in the UK.
Human dignity: ‘a vitally important principle for law’[4]
In R (on the application of A, B, X and Y) v East Sussex CC (No2), Justice Munby had to decide on the most appropriate ways for carers to lift (manually or with a hoist) two severely disabled adult sisters following the discontinuation of their care package provided by East Sussex County Council. In one of the rare judicial elaborations on human dignity to be found in the common law, Justice Munby set out the key features of human dignity:
‘[86] The first [particularly important concept] is human dignity. True it is that the phrase is not used in the Convention [ECHR] but it is surely immanent in article 8 [ECHR], indeed in almost every one of the Convention’s provisions. The recognition and protection of human dignity is one of the core values — in truth the core value — of our society and, indeed, of all the societies which are part of the European family of nations and which have embraced the principles of the Convention. It is a core value of the common law, long pre-dating the Convention and the [EU] Charter [of Fundamental Rights]. The invocation of the dignity of the patient in the form of declaration habitually used when the court is exercising its inherent declaratory jurisdiction in relation to the gravely ill or dying is not some meaningless incantation designed to comfort the living or to assuage the consciences of those involved in making life and death decisions: it is a solemn affirmation of the law’s and of society’s recognition of our humanity and of human dignity as something fundamental. Not surprisingly, human dignity is extolled in article 1 of the Charter, just as it is in article 1 of the Universal Declaration. And the latter’s call to us to “act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” is nothing new. It reflects the fourth Earl of Chesterfield’s injunction, “Do as you would be done by” and, for the Christian, the biblical call (Matthew ch 7, v 12): “ all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets” . 87. Dignity interests are also, of course, at the core of the rights protected by article 3.’ (emphasis added).
In the above extract, Sir James incisively identified some of the most important features of human dignity. (1) Its overall significance as being fundamentally connected to our humanity. Sir James eloquently emphasised elsewhere that ‘it applies to those who, for whatever reason, are physically or mentally disabled, those who are unable to communicate or to understand what is going on around them and, crucially, to those who are unaware or uncomprehending of the fact that what they are being exposed to is indignity’.[5] (2) Human dignity is deeply embedded within the law both as ‘immanent’ in the common law and ECHR and at the intersection of the absolute prohibition on dehumanising treatment under Article 3 and of the right to privacy under Article 8. (3) Human dignity can be used as a hermeneutic tool for judges to protect people in situations of extreme vulnerability when other tools, such as autonomy or privacy, cannot.
As a result, a key benefit of relying on human dignity in the A, B, X and Y case was to move the discussion beyond the antagonism between the applicants’ dignity and that of their carers to emphasise that their respective dignity could only arise from a relationship of equality and reciprocity. In other words, it is through the quality of the relationship that the humanity and dignity of both parties could be recognised. The Kantian imperative not to reduce someone to a mere object (i.e. a weight to be lifted from one place to the next) lies very close to the surface and it became more apparent in Sir James’ non-judicial writing[6]. He elaborated on this relational dimension in a later case, noting that ‘[i]t is only by considering the child’s network of relationships that their well-being can be properly considered.’[7]
Judging with dignity: ‘showing understanding, empathy and compassion’
‘At the end of the day we must treat [an incapacitated patient] with respect, as a human being, and with the dignity we would wish for ourselves. [An incapacitated patient] is not the mere passive object of paternalistic decision-making; she is someone like us.’[8]
If judges have been instrumental in making human dignity real, it must be emphasised that they do not make it up. ‘Dignity demands that in all our dealings with the vulnerable and incapacitated, we must show our respect for that person as a human being, as a unique individual, requiring of us understanding, empathy and compassion.’[9] This insightful reflection by Sir James captures both what dignity means and what judging with dignity means.
Judging with dignity requires great technical expertise in the complexity of law, a skill widely attributed to Sir James. Moreover, as evident in the above judgment, he did not use the argument of dignity as a tool of judicial overreach. Quite the contrary, as he ventured for one of the first times into this new territory, he was very careful to equip himself with the compass of ‘recognition of humanity’ of the other, and to embed human dignity deep in the common law and in the two ECHR rights most often associated with it by the European Court of Human Rights.
As a judge, Sir James was acutely aware of his structural position of power over the applicant, and he was deeply committed to ensuring that that power was not misused. Dignity, he wrote, is also about happiness. ‘What good is it making someone safer if it merely makes them miserable?’[10] In answering this crucial question he set out three dimensions of human dignity. The first is ‘process’, which requires ‘proper consultation and participation’ of all those involved in the life of the incapacitated or vulnerable person. The second promotes an inclusive understanding of best interests and welfare, to make sure that they are not weaponised. The third is about the ‘day-to-day context’ and the mundane – and yet crucial for people’s dignity – assistance with feeding and toileting. This very basic level of dignity, he observed, is lacking in hospitals and care homes which are ‘a disgrace to any country with pretentions to civilisation and which ought to shock the conscience of any decent minded person.’[11]
The UK Parliament somehow did not see fit to explicitly either endorse the UDHR dignity promise when (for instance) adopting the Human Rights Act in 1998. Neither did it see fit to retain the commitment that ‘human dignity is inviolable’ (Article 1 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) when leaving the EU[12]. In this (almost complete) dignity desert, the work of Sir James with his commitment to humanity and justice offered a welcome oasis. He and his judicial wisdom will be sorely missed.
Catherine Dupré is a professor of comparative constitutional law at the University of Exeter, and she edits the Dignity&Democracy Blog.
Picture: The Observer, 16 January 2026
[1] Aharon Barak, Human Dignity: The Constitutional Value and the Constitutional Right (CUP, 2015); Erin Daly, Dignity Rights: Courts, Constitutions and the Worth of the Human Person (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), Catherine Dupre, The Age of Dignity: Human Rights and Constitutionalism in Europe (Hart/Bloomsbury, 2015) chapter 4.
[2] Key dignity cases include Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) ex parte Adam (FC) (Respondent) Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) ex parte Limbuela (FC) (Respondent) Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Appellant) ex parte Tesema (FC) (Respondent) (Conjoined Appeals) [2005] UKHL 66; and Regina (McDonald) v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council (Age UK Intervening) [2011] UKSC 33. Opinions of Brenda Hale
[3] See the special issue that I edited at the invitation of Jonathan Cooper: (2019) European Human Rights Law Review Issue 2.
[4] James Munby, ‘Why do we ignore dignity? Some Comments’ (2019) 2 European Human Rights Law Review, 119-128, 124.
[5] J Munby (2019) 2 EHRLR, 119.
[6] J Munby (2019) 2 EHRLR, 121.
[7] Re G (Education: Religious Upbringing) [2012] EWCA Civ 1233, at para 30.
[8] J Munby, ‘What Price Dignity?’ (2010) 13 Community Care Law Review 305-312, 312.
[9] J Munby (2019) 2 EHRLR, 126
[10] A question he originally raised in Re MM; Local Authority X v MM (by the Official Solicitor) and KM [2007] EWHC 2003 (Fam), and developed in ‘Dignity, Happiness and Human Rights’ (2011) Elder Law Journal 32-38.
[11] J Munby (2019) 2 EHRLR, 127.
[12] C Dupre, ‘‘Human Dignity is Inviolable. It must be respected and protected.’: Retaining The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights after Brexit’ (2018) 2 EHRLR 101.