CPT website: https:\/\/www.coe.int\/en\/web\/cpt\/-\/council-of-europe-anti-torture-committee-cpt-carries-out-a-visit-to-azerbaijan<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On 3 July 2024, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture<\/a> and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) issued a Public Statement on Azerbaijan<\/a> in which it highlighted the \u2018outright refusal of the Azerbaijan authorities to cooperate\u2019 with it. This is not simply a point of bureaucracy, failing to communicate with the CPT or to facilitate a visit (which they also did). Lack of cooperation in this relation means that human suffering including \u2018widespread resort to physical ill-treatment (including, on occasion, torture) by the police in Azerbaijan\u2019[1]<\/a> continues with the authorities\u2019 full knowledge. The CPT\u2019s recourse to its little used Public Statement mechanism gives us pause to reflect on what it tells us not only about Azerbaijan and the CPT, but also in a wider sense about the project of human rights and state behaviour. In this blogpost, the CPT\u2019s experience is presented as a case in example of the wider theme of state cooperation and the necessary but difficult diplomatic role played by human rights bodies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Wider Issue: State non-cooperation<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Human rights progress relies on the willingness of states to comply with relevant norms, to be open to scrutiny (whether internal, external, publicly or behind closed doors) and to adapt or moderate their laws and practices as appropriate. This is not a point confined to the CPT context, or the European regional level. At the UN level, this understanding explains the approach of having for example human rights Treaty Bodies<\/a> in place, Special Procedures<\/a> mandates, and the Universal Periodic Review<\/a>. At national level, it accounts for the role played by National Human Rights Institutions<\/a> (NHRIs), or in the torture prevention context specifically, National Preventive Mechanisms<\/a>. Azerbaijan is the latest in a list of states that is demonstrating no such willingness, but it is certainly not alone. Russia is discussed below. Other examples of the necessity for state buy-in (albeit in a juridical context) can be found here<\/a> and here<\/a>. The vital question is what can or should be done in such circumstances?<\/p>\n\n\n\n The CPT and Cooperative Dialogue<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The CPT is an interdisciplinary non-judicial body of experts within the Council of Europe (CoE) whose mandate is the prevention of torture and ill-treatment, including by the improvement of standards of treatment and conditions of detained people.[2]<\/a> Mandated under the 1987 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment<\/a> (ECPT) which entered into force in 1989, the CPT has access and undertakes regular preventive visits to places of detention[3]<\/a> across all ECPT States Parties: namely, all Council of Europe states and the Russian Federation. The preventive approach is built on two central pillars of confidentiality and cooperation. Accordingly, the CPT\u2019s visits form the basis for confidential, cooperative dialogue between the state and the CPT.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Confidentiality of information and exchanges[4]<\/a> supports states\u2019 ability to discuss any challenges or short-comings openly with the CPT, away from public scrutiny. Following a visit the CPT transmits its report to the state, including any recommendations for improvement in the protection, conditions and treatment of detained people.[5]<\/a> The state should reply to this and for any \u2018immediate observations\u2019[6]<\/a> (concerns to be immediately addressed), it must do so swiftly, according to the timeframe set out by the CPT. Engagement in dialogue is an aspect of cooperation required under Article 3 ECPT.<\/p>\n\n\n\n States early began authorising the publication of visit reports and their government\u2019s responses and although often after a considerable (years long) delay, the practice is normalized. Indeed a number of states (16 to date) have agreed to the \u2018automatic publication procedure\u2019<\/a>. Whereas Russia and Azerbaijan at one point became conspicuous as the only states not to have authorised publication. Hence there is a perceptible difference in states\u2019 willingness to be transparent.[7]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Crucially, these are dialogues and relationships forged over years. Based on its findings the CPT makes recommendations to states, and state cooperation requires them to improve the situation in the light of the CPTs recommendations.[8]<\/strong><\/a> <\/em>It is thus very apparent to the CPT when this cooperative requirement is not being met.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When Cooperation Fails<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In all of the CPT\u2019s visiting history, which began in 1990, the CPT has so far made only 11 Public Statements<\/a>, on the situations in: Turkey (1992, 1996); Russian Federation (2001, 2003, 2007, 2019); Greece (2011); Bulgaria (2015, 2021); Belgium (2017), and Azerbaijan (2024). Public Statements are treated by the CPT as a last resort: the final point in a process, when even urgent high-level talks are perceived by the CPT to have failed. They are issued under Article 10(2) ECPT when the state \u2018fails to cooperate or refuses to improve the situation\u2019. They therefore signal not only that there are serious issues pertaining to torture and\/or ill-treatment within the state but more precisely, that the state is not willing to address them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One clue a Public Statement is being considered is reference in CPT documents to high-level talks accompanied with a nod to Article 10(2). In the CPT\u2019s 33rd<\/sup> Annual Report from 2023<\/a> for example, we see this twice: for Lithuania and Greece.[9]<\/a> For many states, the possibility of a Public Statement may be sufficient encouragement to redouble their efforts. Not so, it seems, for Azerbaijan.[10]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Diplomacy and Dialogue<\/u><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The release of a Public Statement is not the end of diplomacy. The CPT\u2019s approach is always to emphasize positive points, including in dialogue with a state that is not fully cooperative. The latest Public Statement frames \u2018several major improvements in \u2026 two prison establishments\u2019 as evidence \u2018the Azerbaijani authorities can make significant progress.\u2019[11]<\/a> It can be questioned whether Azerbaijan was ever fully committed to improving, but this may not be entirely fair since it did after all ratify inter alia the Statute of the Council of Europe<\/a>,[12]<\/a> the European Convention on Human Rights<\/a> (ECHR), and the ECPT.[13]<\/a> Whilst the latter two ratifications may have been a precondition of Council of Europe (CoE) membership, they still occurred.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moreover, improvements and the decisions eventually to publish reports, including six in one day in 2018<\/a>, – admittedly, only a few months after high-level talks<\/a>, – demonstrate some cooperation. It can be added to this list that in 2009 Azerbaijan ratified the UN Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture<\/a> (OPCAT) opening itself to the same level of visiting access from a UN body, the Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture (SPT) as it had already to the CPT. As a requirement of the OPCAT, also in 2009, Azerbaijan designated a National Preventive Mechanism<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, as the CPT\u2019s Public Statement and its visit reports<\/a> make clear, a number of vital, long-standing recommendations have remained unimplemented. Not noted by the CPT, but significant is that the SPT suspended its own visit to Azerbaijan<\/a> in September 2014 due to lack of cooperation. That visit was made again in April 2015, but further details are not in the public domain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to the 2024 Azerbaijan Public Statement, the point when the state stopped responding positively, or at all, to dialogue with the CPT coincides directly with wider CoE politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018[O]n 26 January 2024, two days after decision<\/a> by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) not to ratify the credentials of the Azerbaijani delegation to PACE, the authorities informed the CPT that the high-level talks were cancelled without explanation.\u2019[14]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n PACE did this citing Azerbaijan\u2019s failure to fulfil \u2018major commitments\u2019. For the CPT however, which may have preferred to continue its dialogue, complete silence ensued. This has impeded the CPT\u2019s ability to revisit the state, leaving it comparably in the dark about the situation on the ground.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The CPT has expressed its full commitment \u2018to continuing dialogue\u2019[15]<\/a> with Azerbaijan and observes that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2018priority should be on implementing the CPT\u2019s long-standing recommendations regarding the manner in which persons in the custody of law enforcement agencies are treated in Azerbaijan. Progress observed during the 2022 ad hoc visit in the implementation of the Committee\u2019s recommendations regarding prisons demonstrates that this is possible provided there is the political will.\u2019[16]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Since PACE\u2019s decision, which had the effect of suspending Azerbaijan\u2019s Parliamentary delegation from participating in PACE, it seems political appetite for even partial cooperation has evaporated. There are even suggestions that Azerbaijan is considering withdrawing from the CoE and ECHR if that participation is not restored, discussed here<\/a>. The experience of Russia is that in spite of leaving the CoE it remains party to the ECPT<\/a>, but it remains to be seen whether this is meaningful in practice: the CPT has not conducted a visit to Russia since this happened. It does tell us something of the CPT\u2019s thinking however: that it is better the state remains party to the ECPT, with at least the possibility of oversight and the hope of cooperation towards improvement, than that it leaves it altogether.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Whether other human rights bodies with comparable issues of state cooperation would do the same is context-driven and of course options are likely, as here, to be limited. The CPT for its part, places its faith in dialogue and diplomacy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It can only be hoped now that Azerbaijan will find the willingness to re-engage, and committedly, to the improvement of treatment and conditions of detained people in its jurisdiction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [1]<\/a> Azerbaijan Public Statement CPT\/Inf (2024) 24, para. 4.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [2]<\/a> For a detailed examination of the CPT and its work see Bicknell, Evans and Morgan, \u2018Preventing Torture in Europe\u2019 (Council of Europe, 2018).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [3]<\/a> A term which encompasses many different contexts including police stations, prisons, immigration detention, psychiatric detention and social care homes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [4]<\/a> Article 11, ECPT.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [5]<\/a> Article 10(1), ECPT.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [6]<\/a> Article 8(5)<\/p>\n\n\n\n [7]<\/a> Book, p.54<\/p>\n\n\n\n [8]<\/a> A phrase consistently rehearsed through CPT Reports, and which reflects the wording in Article 10(2) ECPT when cooperation fails.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [9]<\/a> For which it respectively \u2018set in motion\u2019 and \u2018open[ed] the procedure\u2019 under Article 10(2).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [10]<\/a> In the case of Azerbaijan, the CPT\u2019s Annual Report that indicates high-level talks made no reference to the procedure. It is indicated clearly in the state report however, which the CPT published alongside its Public Statement, as a process commenced in July 2023. See CPT\/Inf (2024) 23<\/a>, para. 7.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [11]<\/a> Azerbaijan Public Statement CPT\/Inf (2024) 24, para. 4.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [12]<\/a> Ratified 25 January 2001<\/p>\n\n\n\n [13]<\/a> Both ratified on 15 April 2002<\/p>\n\n\n\n [14]<\/a> Azerbaijan Public Statement CPT\/Inf (2024) 24, para. 6.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [15]<\/a> Azerbaijan Public Statement CPT\/Inf (2024) 24, para. 16.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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