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P E G A S U S

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NOBODY'S MERRIMENT

The short article in the last issue of Pegasus (1) on a possible reference to a passage from Ovid's Ars Amatoria in Shakespeare's Hamlet reminded me of a phrase in the bard's Henry the Fourth (Part Two) which caught my eye several years ago. The scene is the Boar's Head Tavern in Eastcheap, favourite drinking-place of Sir John Falstaff who has not yet arrived. Francis has just ordered a fellow (unnamed) drawer to cover up some apple-johns (withered apples) from the sight of the approaching Falstaff who is known not to like them. Then Francis reveals to a third drawer that Henry, Prince of Wales, and Poins will soon be arriving and must wear the disguise of jerkins and aprons so that they may not be recognised by Falstaff. Then the third drawer utters the lines which I intend to study:

> By the mass, here will be old utis;
> it will be an excellent stratagem.
>
> 2 Henry IV, 2, iv.

The word in which I am most interested is, of course, 'utis'. Dictionaries and glossaries agree in taking the word to be *utis (or *utas) from the early French 'utaves' which was derived from the plural 'oitauves', a corruption of the Latin 'octava'. The meaning of *utis is generally taken to be 'The octave or eight days of a feast'; hence 'merriment, festivity'. What, then, is the point of using 'utis' here? Obviously the apple-johns are viewed as representing the feast to bring merriment. But surely the last topic was the plan to hide Prince Henry and Poins from Falstaff? And anyway surely the covering over of the apple-johns could not be called a 'stratagem' in the next line? That there are problems in the traditional interpretation of 'utis' presents a justification in suggesting a fresh answer which has a place in a classical magazine.

The effect of these two lines is to summarise the longer statement of Francis so that the audience fully understands what is happening. And what is happening is that Prince Henry and Poins are going to assume a disguise to deceive Falstaff. But can 'utis' mean a 'disguise'? Not according to the dictionary. But surely 'disguise' and 'utis', even if unconnected in meaning by etymology, do strike a note of compatibility to anyone who has read the Odyssey?

In the ninth book Odysseus tells of his voyage from Troy and how he came to the land of the Cyclopes. With a band of his men Odysseus went ashore and found the Cyclops Polyphemus in a cave. However, Polyphemus succeeded in trapping Odysseus and his men in the cave by pushing a huge stone, which no mortal could move, across the entrance, thus rendering useless any attempt to kill the monster while the stone remained in place. Polyphemus asked Odysseus his name, but the latter would not reply until the monster had taken an excess of wine, and then he revealed that his name was 'Οὖτις ' - 'Nobody'. Then Odysseus and such of his men as had not been devoured by the monster plunged a stake into Polyphemus' lone eye. In his panic and anger Polyphemus threw open the entrance and called on his brother Cyclopes to come to his aid. But they ignored him thinking that he was mad when he replied to their questioning that he was being done to death by 'Nobody's treachery'. Whereupon Polyphemus took up his position by the entrance and stretched out both arms in the hope of catching Odysseus and his men as they tried to slip out among the sheep which were kept in the cave. In such a situation Odysseus lived up to his epithet of 'many-wiled' and hit upon the plan of lashing his men

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(1) M. J. Handscomb, An Ovid reminiscence in Shakespeare, Pegasus X, p.3.

beneath the sheep and himself clinging beneath a ram. Polyphemus stroked the back of every sheep as it went out to pasture, but omitted to feel underneath the creatures and thus Odysseus and his men escaped.

Such was the stratagem which Odysseus employed consisting of a disguise in the form of sheep's wool which could be referred to in the same breath as the drawer's exclamation on the deception to be practised upon Falstaff. Indeed although even the OED (1933) records the form 'utis', every example on which it draws has the form 'utas'. The only instance of 'utis' itself is in the writings of Porson who lived a couple of centuries later and who was using the Worcestershire dialect form 'utis' meaning 'noise, confusion, din' (1) which would obviously be an unsuitable meaning here. I do not intend to enter a vast digression upon whether Shakespeare's 'small Latin and less Greek' would include a knowledge of 'Οὖτις ' - the fact that elsewhere the bard makes classical references of an abstruse kind shows the futility of any such pursuit. Certainly George Chapman, who made the first translation of the Odyssey into English in 1612, does not keep the Greek form, but prefers 'No-man', so that the argument that Shakespeare saw a rough draft of a translation of Plutarch when he wrote Antony and Cleopatra cannot be applied here although it is quite possible that he discussed the matter with the translator himself. Certainly Chapman uses the word 'stratagem' only two pages after the first appearance of 'no-man'. Of course none of this is conclusive evidence that the traditional interpretation of 'utis' is incorrect - but is there any more evidence to accept 'utis' as meaning 'merriment' in the first place? If not, then does not the use of 'stratagem' after 'utis' suggest that the reference is to Homer and not the pointless one to an eight-day festival of merriment?

T. J. HUNT

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(1) as in Joseph Wright's English Dialect Dictionary, 1898

IT COULDN'T HAPPEN HERE

An Experiment

In December 1956, a Charter of Incorporation was issued by the Queen, establishing 'in Our City and County of the City of Exeter' a University by the name and style of "The University of Exeter". The Charter has since been reprinted in every issue of the University of Exeter Calendar and is thus easily available to most of my readers. Section 3 deals with the objects of the University, and its first paragraph (a) reads:

> To provide to the full extent which its resources from time to time permit for research and instruction in the humanities and sciences and other spheres of learning and knowledge of a standard and thoroughness required and expected of a University of the highest standing and to secure the advancement of knowledge the diffusion and extension of Arts, Sciences and Learning and the provision of a Liberal and Professional Education.

The present writer has always maintained that, as far as this section of the Charter is concerned, and in its special application to the Arts subject known as the Classics, on which alone he is qualified to pronounce any judgement, the 'full extent to which its resources from time to time permit' has been far from fully used. Exeter conditions of research - twelve years after the issuing of the Royal Charter and forty-six years after the foundation of the University College of the South-West, still hardly permit its Classical scholars and research students to reach, by the use of local resources alone, 'a standard of thoroughness required and expected of a University of the highest standing'. By using local resources only, the Classical student in Exeter could not, with the best will and the greatest talents in the world, 'secure the advancement of knowledge' and 'the diffusion and extension of Arts, Science and Learning' (all three nouns applicable to one or other aspects of Classical studies). The reason is simple: most of the advances made in his subjects, especially those made by scholars of former generations or by foreign scholars, never reach him in Exeter. This, one hardly needs to say, is not due to difficulties in transport. In order to follow up the advancements made in his subject, the Classical student nowadays has no need to go to international book fairs and to correspond widely with colleagues in other countries who could tell him of work done by their local friends and colleagues. The academic book trade is well organised now, and anything missed in the catalogues can be found, two or three years later, in the Année Philologique, that annual bibliographical publication which lists almost anything printed in any department of Classical studies anywhere in the world, year by year. All that the Classical scholar needs nowadays is a library which obtains, to the full extent which its resources permit, all these new publications in the various fields of his ever-expanding subject. It is a common fallacy to assume that only the scientist cannot risk being out of date. Of course, much in the Classics does not get outdated as soon as some scientific publications, and some Classical books never become completely outdated. But this means that, whereas a scientist, founding a new department, or institution, or university, has only to provide himself with the most important recent publications, the Classical scholar has to be provided with much of the fruits of Classical scholarship of the last four centuries, as well as the more recent publications: texts, commentaries, handbooks, new works of interpretation, epigraphical and papyrological publications, new dictionaries - to name but a few classes of materials published every year. That is, the Classical section of any library which claims even to approach 'a standard and thoroughness required and expected of a University of the highest standing' should be acquiring thousands and thousands of books and periodical publications a year, just to keep up with new developments. If, as in our present case, the library has only been there for a few decades,

it should, in addition to it, try to fill as many gaps as it can in works of scholarship published before its time - especially those of the nineteenth century. That this is not happening in 'a University of the highest standing' like Exeter is no secret, and I believe that I could not be sued under any Official Secrets Act if I disclosed the simple fact that most of our science departments are given far, far greater grants for books and periodicals, apart from the vast amounts of money they receive for scientific tools and equipment for research purposes.

In an article published in PEGASUS 7 (p.27), I wrote: 'A scientist in Exeter (or so I am told by some of my scientific colleagues), can start and finish most of his experiments, even in some advanced parts of his subject, in Exeter, and with the facilities available in Exeter itself. For the Classicist- and the Byzantinist - the instruments available for his 'experiments' are books and periodicals. At present he has to go to better places to finish off his experiments - if he is a Classicist - or to start them - if he is a Byzantinist'. The very few advancements made since in library conditions in Exeter have not changed this general picture, and the following little experiment was made in order to show this.

It is an experiment that could, for a change, be taken in Exeter, since its subject was the possibility of certain research undertakings in Classics under present Exeter conditions. In other words, it was an experiment on experiments, and such a sophisticated undertaking should be possible in a University of the highest standing. The way it was conducted was as simple as it could be, and would not take more than a few minutes in the Library. Like most decent scientific experiments, it can be repeated with other materials. The results, I should think, will always be very much the same.

I took two books in two different departments of Classical studies, both written by an expert in a University with more decent resources than Exeter, and both incorporating, to a greater or lesser degree, some of the work done by predecessors in the field. I was careful not to choose for my experiment books which are too technical or on a very rare and recherché subject, or books which are only intended for the very few experts. A work with a title like 'The Greek Manuscripts of Plato in the Libraries of Venice' can obviously be written only by an expert who has resided in Venice for years. Books on 'The Spelling of Latin Literary Works in the Late Republic' would have a somewhat limited appeal, and can only be written in a major library well equipped with the latest epigraphical evidence. What I had in mind were Classical books of a more ordinary type, those constantly used by scholars and undergraduates whatever their more specialized interests. In short: I looked for books in fairly large demand, of the sort that is being constantly written and revised to make room for recent advances in the subject; books which many an ordinary Classical scholar in an ordinary university would be expected to turn out from time to time. The idea was to see how much of this type of books could be written by a Classical scholar residing permanently in Exeter, without the constant need to escape to decent libraries for as long as his professional and private commitments allow.

The obvious kind of books answering to this description would naturally include commentaries on some of the more central Greek and Latin texts, and handbooks on some of the more central topics in Greek and Latin literature and history. Commentaries tend to get somewhat antiquated as more and more research on the respective author and text is being produced. Madvig's commentary on the De Finibus is still a great masterpiece, and a decent scholar should make its acquqintance sooner or later. But much has been done on various topics related to that book since Madvig published his second edition in 1872, and for the modern reader, a new commentary would be necessary. The same applies to handbooks on various subjects, and many of them are constantly being

revised and rewritten to incorporate recent research. Thus we are made quite familiar with commentaries like Jahn-Kroll on some Ciceronian writings, and revised editions like George Thomson's new Oresteia - or with handbooks like Kühner-Gerth, Christ-Schmid-Stählein and Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr. For my present experiment, I have chosen Professor E. R. Dodds' Commentary on the Bacchae of Euripides, Second Edition, Oxford 1960, and M. L. W. Laistner's The Greater Roman Historians, California 1947. Both are 'ordinary' in the sense that they are intended for the widest Classical audience. Both are constantly used in Exeter. Dodds is on the list of books to be used for students reading Euripides as a Set Author in their first or second year, and for the Literary Form course in the third year. Laistner is included in the reading list for Latin Literature in Part I, and is constantly being mentioned to students writing essays on anything connected with Roman historiography.

To assess how much of these books could be written under Exeter conditions is not a task which can be fulfilled to perfection. Many factors which lie behind the composition of such books cannot be measured in detail. These include, for example, the amount of general wide reading on the subject done by the author which is not mentioned in detail in the book; the opportunity to enjoy the company of other experts whom one can always consult; and the intelligent student audience whom the author meets year after year in his teaching hours, and who help him to feel how he ought to 'set the tone' of the book. But there is one thing that can be measured: the books and articles actually quoted in the course of the work concerned. Since my experiment is mainly negative: to show what cannot be done here, this might give one enough of an indication.

It would be tedious to go through a whole book, listing every simple reference, and then, and only then, checking them all. Tedious and unscientific. For the scientist tends to investigate a sample and, provided it is a fairly random sample, he can then draw conclusions for the whole. In the same manner, I have chosen two samples: Dodds' commentary on the first 61 lines of the Bacchae, pp. 61-71 of his 1960 edition, and the books and articles mentioned in Laistner's notes to Chapter I of his book, pp. 165-6. I have omitted from my list two categories of books. First, texts in their various editions, since most texts are available in some editions in most libraries, and since we are concerned with work on the interpretation of the texts. (But I hasten to add that, had I made the same experiment on the various editions of the various texts used by Dodds, the result as to the availability of most of them in Exeter would not be enough to cheer up most of my readers). The second category contains modern non-Classical publications, used mainly by Laistner to illustrate some general points. One could write a book of Roman historiography without Carlyle's Frederick the Great or an 1864 issue of the Saturday Review. With this reservation, we proceed to our lists.

A. Dodds, Commentary on Bacchae 1-61:

(a) Books:

1. A. B. Cook, Zeus.
2. Kretschmer, Aus der Anomia.
3. Calder, Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua.
4. Jeanmaire, Dionysos.
5. Kitto, Greek Tragedy.
6. Kühner-Gerth.
7. Zielinski, Tragodoumena.
8. Goodwin, Moods and Tenses.
9. A. C. Crawley, Dress, Drink and Drums.
10. Frickenhaus, Lenäenvasen.
11. Oxyrhynchus Papyri, vol. XIII.

Availability in Exeter: Numbers 2, 3, 4, 7, 9 and 10 on this list are not available in Exeter University Library (No.11 has only been acquired six months ago). That is: 6 out of 11 books not available.

(b) Periodical Articles:

1. Usener in Rheinisches Museum xxix.
2. Mesk in Viener Studien lv, 1937.
3. Prato in Maia ix, 1957.
4. Kitto in The Classical Review lx, 1946.
5. Campbell in The Classical Quarterly xlix, 1956.
6. Longo in Antiquitas I, 1946.

7a Platnauer in The Classical Review lvi, 1942.

7b. Harrison in the same vol. of same periodical (and therefore counts as the same from the point of view of availability).

8. Deichgräber in Hermes lxx.
9. Kamerbeek in Mnemosyne 1948.
10. Dalmeyda in Revue des Etudes Grecques xxviii, 1915.
11. Lawler in Memoirs of the American Academy of Rome, vi, 1927.

Availability: Of these 11 articles, only three vols. are available in Exeter: nos. 4, 5 and 7 (a and b, since both are in the same volume).

B. Laistner, Notes to Chapter I of The Greater Roman Historians.

(a) Books:

1. G. L. Barber, The Historian Ephorus.
2. A. Aymard, Les premiers rapports de Rome et de la Confédération achaienne.
3. Paul Scheller, De hellenistica historiae conscribendae arte.
4. E. Burck, Die Erzählungskunst des T. Livius.
5. R. von Scala, Die Studien des Polybius.
6. K. Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie.
7. Graf Uxkull-Gylleband, Griechische Kultur-Entstehungen.

Availability: None.

(b) Articles in Periodicals:

1. Rostovtzeff in Klio 16, 1920.
2. C. F. Edson in Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 46, 1935.
3. B. L. Ullmann in TAPA 73, 1942.
4. Hirzel in Abhandl.d.sächs. Gesellscaht der Wiss. 1900

Availability: None.

We can now try to come to some conclusions. In the case of the Bacchae, six out of eleven books and eight out of eleven volumes of periodicals were not available in Exeter. That is, about 55% of the books and 72% of the articles used by Dodds for this small section of his commentary would not have been available to him in Exeter library conditions. In the case of Laistner, the lack of books and periodicals is total. I am prepared not to draw any conclusions from Laistner, and to assume (though God only knows why I should do so) that perhaps one should not expect every 'University of the highest standing' to provide materials for a disquisition upon such a remote and ineffectual topic as Hellenistic Historiography. Euripides' Bacchae, however, is a much more central topic for all students of ancient literature, religion and philosophy. The whole play contains 1392 lines, which is about 23 times the number of lines in my sample section. Assuming that some of the books and articles listed above would naturally recur in other parts of the commentary, I shall multiply

the number of missing items by, say, 15 rather than 23. This will still mean that, for a Classical scholar trying to write a commentary of this sort in Exeter, 90 books and 120 volumes of periodicals will be missing. This, I can now remind my readers, does not include a large number of old editions - and of course it does not include work on some of the actual manuscripts, spread over many European libraries, some of which has to be done on the spot. Those acquainted with inter-library arrangements will realise that it would be impossible to obtain all 210 missing volumes for the use of one person, and even more impossible to keep them together for constant reference over the years as one writes and rewrites the various portions of one's commentary. It took Professor Dodds some years to write his commentary on the Bacchae. Under Exeter conditions, he could only work on most of it while away in the greater libraries during his vacations. Assume now that it actually took Dodds five years to write his book. Assume that he had been living in Exeter, in the best material conditions, with private means and no family commitments, so that he could go to Oxford and work on his commentary every minute of his vacations. The vacations in Exeter, put together, amount to about 40% of the year. That is, what our commentator could do in Oxford in five years would, in the best case, take him ten years in Exeter - or rather, on the occasions when he could get away from Exeter. The fact that some of the materials are available here could be overlooked. It is easily counterbalanced by the fact that most lecturers cannot afford to spend their whole vacations away, and by the consideration that, for many a fresh point, one needs to refer again to books and articles used before. In a library which contains less than half the items needed for reference, the writing of a commentary of this sort would become a torture.

But it <u>has</u> taken Mr. Barrett, in Oxford, fifteen years to write his Commentary on the Hippolytus? So it did - and Barrett's commentary is done on a much more ambitious scale than Dodds'. But, apart from any other considerations, one could simply say that it would, in that case, have taken Barrett about 37 years to write the same book in Exeter.

I can only think of one other objection: classical scholars <u>have</u>, in practice, written and published while in Exeter. What about the late W. F. Jackson Knight and his many books?

The answer is simple. Roman Vergil was the only book written by Jackson Knight while in Exeter, which claimed to advance original views, sum up former results, and make a new contribution to the subject. Much of this book incorporates materials already published by Mr. Knight while he was a teacher in Bloxham, within easy reach of Oxford and its libraries; and I have it on the author's own evidence that, before he wrote the final version of the book in the early 1940's, he spent a whole summer in the Bodleian Library working at the recent contributions to Virgilian studies, checking references, looking at old editions and discussing matters with colleagues. It is significant that, before he came to Exeter, Mr. Knight had already published three books. Since then, he published one long book, partly incorporating his earlier studies, and confined himself to publishing articles. On his death, he left the first version of two other books in typescript. Both of them were not published in his lifetime for various reasons. But I suspect that one of them was, that he had no conditions for checking references and reading more recent literature, to make these books look more like Roman Vergil. Mr. Knight's colleagues in Exeter, over the last twenty years or so, have most of them published a fair amount. But most of it is confined to articles. The reason is simple: it <u>is</u> feasible for an Exeter man, by using inter-library loans and going away for long periods to deal satisfactorily with a more narrow subject and complete an article, even a fairly long one, on it. But the prospect of undertaking a major project like writing a commentary on a text, or a handbook, or any other large-scale work, is so daunting, that no Classical

book has been written in Exeter University since the publication of Roman Vergil.

I have preached long enough in the first part of this essay. Let me just conclude by saying that the above experiment has shown how much, in my own subject, an institution which is supposed to be 'a University of the highest standing' has done 'to secure the advancement of knowledge' and 'the diffusion and extension of Arts, Science and Learning'.

J. GLUCKER

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A PIECE CONCERNING PROFESSOR F. W. CLAYTON, HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS, PUBLISHED - BY SHEER COINCIDENCE, OF COURSE - DURING HIS YEAR'S LEAVE OF ABSENCE,

- in which the poet bewails the absence of the Professor from Exeter.

A new version of Kallimakhos, Epigram ii (Pfeiffer)

They told me, Liverpudlus, they told me you were Fred;
They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed.
I wept, as I remember'd, how often you and I
Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the sky.

But now that thou art taking, my dear old King's Coll guest,
Though using thy grey matter, a well-deservèd rest,
Still are thy pleasant planets, thy nights and gales awake,
For Leave, it taketh all away, but them he cannot take.

[The translator wishes to remain anonymous; what a hope! He is indebted for felicitous touches to Mr. D. J. **th*rs and to Dr. *. N. B*k*r. He hopes that this rendering will falsify the remark at the end of the note on this epigram in The Oxford Book of Greek Verse in Translation, p.748.]

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STOP PRESS

Mr. Enoch Powell (writes our political correspondent) wishes to issue a formal denial of the rumour that he intends to return to classical scholarship. The story originated when he bought at a well-known London bookseller's what he took to be a book on immigration, entitled "Ho! Race!". On discovering that the volume contained only Latin poetry, he returned it. He also wishes to deny that he has cancelled his account at Blackwell's, and states that he cannot imagine how such an extraordinary rumour could have gained credence.

KING JOHN Act V Sc. 1.

ΝΟ. ἄκουε δὴ· πᾶσ' ἐνδέδωκεν Ἀττίκη
πλὴν Σούνιόν γε· χὡς ἄν εὐμένης ξένος
πόλις δέδεκται τὸν μετ' Εὐμόλμον στράτον.
πρόμοι δ'ἀπῆλθον σοὶ μὲν οὐ κατήκοοι
ἔχθρᾳ δὲ συμμαχοῦντες, ἄριθμος οὐ πόλυς,
ἄνω κάτω φοιτῶσιν ἔμπληκτοι φόβῳ
ΒΑ. ἆρ' οὐχ ὑποστρέφουσιν εἰς ἐμ' οἱ πρόμοι
ἣν γνῶσ' ἔτι ζῶν κεῖνο φίλτατον τέκνον;
ΝΟ. οὐκ ἐστιν· ἐρριφθέντα γὰρ θανόντα τε
ηὗρόν νιν ὥσπερ τινα κένην θήκην ἀφ' ἧς
ἁγαλμ' ἐμάρφθη χερὶ μιαιφονωτάτῃ.

Bas. All Kent hath yielded: nothing there holds out
But Dover Castle: London hath receiv'd,
Like a kind host, the Dauphin and his powers:
Your nobles will not hear you but are gone
To offer service to your enemy;
And wild amazement hurries up and down
The little number of your doubtful friends.
King J. Would not my Lords return to me again,
After they heard young Arthur was alive?
Bas. They found him dead and cast into the streets.
An empty casket, where the jewel of life
By some damn'd hand was robbed and ta'en away.

RICHARD J. MORRIS.

LETTER FROM ODYSSEUS TO PENELOPE

Non sine laetitia, coniunx carissima, legi
  Scripta tua cara garrula facta manu.
Non sine laetitia disco te, grata, valere
  Attamen in verbis - heu mihi! - luctus adest
Voce fera scribis. Dicis me velle manere
  Coniugis et credis posse perire fidem.
"Ipse veni" scribis, "noli rescribere quicquam",
  Hoc superi cedant: ipse venire volo.
Nam moror invitus. palor trans aequora semper
  Fataque regressus nunc inimica vetant.
Me voluit Circe, voluit retinere Calypso
  Usque tamen dulcis vincis utramque deam.
Quid referam falsas sirenes monstraque ponti?
  Quid referam duri lurida regna dei?
Dira tuli. Sed adhuc servat me splendida Pallas
  Te servet Pallas - sit tibi firma fides.
Iamque vale coniunx me spectatura. Secundent
  Laertesque senex Telemachusque puer.

RICHARD MORRIS.

GODS, GRAVES AND SCHOLARS

1

In "The White Goddess" Robert Graves develops the theory of 'analēptic thought', which he broadly defines as "the intuitive recovery of forgotten facts by means of a deliberate suspension of time", differing from a dream or trance in that the rational mind continues its critical processes throughout. A similar suspension of temporal criteria (technically "prolēpsis"), he suggests to be the true source both of artistic activity and of scientific discoveries of genius. Graves instances the case of the Irish mathematician, William Rowan Hamilton (1805-65), to whom, while crossing Phoenix Park, Dublin, occurred the mathematical theory of "quaternions" in the system of linear algebra, the validity of which was only being affirmed by conventional means a century later. From his own experiences, he illustrates his intuitive solving of the riddles from the Celtic "Hanes Taliesin" poem which occasioned "The White Goddess". He solves the "Unspeakable Name" of the Hebrew God, written for security reasons "JAHWEH"; and the enigma of the beast whose number is 666, from the Revelation of St. John; also the mystery of the emperor Claudius' death, his suggestion being that he was poisoned by the same species of gourd as is used in II Kings 4, 38-41. Intuitive thought can easily be confused with mere guessing from inadequate evidence, and for this reason it is to be doubted whether results thus reached will achieve even consideration at the hands of orthodox scholars.

2

Inductive reasoning falls notoriously wide of the mark when it is applied to the study of culture, ancient or modern, precisely because culture is a living organism, and as such is constantly being created: and when the sociological unit ceases to exist, either the culture is assimilated into a surviving tradition, insofar as it is capable, or it ceases to exist. It is the function of the analytical critic to describe and systematise: to attain this end he must isolate one lonely moment from the culture's continual evolution and regard this as unchanging and immutable; the result thus obtained is only true for that infinitesimal moment and is superseded the next. Graves' theory of intuitive thought involves a suspension of all temporal criteria - the "now" of existence becomes meaningless, and the sea of culture ceases heaving the becomes apprehensible as a unity. It is only through this sense, the intuitive, that the unity of culture may be grasped as unity, and not as an isolated fragment.

3

Graves explains, in an essay entitled "What food the centaurs ate", a a new theory of Dionysiac inspiration: wine and ivy beer were, indeed, drunk by the followers of Dionysus, but not for the purpose of intoxication, rather to wash down the fiery taste of the mushroom "amanita muscaria". The effects of this drug are hallucinations, erotic energy, immense muscular strength, and often the illusion of having travelled thousands of miles - all this phrenetic activity is followed by a period of complete inertia. Later, this mushroom became the secret food of the Eleusinian mystery cult. "Amanita muscaria" (fly amanite) a scarlet-capped, white-spotted mushroom growing in coniferous

or birch woods, appears throughout Europe: its ritual use is recorded in the orgies of the Korjak tribe of Siberia; another hallucinogenic mushroom, "psilocybe", has traditionally been taken in devotion to Tlaloc, their mushroom god, by the Masatec indians of Oaxaca province, Mexico.

Graves lists the following as evidence: in many parts of modern Europe there is a demonstrable aversion from eating the many types of edible mushroom other than the common "agaric campestris"; this would suggest that there once was a taboo upon mushroom eating, possibly in origin springing from their ritual use in the Eleusinian mysteries; such a taboo would also account for their being no mention of them in Pre-Hellenistic Greek literature. Since mushrooms proverbially were the food of the gods (according to Nero, at least, in a cruel jest about Claudius' mode of departure), and so was "ambrosia", we are asked to consider the following lists of ingredients of "ambrosia" and "nectar", from the "Greek Grammarians" (unspecified):-

ἀμβροσία	μέλι	νέκταρ	μέλι
	ὕδωρ		ὕδωρ
	καρπός		καρπός
	ἔλαιος		
	τυρός		
	ἄλφιτα		

the initial letter of each word (reading downwards) spells out, in both cases, a word reminiscent of the Greek μύκης (mushroom) - an example of the ogham devide of spelling a secret word by using the initials of ordinary words: Graves suggests that these formulae were in some way connected with the initiatory catechism of the mystery cult at Eleusis. There are possibly three representations of hallucinogenic mushrooms in classical art (a) a bas-relief of the Fifth century B.C. found in Pharsalus in Thessaly, exhibited in the Louvre, Paris (no. 701) displaying Persephone and Demeter about to eat "amanita muscaria" mushrooms - publishing, according to Graves' argument, a closely concealed ritual secret. (b) a vase painting (circa 630 B.C.) of Nessus being killed by Heracles, showing the slender, upright, mildly hallucinatory mushroom "panaeolus papilionaceus". (c) the reverse of an archaistic Etruscan mirror (4th or 3rd century B.C.) showing the torture of Ixion bound to a fire-wheel, with twining ivy around the perimeter, between Ixion's feet is an "amanita muscaria". The fire-wheel, to which was tied a hissing wryneck, was used in antiquity as a love charm; the mushroom symbolises coition. Ixion was a notorious sexual delinquent, and it is possible that he was being tortured for the same crime as that of Tantalus, that of sharing the "food of the gods" with mortals.

4.

The evidence is open to criticism at very many points, and yet the complete rejection of all the evidence does not necessarily destroy the validity of the theory. What is needed now is more evidence.

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2. "What food the centaurs ate" an essay from "steps" - Robert Graves, Cassell 1958

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GREEK SCEPTICISM

The Sceptics, in common with the post-Aristotelian schools, looked to the Presocratics for support for their views, and made use of the recognition of the limits of human knowledge found in the majority of them. A favourite quotation was from Xenophanes: 'There never was, nor will be, a man who has certain knowledge about the gods, and about all of which I speak; even if one should chance to say the complete truth, yet one knows it not, but opinion is over all.' The sceptics interpreted this in a comparison of the search for truth to taking a shot in the dark, where even if the target were hit one would not know it. Parmenides saw helplessness guiding the wandering thought of men, so that they are carried along deaf, blind anddazed. Similarly Empedocles: 'After observing a brief span of life in their lifetime, subject to a swift death men are borne up and waft away like smoke; as they are driven in all directions each is convinced only of that of which he has experience, yet boasts that he has found the whole.' And Democritus, more drily: 'Actually we apprehend nothing exactly, but only as it changes according to the condition of the body, and of what impinges on the body.'

However, for the Presocratics the deception of experience was only part, the negative part, of their theses, and cleared the ground for the construcgive argument or theory put forward in each case. It was Socrates who, for his method and attitude in general, was hailed as the great predecessor of scepticism. His practice, as shown especially in the early Platonic dialogues, of testing series of definitions or opinions, only to find them all defective with an admission of ignorance as the result, was the pattern of sceptical procedure. His questioning became it was claimed, their 'searching', his confession of ignorance their epochē, or 'suspension of judgment', and his fearlessness their tranquillity. 'I enquire with you, Critias', Socrates says in the Charmides, 'into whatever is proposed, just because I do not myself know.' Also, in the Apology, he suggests that the oracle hailed him as the wisest of men because he knew that he knew nothing: 'Is not this the most culpable ignorance, which pretends to know what it does not?' He is not convinced even of the conclusions of his strangest arguments, as when he says in the Gorgias: 'These things became so evident in our previous discussion that they are held fast and bound by arguments of iron and adamant ... but as for me, my position is always the same, I have no knowledge whether they are true or not.' And this position of Socrates first seems to have been pushed to its extreme by Metrodorus of Chios, who denied even that we know whether we know anything or whether we know nothing.

The sceptics also saw precedents for their attitude among the sophists, expecially in the sophistic claim to be able to debate with equal force for and against any given motion. There are too the arguments of Gorgias in support of the thesis that: 'Nothing exists, if anything did exist it would be incomprehensible, and if comprehensible incommunicable.' And the two famous quotations from Protagoras: 'As to the gods, I have no means of knowing either that they exist or that they do not exist. For many are the obstacles that impede knowledge - both the obscurity of the question, and the shortness of human life.' And: 'Of all things man is the measure, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not.' But of this more later.

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The controversies among the schools of philosophy in the fourth century B.C. were stubborn and bitter. Peripatetics were set against Academics, Cynics against Cyrenaics, Stoics against Epicureans. One side would claim dogmatically to have the right answer, and the other side would say the opposite, equally convinced it alone was correct. Inevitably there was a reaction

against the seemingly futile wranglings, and the pretentious assumptions of knowledge. As expressed by Timon, the sarcastic mouthpiece of early scepticism:

'Who sent this strife of tongues that twist and lie?
The talking sickness comes, and many die.'

Pyrrho of Elis, apparently the first to adopt a sceptical attitude as a way of life, tried to find a cure for this 'talking-sickness'. He set himself three questions, as of basic importance: (1) What is the nature of things? (2) What should be our attitude towards them? and (3) What benefit will this attitude bring? His answer to the first, 'What is the nature of things?' was that there is no way of knowing whether our impressions and opinions correspond to the things themselves or not, and, in addition, against every statement about things the opposite may be advanced with equal justice, so that their ultimate nature is unknowable. 'What then should be our attitude?' 'Well', said Pyrrho, 'since we can neither believe nor assert anything regarding the nature of things we must not put forward any opinion dogmatically, but suspend judgment.' 'The resulting benefit will be tranquillity.' Pyrrho, in disclaiming pretension and controversy, had found the secret of the quiet and happy life, and it was said that he alone appeared to be a god among men. He was compared to the artist Apelles who once found difficulty in reproducing the foam round a horse's mouth, and in despair threw his sponge at the painting; he got the right effect by chance. So Pyrrho, in giving up the search for happiness, found it. Ataraxia, tranquillity, follows epochē, suspension of judgment, as surely as his shadow follows a man.

How was the answer to the first question, that the nature of things is unknowable, reached? In attempting to show this I shall draw from the common stock of sceptical arguments up to the first century B.C. Neither Pyrrho nor Carneades wrote anything; the substance of their work seems to have been reproduced by their followers, and then summarised by later compilers, and it is often difficult to see how far back a particular line of thought extends. There is little doubt however that Carneades was the sharpest and most intelligent of the sceptics, and most of the best work originated with him.

It has been shown that in an obvious way it was long recognised that one must be careful about being dogmatic: the facts are obscure, the senses limited, the mind feeble and life short. Truth is in an abyss, all things are wrapped in darkness, and so on. But the sceptics were more precise, and more telling, than this. Now it is said that we may claim the right to be sure that something is the case (1) if its truth is directly warranted by experience, (2) if it is self-evident, or (3) if it is a conclusion validly derivable from a set of statements of which we can be sure. The sceptics roundly denounced all three candidates. Let us look first at what they had to say against (1), in concluding that no truth is warranted by experience.

The sceptics set out to show that human experience does not transcend φαινόμενα, i.e., how things appear to us, that appearances are deceptive, and that therefore there is no justification for making statements about physical objects on the basis of how they appear; one cannot move from 'this seems so' to 'this is so'. To this effect the sceptics argued as follows: (a) some presentations are true and some false, i.e., deceptive, (b) false presentations do not give certain knowledge, (c) a true presentation is always of such a kind that there can be a false presentation of the same kind, and (d) that there is no way of distinguishing a true presentation from a false of the same kind. (a) and (b) - that some presentations are deceptive and when this is the case we cannot be said to know - were, on the whole, undisputed; (c) and (d) taken together were the trouble. If for every true presentation there can be a false, set against it, with no means of distinguishing them, then there is no guarantee of truth. Granted that some, even the majority, of impressions are true it can never be known that any particular one is so.

The Epicureans saw the difficulty: KD 24 has this - 'If you reject any single sensation, you will confound all other sensations as well - so that you will reject every standard of judgment.' One deception would be sufficient,

and so Epicurus said outright that every sensation is true, and available as a basis for further investigation. The Stoics took another line, in their theory of phantasia katalēptikē. This was defined as an irresistible presentation, caused by an existing object, and imaged and impressed on the subject in accordance with that object, of such a kind that it could not come from the non-existing. That is, there are some presentations which force assent, and compel us to regard them not as probable but as true, and corresponding to the actual nature of things, so that we are completely convinced that what we see really is as we see it.

The sceptics called this wishful thinking, and met it with a flat contradiction. They maintained that no presentation contains in itself characteristics by virtue of which its truth may be inferred with certainty. A deceptive impression can be just as convincing as a true one, 'and the fact that they are found equally self-evident and striking is a token of their indistinguishability', says Sextus, quoting Carneades, 'while the fact that corresponding actions are linked to them is a token of their being equally striking and self-evident.' An example given was that of Hercules, who slew his children, supposing them to be those of the enemy. He had two presentations, one of his bow as a bow, and one of his children as being Eurystheus' children, both equally convincing, received by him in the same condition, similarly affecting him, and compelling him to action. He saw the bow as a bow, and followed it up with the corresponding action of shooting with it, he saw his children as his enemy's children, and followed this up with the corresponding action of killing them. His state of madness is not relevant here if the Stoics argue solely that a true impression is 'more self-evident and striking' than a false, for in such a case the true and the false are equally 'self-evident and striking'.

The sceptics then made a further move. A false impression can seem as irresistible as a true one, but it can also be indistinguishable from it. There are two ways by which they set out to show this. The Stoic will receive a false presentation, although it is 'impressed by a real object and according to that object', if the presentation he gets is of Castor as if it were of his identical twin Polydeuces, or when he is unable to distinguish between two eggs, or snakes in a pit. If the Stoic in desperation produces an example of a farmer in Delos who could tell which eggs came from which hens, he has not answered the underlying objection, that infallible conviction turns out to be erroneous in cases of mistaken identity, which in turn queries the possibility of infallible conviction. Or again the sceptics make trouble over the slight gradations which lead from the true to the false. If 50 is few and 1,000 many, what about 51, which is indistinguishable from 50 as a presentation of 'few', and so on. It is impossible to draw the line; and similarly with grains in a heap, and black ink poured drop by drop into water - when does the water become dark? And in general how can we distinguish between opposites, if we do not know at what point along the scale in the addition and subtraction to give a definite answer? Chrysippus replied that a rest should be taken in the inquiry - but the questioning can still continue after an interval; or that the Stoic will pull up in time, but then, when to pull up? When the answer is clear? But will the answer not be equally clear at the next step?

A parting shot by the sceptics at the Stoic theory of phantasia katelēptikē was that in any case it is circular. An apprehensible presentation is such as is imparted by a real object, and a real object is such as excites an apprehensible presentation. The sceptic rather will say: 'Having taken on one side something false but like the truth, and on the other a like thing apprehended by phantasia katalēptikē, and balanced them, I can accept neither the first nor the second, no more the one than the other. I cannot tell of anything what it is, but only that it is of such a sort. I shall say this appears to me to be so, but not that it is so.'

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The material for attacking the Stoic phantasia katalēptikē was drawn from a whole arsenal of sceptical demonstrations of the ways in which perception can be deceptive; but this again was only half of the account. In their destructive analysis of the instruments of knowledge, the sceptics set a dilemma: if anything is to be known, it must be either self-evident, i.e. known through itself, or derivable by proof, i.e. known through something else. Against the first, that anything is self-evident, they brought up the careful and comprehensive arguments which are summarised in the ten modes of Aenesidemus, to show that no impression can be accepted as truly representing an object. And because we cannot know things as they are, but only as they appear, we must suspend judgment. The sceptics maintained that presentations change not only with the different species of living things, not only with different men according to their customs and their whole development, but even in the case of the same individual at different times, depending on bodily conditions and the different relations in which the individual finds himself with respect to the object. There are also differences in the states of the object, so that one cannot know things directly, and in the face of a multiplicity of conflicting impressions cannot distinguish the true impression from the false; and there is no criterion to which to appeal.

The modes which indicate suspension of judgment are briefly these. The first shows that the same impressions are not produced by the same objects owing to the differences between living creatures. The hawk has keener eyesight, the dog a sharper sense of smell, the dolphin better hearing, antennae are more sensitive than fingers; might not animals then receive more accurate impressions than men? And may they not retain them better, as Odysseus' dog was the first to recognise him, and was less deceived than the men by changed appearances? In fact there are many ways of showing that a dog has as much right to be claimed as a candidate for the true philosopher as any human.

In the second mode are the differences between men. One man's meat is another's poison; there is a wide discrepancy on what it is thought best to choose and avoid. Who then are we to believe? All men? But this is impossible, and would involve contradictions; most men? yet this is childish - how can we find out the majority view of the human race on any subject? Some men? But who? The dogmatists prefer themselves, but improperly so, as they are a party to the dispute. The only course is to suspend judgment.

Thirdly there are the differences between the senses. A painting is three-dimensional to the eye but not to the touch. Perfume is agreeable to smell and bitter to taste, so how are we to say that it is really pleasant or harmful? Similarly, fourthly, there are differences in circumstances. Conditions and changes in general must be taken into account. Health and sickness, youth and age, love and hate, heat and cold affect the impressions received. Nor is there an escape route in saying that the healthy condition is the natural one and the norm - healthy men are in a state natural for the healthy, unnatural for the sick, the sick in a state natural for the sick, unnatural for the healthy. Is age more contrary to nature than youth? Hate to love? Heat to cold? Everyone must be in some kind of condition, and if he judges in that condition, he is not then impartial. The disagreement of impressions is therefore incapable of settlement.

Fifthly there are differences of position, distance and location. Distance makes the large small, the rough snooth; in a certain position the colourless dove's neck appears coloured; a lamp is bright in the dark and dim in the sun. It is however impossible to observe things out of any place or position which affects the impression they give, and so their real nature in unknowable. The same holds for the sixth mode, the difference of combinations; nothing can appear pure in and by itself, but only in conjunction with something else, and

even if we can state the nature of the resultant mixture, either in the external object or in the sense organ, we could not say what is the exact nature of the thing in itself. This is, in particular, a dig at the Stoic theory of krāsis, universal mixture. How is individual identity to be maintained in face of such a theory? Seventhly, the quantity and constitution of the object affects the impression. Silver filings are black by themselves and white in quantity; a measure of wine gives a man strength, too much makes him weak; a dose of medicine is beneficial, an overdose harmful. Everything however is observed in some quantity, and the quantity makes for deception; the right attitude is therefore epochē, suspension of judgment.

The eighth mode, that of relativity, is the most comprehensive, and is in effect a summary of those preceding. The mode is twofold, implying relation to the judge, and to the circumstances of the object. To quote: 'With respect to the judge it is in relation to some one particular animal or man or sense that each object appears, and in relation to certain conditions; and with respect to the object each appears in relation to some particular admixture or manner or composition or quantity or position.' And further arguments were brought in to query the independent, as opposed to the relative, existence of anything.

There was also added, ninthly, the significance of frequency and rarity of occurrence. The sun is seen every day and arouses no comment, a comet is rare, and is regarded as a portent, but it is perhaps only its rarity which makes it seem amazing. The human body, if seen rarely, appears beautiful, but if frequently, less so; gold if common would be ignored. If, then, the value of anything is decreased by frequency and increased by rarity of occurrence, it becomes impossible to know what is valuable or not of itself.

These first nine modes show the impossibility of an impression being given of an object accurate enough to tell us what it really is, the tenth rounds this off by pointing out contradictory opinions resulting from this impossibility. The mode is based on rules of conduct, customs, laws, legendary beliefs and dogmatic opinions. Human sacrifice, polygamy, cannibalism are acceptable in some communities and not in others; the Greeks honour the Olympians, some peoples powers of evil; Stoics believe in providence, Epicureans do not; the examples are innumerable. Human opinions are relative to the cultures in which they have been produced. In face of such diversity again one can only suspend judgment.

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In sum therefore, if nothing can be known directly in itself by the senses, because we have only appearances to work on, can one take the other side of the dilemma and say that knowledge is attainable indirectly, through reasoning? The answer to this is summarised in three of the five modes of Agrippa. The first and third of the five, that of difference and relation, cover the previous work of Aenesidemus, and cast doubt on the immediate and accurate comprehension of anything because of the differences and relations involved in perception. To this however is added the impossibility of reaching knowledge by proof, for proof involves an infinite regress, or indemonstrable hypotheses, or circular argument. The work on this goes back to Carneades, and deserves further consideration. Much of it though is technical and will be omitted, but one or two points may be made.

First, the sceptics attacked one of the fundamental principles of Stoic logic, namely that every axiōma, statement, is either true or false, by presenting the problem of the Liar, first set by the Megarian Eubulides. 'Epimenides calls the Cretans liars, but he is himself a Cretan; does he then lie or tell the truth?', or, in the simpler form: 'A man says that he is lying. Is what he says true or false?' On this the Stoics admitted defeat.

Secondly, the sceptics mocked at definitions, being as usual unsympathetic to departures from the simplest use of language. To quote: 'Isn't it ridiculous to say that definitions are of any use for understanding, or instruction, or elucidation of any kind, when they involve us in a fog of uncertainty? For instance, suppose one wished to ask someone whether he had met a man riding a horse and leading a dog, and questioned him like this - 'O rational mortal animal, receptive of intelligence and science, have you met with an animal capable of laughter, with broad nails and receptive of political science, seated on a mortal animal capable of neighing, and leading a four-footed animal capable of barking?' - how would one be otherwise than ridiculous, in thus reducing a man to speechlessness concerning objects so familiar, because of one's definitions?'

There are further difficulties. Definitions cannot be judged, because of the vast number of particulars from which any judgment on them must proceed. They are also unnecessary. If the definition is put together to fit the object, then the object is already comprehended, but if the object is not comprehended it cannot be defined. Any definition involves a regress or is circular, and this can only be prevented by assuming that some objects do not require definition; but if some objects can be understood without definition, then all can be in the same way. Further, one has got to understand the object before understanding the definition, which makes the definition superfluous in understanding the object. 'An animal capable of neighing' does not help in the apprehension of or instruction about a horse, until one has seen a horse and heard it neigh. In ethics this will mean that it is unhelpful to define the good as useful or choiceworthy or what have you until the good is known, and then the definition is not needed.

Thirdly, to settle the controversies about what is true and what is not, obviously a criterion is needed, but it is impossible to say whether one can be found or not. Either there is the regress of one criterion being judged by another, or circular arguing. The circularity is that demonstration requires a demonstrated criterion, and the criterion requires approved demonstration; or, to put it another way, to decide the dispute about the criterion one must have an accepted criterion, and to have an accepted criterion requires that the dispute about the criterion must first be decided.

The Modes of Aenesidemus have shown that the senses are inadequate judges of the nature of things, but neither can the intellect be set as a criterion. Since it is unable to discern itself accurately, its origin for example and its place (whether in the heart, blood or head - an old dispute), it does not have the credentials to judge anything else. In any case different intellects disagree about what is true; and which intellect are we to follow when they are all parties to the disagreement? What would be our grounds for choosing one intellect rather than another to give us the criterion. A man's age cannot make his intelligence more acceptable, for the chief dogmatists were more or less the same age when they claimed to have found their, diverging, truths. Then too, in ordinary life, so perhaps in philosophy as well, the young are often shrewder than the old. 'Nor indeed' continues Sextus 'by reason of industry either; for all are equally industrious, and there is none whose behaviour is sluggish once he has entered the contest for truth and claims to have found it. And when equality in this respect is ascribed to all, it is an injustice to incline towards one only.' Nor does it help to say that a man has many supporters. There were much the same numbers in the different schools; if one had a majority the combined opposition would still be larger; and quantity is no guarantee of quality. Not age then nor industry nor having many to speak for one can bolster up the claim to know. Even if we did accept the judgment of a clever intellect, a cleverer might arise and contradict, and even if we could find the cleverest man of all, he would be able to deceive everyone.

So no universally agreed or trustworthy criterion can be found to umpire the disputes in the investigation of the nature of things; can proof help? Firstly no, because as with definitions and criteria, if circular argument is avoided a regress is involved. If something true exists it cannot be believed without proof because of the controversy. If proof is offered this will be unconvincing, of course, if conceded to be false; but if true a further proof is required, and so on ad infinitum; it is impossible to prove an infinite series, and so it is impossible to get to know whether something true exists, and if so what it is; one should therefore suspend judgment on the question.

The only way to halt the regress is to have an unproved first assumption, and there are three difficulties with this. An obstinate opponent can make the opposite assumption and how can he be shown to be wrong? If the assumption is claimed to be true, the claim is suspicious because the statement has been assumed and not proved. And if the assumption conduces at all towards proof, let the subject of inquiry itself be assumed, and not something else which is merely a means to establishing the subject of the argument; but if it is absurd to assume the subject of inquiry it will also be absurd to assume what goes beyond it.

Furthermore the conclusions are either going to be pre-evident or non-evident. In the Stoic examples: 'if it is day then it is light, it is day therefore it is light'; and: 'if Dion walks, Dion moves, Dion walks therefore Dion moves', the conclusion gives no extra information, and the proofs do not therefore provide new bits of knowledge. In other cases the premises are non-evident, so that the conclusions are also non-evident. Examples of this are: 'if motion exists, void exists, motion exists, therefore void exists', where the first premise could be challenged with motion in a plenum. Or again: 'that by the separation of which from the body men die is the soul; it is by the separation of blood from the body that men die, therefore the blood is the soul'; here the form of the argument is conceded to be valid, but the premises are disputed and the conclusion therefore non-evident, so our ignorance on the nature of soul remains as before.

The modes of Agrippa were also used to attack aetiology. When the aitia, the cause or explanation, is disputed, as it is when concerned with the non-evident, then a regress of explanations is started, if they are not to be circular. And if a halt is called the proposer 'will either say that the explanation holds good as far as the circumstances of the present discussion require, thus introducing the relative point of view, or else he will make some unwarranted assumption, and be stopped on that score'. Explanations of the non-evident are unsatisfactory on other counts too. Prejudice inclines the investigator to work according to unjustified assumptions instead of by commonly approved methods, and often overlooks the possibility of several explanations, or ignores any which conflict with the favoured one. Also there is no agreed verification of explanations of this kind from appearances; it is assumed too that the non-evident behaves in the same way as the evident, and we cannot be sure of this; and when difficulties in the subject matter are involved requiring explanation, there will be even more difficulties in an explanation based on such subject-matter.

There is another point. The sceptics asked if a dogmatic statement about a non-evident object was made before or after katalēpsis, apprehension of it. If before, then the statement is apistos, not to be believed, because groundless; if after an immediate and clear impression, then it is not non-evident, but obvious to all. But there is endless controversy about what is non-evident, and therefore the dogmatist who makes a positive assertion about a non-evident object cannot have done so because it made a direct and clear impression. If he says it was the result of search, how could he have started his search unless he had an accurate apprehension of the object of his search?

So there is further circularity: the apprehension requires that there has been previous investigation, and investigation previous apprehension. Investigation is only possible for those like the sceptics who confess ignorance of the real nature of things, but it is inconsistent in those who believe that they have an exact knowledge of them. Research, scientific or otherwise, is destroyed by dogmatism, but kept living and flourishing when the sceptical attitude is adopted.

Finally, the sceptics set against dogmatism the saying: πάντι λόγῳ λόγος ἀντικεῖται - to every logos a logos is opposed. I.e., the sceptic says: 'To every argument investigated by me which establishes a point dogmatically, it seems to me that there is opposed another argument establishing a point dogmatically, which is equal to the first in respect of credibility and incredibility. This is not a point of dogmatism on my part, but a comment on what appears to me now to be the case. Even if an opposing logos is not apparent to me at the moment, I can say that, just as your theory, before you proposed it, existed but was not discovered, so the opposite theory may exist but still undiscovered. I cannot therefore yield assent to this logos.'

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Two objections were brought against the sceptical position: (1) that it is self-refuting, and (2) that it makes life impossible. The sceptics, to their credit, recognised the force of these objections, and set out to meet them. To take the first, the peritropē, or turning the tables. Now it is self-refuting to say 'I can offer you a proof that proof is impossible', and the sceptics were careful to avoid this. To the dilemma: 'If the sceptic argument is weak it is inadequate, if strong, then it shows that reason is forceful' the sceptic replies with 'πάντι λόγῳ' : 'I am saying merely that I can produce an argument as good as any other argument; if any argument is valid, then the opposing argument I balance against it is valid.' An example: the Stoics attacked the sceptics with this - 'If proof exists, proof exists, if proof does not exist proof exists, therefore proof exists.' And the sceptics countered with: 'If proof does not exist proof does not exist, if proof exists proof does not exist, therefore proof does not exist.' The counter-argument is just as good as the first, for what they are both worth.

Or again, their opponents wanted to know how the sceptics could attack the criterion. If their argument uses a criterion, they are self-refuted, and if not they will not be believed; in asserting that there is no criterion, they will adopt a criterion in order to confirm that assertion. The sceptics replied that they were not abolishing criterion, but pointing out that the existence of criterion is not to be assumed, since it is possible to put forward the opposite view with equal credibility.

The anti-sceptical position was summarised forcefully by Lucretius in the following lines from book 4 of the De Rerum Natura: 'If anyone thinks that nothing can be known, he does not know whether even this can be known, since he admits that he knows nothing. Against such an adversary therefore who deliberately stands on his head I will not trouble to argue my case. And yet, if I were to grant that he possessed this knowledge, I might ask several pertinent questions. Since he has had no experience of the truth, how does he know the difference between knowledge and ignorance? What has originated the concept of truth and falsity? Where is his proof that doubt is not the same as certainty?'

Let's go back a bit. Protagoras' interpretation of ou mallon, no more this than that, seems to have been a positive one - both is this and not this: the wind is warm for A and cool for B and in each case we must accept the individual's

opinion on how it is for him. In general man, any man, is the measure, of the things that are that they are, and of the things that are not that they are not. In the Theaetetus Plato turns this against Protagoras himself. In the dialogue Socrates says: Protagoras, admitting as he does that everybody's opinion is true, must acknowledge the truth of his opponents' belief about his own belief, where they think he is wrong. - Certainly. - i.e., he could acknowledge his own belief to be false, if he admits that the belief of those who think him wrong is true? - Necessarily. - But the others, on their side, do not admit to themselves that they are wrong. - No. - Whereas Protagoras, according to what he has written, admits that this opinion of theirs is as true as any other. Evidently. - On all hands then, Protagoras included, his opinion will be disputed, or rather Protagoras will join in the general consent, when he admits to an opponent the truth of his contrary opinion. Isn't that so? - Yes. - Then, since it is disputed by everyone, the Truth of Protagoras is true to nobody, to himself no more than to anyone else.

Democritus took the negative view of ou mallon: no more this than that means neither this nor that. The honey which seems sweet to the healthy man and sharp to the sick, is, really, neither. Both this, and Protagoras' view, meet with trouble from Aristotle. In Metaphysics K Aristotle comments in general on those who say 'this is so' is no more true than 'this is not so'. To quote: 'As, when the statements are separated, the affirmation is no more true than the negation, in the same way (the combined and complex statement being like a single affirmation) the whole taken as an affirmation will be no more true than the negation. Further, if it is not possible to affirm anything truly, this itself will be false - the assertion that there is no true affirmation. But if there is true affirmation, this appears to refute what is said by those who raise such objections and utterly destroy rational discourse.' I.e. if an affirmation is no more true than its negation then the affirmation 'an affirmation is no more true than its negation' is itself no more true than its negation. Ou mallon as a universal principle is therefore untenable.

The sceptics seem to have been well aware of all this, and took various ways out. One was to bring in all the senses of ou mallon and refuse to decide between them. That is, the sceptic says of each theory that it no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not. This was used then in the truncated form; 'no more this way than that way than neither way.'

Also the sceptic could take up the extreme position, and agree with Metrodorus, that we know nothing, not even that we know nothing. Or, as Timon puts it: 'why yes, why no, and why the very question why?' Cicero reports Carneades as saying that when one reports that nothing can be perceived, no exception at all is made, so that the very impossibility of perceiving anything is not to be perceived. Suspension of judgment should be the attitude not only to 'something can be known' but also to 'nothing can be known'. Carneades is willing to grant that ou mallon refutes itself along with everything else. The sceptic then cannot be accused of dogmatising. As Sextus says: 'If, while the dogmatiser posits the letter of his dogma as the truth, the sceptic puts forward his formulae so that they are virtually cancelled by themselves, he should not be said to dogmatise in putting them forward.' The position is compared to that of the creature called the polypus, which eats itself, or to a laxative which removes itself along with the harmful fluids of the body. The medical metaphor appears constantly. Philosophy can be dispensed with once it has done its work of curing us of the follies of dogmatism; it washes itself away along with what it works on.

Another escape from the peritropē trap was to keep out of the dispute the sceptic phrases like 'nothing is to be determined', 'to every logos a logos can be opposed', and 'no more this than that', and to give them special status. To take again ou mallon, 'no more this than that'. The sceptics say that though

this shows the character of a form of assent or denial, they do not employ it in this way, but take it in a loose and inexact sense, either in place of a question, 'why more this than that?', or in place of the phrase: 'I know not to which of these I ought to assent, and to which not'. 'For our aim is to indicate what appears to us; while as to the expression by which we indicate this we are indifferent.'

We may then perhaps suppose the sceptic, anachronistically, answering Lucretius, and any one else who tries to turn the tables on him, as follows: 'I want to make it clear first that none of the formulae I use is put forward as an assertion which I claim to be true. I'm quite prepared to admit to the possibility that they can be used to cancel themselves; if anything this strengthens my position. I'm not pretending that what I say gets us any nearer to understanding the real nature of things. I use my terms indifferently, and as loosely as you like, so I'm not going to enter into any dispute about words. I don't mind if you say my terms are relative, relative to me, because that again is to my advantage. Also, remember I'm not using them universally, but only with respect to the non-evident which the dogmatists are constantly speculating about. And anyway I am only passing a comment on what appears to me to be the case at the moment. And if I put it in this way, can you argue against me without playing into my hands?'

The second main objection raised against acepticism was that it made life impossible. If nothing is determined how do we distinguish food from fodder, how avoid precipices? No one can go through life in a permanent state of epochē; the slightest preference destroys the balance of 'no more this than that'.

According to Diogenes Pyrrho just did not bother about precipices, carts and dogs, and was only saved from disaster by the vigilance of his friends. They must have had a busy time, or perhaps he was not completely sincere, as he lived to be nearly ninety.

Carneades, typically, met the objection head on. While withholding assent concerning the possibility of anything being true, he recognised that some stimulus and groundwork for action was needed. In every impression two relations are involved, that of the impression to the object which makes it true or false, and that to the subject which makes it seem so. The first is beyond our understanding, but the second, how impressions appear to us, is within the sphere of opinion. We can attach to the impressions as they appear to us sufficient weight to allow them to guide our conduct, but we must be on our guard against considering them to be really known or true. Assent should be given to no notion in the sense of its being true, but can be to many in the realm of phainomena, in the sense that these can be considered probable.

Carneades' theory of probability is a subtle one, and the details need not be entered into here. In the main it is based on a series of verifications, which can provide a security sufficient for practical ends. He set out three main heads of probability: (1) the immediately probable, given by the first impression, which is sufficient in trivial matters, or used, e.g., when there is no time for further investigation; (2) the probable and uncontradicted, where the first checks show no incompatibilities; and (3) the probable and uncontradicted and tested, where as many precautions as possible are taken; this is the most convincing, and from probabilities of this third kind a system of connected results can be formed, and used as a guide to conduct. Comparisons were made to a doctor who diagnoses from a multiplicity of symptoms, or to a magistrate who questions a large number of witnesses; and the more important the issue involved, the greater the degree of verification required. The tested probabilities link up, so that the sceptic is willing to infer, e.g., fire from smoke, a wound from

a scar, future death from an injury to the heart. If he goes on a short journey by sea with a good ship and crew and in fine weather he expects to reach his destination. He works on associations based on degrees of probability of impressions, observing and remembering their combinations and orderings.

The sceptic here made a distinction between reflective and indicative signs. Reflective signs work with what is only temporarily obscure; it is one 'which has been associated in our observation with the thing signified, and which by its clearness at the time of perception reminds us of that which in our observation has been associated with it, and which is not now directly perceived'. But the indicative sign, which was claimed to take us from the evident to the non-evident, was rejected by the sceptic. As it appears to him, the links in the system are all within the sphere of phainomena. The sceptic is still not going beyond them to make any pronouncement on what is naturally non-evident. He lives 'keeping to appearances, in accordance with the normal rule of life, undogmatically'.

Since, in this way, the guide for conduct is based on ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, i.e. what is found to be the case for the most part, the sceptic also says: 'we follow a line of reasoning, which, in accordance with appearances, points us to a life conformable to the customs of our country, and its laws and institutions.' The sceptic was not inconsistent in leading the normal life of the good citizen. And it appeared that the observance of the requirements of life was fourfold: 'It is by the guidance of nature that we are capable of sensation and thought. It is by the compulsion of the feelings that hunger leads us to food and thirst to drink. It is by virtue of the tradition of laws and customs that in everyday life we accept piety as good and impiety as evil. And it is by virtue of the instruction of the arts that we are not inactive in those arts which we employ. All these statements however we make without prejudice.'

And finally, to draw the threads together. The Greek sceptics sharpened long-existing doubts about the possibility of man being absolutely sure about anything. We are tied within the world of appearances, and cannot go beyond it either by means of the senses or by reason. Any statement about what is non-evident can be opposed with another equally credible, and there is no umpire with credentials adequate enough to help us come to a decision, and so we should suspend judgment. Yet the recognition that certainty is beyond our reach does not prevent us from having standards for evaluating the reliability and application of impressions as they are presented to us, so that a normal life is possible, and if based on the sceptical attitude will be fruitful in research, and tranquil. And in contrast to the arrogance of some of the contemporary schools, and to the self-centredness of others, Greek scepticism has much to commend it, for τὴν πρᾳότητα τέλος εἰπεῖν τοὺς σκεπτικούς - the sceptics say they aim at gentleness.

ROSEMARY WRIGHT

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ADDENDA

I. Chief figures

Scepticism as a way of life (ἀγωγή)
Pyrrho of Elis c.360-275 B.C.
Timon of Phlius c.320-230 B.C.

Scepticism in the Academy
Arcesilas of Pitane c.315-240 B.C.
Carneades of Cyrene c.214-129 B.C.
Clitomachus of Carthage c.187-110 B.C.

Return to Pyrrhonism
Aenesidemus of Cnossus c.100-40 B.C.
Agrippa 1st century B.C.

II. Main sources
Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I-III
Against the Logicians (adv.Dogm. I, II, adv. Math. VII, VIII).
Against the Physicists (adv.Dogm. III, IV, adv.Math. IX, X)
Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Pyrrho and Timon (IX. 61-116)
Cicero: Academics II (and, for sceptical attacks on Stoic theology, De Natura Deorum III)
Augustine: Contra Academicos

III. The ten Modes of Aenesidemus
(SE Pyrrh. I. 36-38, also I.40-163 and DL IX.79-88)

1. ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ζώων ἑξαλλαγήν
2. ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφοράν
3. ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατασκευάς
4. ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις
5. ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους
6. ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας
7. ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ ὑκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων
8. ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρός τι
9. ὁ παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς η σπανίους ἐγκυρήσεις
10. ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις

1-4 ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρίνοντος
7, 10 ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρινομένου
5, 6, 8, 9 ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν

IV. The five Modes of Agrippa
(DL IX. 88-89, and SE Pyrrh. I. 165-169)

1. ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας
2. ὁ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλων
3. ὁ πρός τι
4. ὁ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
5. ὁ δι' ἀλλήλων

OVID AND ARARAT

Readers of most editions of Ovid's Metamorphoses must have puzzled over the occurrence of ararat at the end of a hexameter in Ovid's version of the story of the Flood[1], and recently one such reader, Mr. T. T. B. Ryder[2], has discussed its possible explanation. He writes 'there can ... be only two possible alternative explanations: either that Ovid was aware of the play on words and included ararat as a learned jeu d'esprit...; or that the poet was in some way divinely inspired to include unwittingly a reference to the sacred version of his story'. Even though I agree with Ryder that the possibility Ovid knew the Hebrew version of the Flood and introduced ararat as a learned joke is so unlikely as to need no consideration, there are two other possibilities.

One is coincidence. This Ryder tends to dismiss because the odds are astronomically high against the form occurring in just this passage; but high odds do not make a coincidence impossible. Although ararat is a rare abbreviated form of a fairly rare tense, it has a euphonious sound that would appeal to a poet like Ovid. But the syntax of the line is a little odd; the more usual sequence of tenses would be present followed by imperfect. Other poets might have chosen to emphasise the disaster of the transformation of the land to a wide, watery expanse by using the unexpected pluperfect form to stress the (apparent) finality of the change. But Ovid, even in his hexameter poetry, always strove to achieve a smooth-flowing style, and is more likely to have written arabat than ararat.

This brings us to the other possibility, and this is that the text has been altered. This Ryder admits, saying 'if someone should think that the whole problem might be the result of a careless monk who knew his Genesis so well that he subconsciously changed arabat to ararat, the monk must... have known it not merely in Latin, but in Greek or Hebrew better...' But it need not have been a careless copyist who made the change; it is just as likely an educated Christian made an alteration, which then became part of the MSS tradition, to produce in Ovid the appearance of divine inspiration so that he could read and interpret allegorically Ovid's poetry without incurring the wrath of other Christians. For in the early centuries of the Christian era it seems the reading of Ovid, in particular the Metamorphoses, was very restricted because it was opposed by the priests and monks[3]. The first glimpse of a changed attitude occurs in Theodolphus, a Bishop of Orleans, who died in 821[4]. He says of Ovid and Vergil[5]:

> in quorum dictis quamquam sunt frivola multa,
> plurima sub falsa tegmine vera iacent.

In the same poem he names certain Christian Fathers whose writings he specially liked, and among these is Dio Chrysostom (flavo ore Ioannem) who wrote in Greek. The Bishop was therefore capable of reading the Greek version of the Old Testament in which the name of the mountain on which the Ark came to rest is given its Hebrew name transliterated into Greek litters (Genesis VIII4). I do not claim Theodolphus changed the text; but he is the sort of educated Christian, alive before the tenth century from which our MSS of Ovid date, who could have made the change.

In textual matters the traditional procedure is the accumulation of parallels, and it so happens there is another example of a textual alteration to accommodate a biblical allusion. In the following number of Greece and Rome to that in which Ryder's note appears there is an article by Mr. J. T. Christie on Bentley's Horace[6] in which he mentions Odes III 18, 12. The text as usually printed by post-Bentley editors is festum in pratis vacat otiosus / cum bove pagus, but six of the best MSS have pardus for pagus and this was the text some pre-Bentley editors printed. 'An pardi ad agnos colendos et opus rusticum adhibentur?' asks Bentley[7]. Pardus he explains as a monkish memory of

Isaiah 11, 6 'The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf and the lion and the fatling together...' Recent editors accept Bentley's conclusion[8].

Here then we have an example of a textual variant in respectable MSS explained by the assumption someone desired to introduce a biblical allusion. As with Horace so in Ovid there is a MSS variant for some MSS have arabat (or arabant) not ararat[9] a reading retained by the Loeb editor who thus denies the readers who become acquainted with the Metamorphoses for the first time with that edition of an interesting talking point. However I think he is right for I believe the Horatian parallel and stylistic consideration make it likely Ovid wrote arabat rather than ararat.

J. H. COWELL

FOOTNOTES

1. Met., I 253 - 437; line 294 reads et ducit remos illic ubi nuper ararat in the edition through which many will become acquainted with the passage for the first time, that of A. G. Lee, Pitt Press Series, CUP (1953).
2. 'Ovid, the Flood, and Ararat', G & R 2nd ser. 14, 1967, pp. 126 - 9.
3. L. K. Born, 'Ovid and Allegory', Speculum 9, 1934, pp. 362 - 3.
4. J. E. Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, I^3, CUP (1921), p. 479.
5. Carmina IV 1, 19 - 20 in Migne, Patr. Lat., CV col. 331.
6. G & R 2nd ser. 15, 1968, p.25.
7. In Q. Horatium Flaccum, Notae atque Emendationes Richardii Bentleii, Cambridge (1711), p.132.
8. See, for example, Wickham ad loc.
9. See Ryder, p.129; one modern editor, R. Ehwald in his Teubner edition (1915), retains the imperfect.

NEW COMEDY, ARISTOPHANES AND EURIPIDES

The differences between the comedy of Aristophanes and the New Comedy of Menander are more obvious than the resemblances. Aristophanes is both political and topical; Menander rarely mentions current affairs and then only as background to his characters. Private affairs have taken the place of matters of public interest; "probable" plots involving scenes of everyday life replace Aristophanean fantasy& caricature. The audience enjoy the plays as private individuals whose lives centre on domestic affairs of families, marriages and money, not as members of the δῆμος interested - if not necessarily from pure public spirit - in the affairs of the state. Democracy continued to function in the fourth century but the people had become more apathetic and the sense of Athenian nationality less keen as Athens became an international centre for philosophy and the population more cosmopolitan. The old Aristophanean comedy was felt to be vulgar, the obscenity has disappeared by the time of Menander.

Whereas in Old Comedy plays end with symbolic marriages and fertility motifs, New Comedy substitutes love stories with real marriages at the "happy ending". In Aristophanes Peisthetaerus marries Βασιλεια , or aulos-girls are brought in - in the Wasps and Thesmophoriazusae - for a riotous ending. The standard old comedy ends with a κῶμος with plenty of wine, women and song. In fact the Dyscolos ends exactly like this - only off-stage, and the characters are generally better behaved. The sacrifice which began half way through the play has been finished, the wine is being poured, with jokes about drunken women familiar to Aristophanes, and finally even Cnemon the Bad-tempered man is carried off grumbling to join in. Plautus 'Pseudolus' also ends with a party at which Pseudolus gets drunk and carries off his master to join in.

Intrigue and complicated plotting has mainly replaced the comparatively straightforward old ἀγών . Instead of, say, Dicaeopolis standing up and arguing with the Acharnians or the sausage-seller with Paphlagon leading to victory for one party and defeat, often ignominious, for the other, a clever slave uses tricks - Plautus' adaptation Pseudolus, or Sostratus in the Dyscolos tries by amicable rather than hostile means to persuade the farcically misanthropic Cnemon to give him his daughter in marriage, practising a little deception in his preference to be a hard-working farmer.

The hero in Aristophanes - e.g. Dicaeopolis, Peisthetaerus, sausage-seller - wins by his own skill in debate and ingenuity; he who was an old peasant becomes superhuman. But it is luck or coincidence that gets Menander's heroes out of trouble - Cnemon falls down the well of his own accord and Sostratus succeeds not by threats or rhetoric but by <u>helping</u> him. The Aristophanean hero is more likely to approve the slave's counsel of dropping a mill-stone on him. Reformation takes place in the 'Knights' but it is symbolic - of Demos - and achieved by magic. In the New Comedies of the Roman dramatists the hero is usually helpless and a slave provides the brains. 'Pseudolus' is much closer to Aristophanes than any of Menander's characters; he has touches of the supernuman in his ability to devise schemes to run everything to his advantage. Ballio is more of an Aristophanean villain - incorrigible and completely defeated at the end. Another interesting parallel with Aristophanes in the Dyscolos comes at the end; the two slaves see their chance to get their revenge on Cnemon for his previous rudeness and attack on them and take turns in knocking at his door and pestering him in the true malicious Aristophanean spirit that has no pity for the defeated party. But at the end the old man suffers nothing worse than to be carted off to join the feast, this is painful to him in his hatred of company but very different from the treatment Lamachus or Paphlagon suffer. Beatings-up are still thought as funny by Menander as by Aristophanes: erring or unfortunate slaves suffer as they did in the plays of Aristophanes' rivals, but free men usually escape in New Comedy

Aristophanes claims - with varying degrees of seriousness - to 'improve' his audience by offering good advice. His advice is political; Menander disregards politics - Athens by then was under Macedonian rule - but he does put forward ethical advice and examples in the actual plot of his play; for instance, it is made clear in the Dyscolos that Sostratus wins his girl by his excellent character and willingness to work (not characteristic of Aristophanean heroes); the girl Myrrhine is a sweet and virtuous maiden; Gorgias shows his high principles by at first refusing the offer of Sostratus' sister in marriage. Menander avoids real villains to be ejected from the happy culmination - he reconciles his characters at the end. Cnemon for the first half of the play is farcically ill-disposed; but later he is given some excuse in his claim that he behaves as he does from hatred of evil influences and admits he goes too far. It is thought that the miser in the Plautine Aulularia undergoes a similar reformation. If Aristophanes introduces a villain or bad characters in the episode they are simply defeated, or hostile forces are won over in the ἀγων . Menander's characters are simply misguided. Polemon is naturally deceived in the Περικειρομένη , Charisius in the Ἐπιτρέποντες . In old Comedy the hero - and his adherents - live happily ever afterwards, in Menander everyone does. The Old ending is more primitive, the New more civilized and peaceful. The nearest Aristophanes comes to this universal harmony is in the Lysistrata when all Greek states are to be reconciled and all their men with women - the "defeated" are happy.

Menander's comedy depends on the interplay of characters, variants on stock types, Aristophanes' on ideas. The comic characters have a long history with their beginnings in Epicharmus of Sicily in the early 5th century. Type characters appear in Aristophanes mostly in the episodia; the poet, the soothsayer, the informer, and are usually mercenary charlatans. A favourite character of New Comedy, however, the Boasting Soldier, makes his first extant appearance as Lamachus in the 'Acharnaians'. Father and son pairs appear in the 'clouds' and the 'Wasps', their relation was already a comic cliché for Aristophanes has great fun reversing it in the 'Wasps' - the respectable son tries to restrain his wayward father. Strepsiodes tries to play the stern father without notable success. "I'll disown you!" he cries to Pheidippides. "Then I'll go to Uncle Megacles" says his son, "He won't leave me without a horse". The son at first scorns the 'new Education' while the father is impressed by it. The slave who is such a popular character in New comedy, does not have much part in Aristophanes till the Middle play 'Plutus'. Nicias and Demosthenes are slaves of Demos as an allegory and disappear later in the play; Xanthus in the "Frogs" - produced in 405 - has a bigger part at the beginning and shows that Aristophanes' rivals at least used the slave regularly as a comic character - he retails all the corny jokes with relish. But there is no sign of the crafty slave so popular later. The social standing particularly of the characters is different; Aristophanes usually portrays a peasant or ordinary citizen, poor but not absolutely impoverished. New comedy uses well-to-do middle class and their slaves and hangers-on; concern about money usually stems from extravagance on someone's part or greed over dowries. An old peasant is portrayed, but he has changed. Cnemon is poor - or makes himself so - and he is fanatically suspicious and misanthropic. He is not of course intended to be an average farmer, but other characters say that all peasants are rather like that; Cnemon is not atypical, only exaggerated. Aristophanes portrays the suspicious peasant too in the 'Acharnians' chorus and the 'Wasps', but he is generally much more sympathetic to the poor farmer; the audience is expected to identify with him at least to some extent. That is the basic difference between his peasants and Menander's in the 'Dyscolos' where the audience really identifies with Sostratus and his people. Cnemon is not just a Bad-tempered Man; he is a Bad-tempered Peasant. The other side of the coin is shown in Gorgias; he is the Virtuous Poor Man. Aristophanes' poor country men may be sympathetic but they are certainly not such unlikely paragons. Gorgias is distrustful of

Sostratus at first, but this is only natural; for Sostratus too is a young man of exceptionally good character. All New comedy characters are not so virtuous if one can judge from Roman adaptations - Menander was probably especially inclined to show good characters or those with a good excuse for their behaviour - extreme youth being considered one.

The chorus, which has a major part in Aristophanes has become mere interlude in Menander. The beginning of the trend can be seen in Aristophanes' Ecclesiazusae and Plutus where the parabasis has gone and choral interludes are marked in several places. By Menander's time the plays are entirely in iambic trimeters with choral interludes; though Plautus makes use of other metres in dialogue. The style is colloquial with a tendency to the prosaic, with none of Aristophanes' delight in word-play and manufactured words.

Epicharmus of Sicily, the first comic playwright, directly foreshadows Menander with his comedies of human character. There are few fragments, but in one the first parasite describes his way of life. Cheating soothsayers are also mentioned, and Epicharmus was said to be the first poet to represent drunken men on the stage. It is interesting that both Epicharmus and Menander were writing when 'tyrants' were supreme rulers over their respective states and the people had their power and interest in politics curtailed. Epicharmus also wrote mythological burlesque, popular in Middle comedy a little earlier than Manander, favourite characters being a hungry Heracles (a stock joke in Aristophanes' time), comically characterized as stupid and greedy, and Odysseus, whose cleverness and caution could be turned into craftiness and cowardice. These gods and heroes are perhaps the first stock characters; their traits are known already and it is left to the dramatists to exploit and contrast them. The New comedy avoids the supernatural - gods appear only as prologue.

Epicharmus was also famous for his philosophical maxims, which were collected like those of Menander. He was said to be a pupil of Pythagoras, as Menander of Theophrastus. The philosophy of Pythagoras and others appears in his fragments but it was probably used mainly as burlesque or as an excuse by some character. Philosophy was a popular target, as in Aristophanes' Clouds and Middle comedy. Menander introduces ideas of the day with varying degrees of seriousness; when disagreeable old Cnemon objects to the greed of sacrificing animals and eating them yourself, whereas incense all goes to the gods, one has a suspicion that he objects to pleasure on principle, particularly when indulged in so near his home that he has to see people for once. The remark is quite within character. The famous maxim "Those whom the gods love die young" which occurs in a play of Plautus adapted from Menander, is spoken by a slave who is being rude to an old man. The maxims which were collected from Menander's work look serious out of context but may not have been so within the play.

The structure of New Comedy plots resembles that of tragedy more closely than that of Old Comedy. The plot is supremely important and based on intrigue and the conflict of character, usually involving recognition of abandoned children. New comedy adopts the five-act structure, with a Prologue, usually by a god or personified abstract quality, major climax in Act 4 and solution in Act 5, - the acts are divided by choral interludes. Euripides was the most popular of the tragedians in the fourth century and his plays were frequently performed. In several respects his plays have characteristics found in New Comedy. A number of his plays were based on stories of the recognition of lost children. Ion is an extant example: others were the Antiope, the Hypsipyle, Melanippe the Wise, Melanippe Bound. A god (excluding Jason in Hypsipyle) seduces a mortal woman who bears twins, exposes them and they are rescued and reared. The children grow up, encounter their mother later in life and rescue her from danger. The resemblances to New Comedy are easier to see in the extant Ion. There is a recognition by tokens exposed with the child, the further complication of Mithus' rape of a girl at a Delphic festival (New comedy would make him

the father) and the deception of Xuthus by this belief. Euripides was not the first to use recognition scenes - Electra recognises her mother by tokens in the Choephoroe - but he uses the discovery of children or relatives thought to be dead to a greater extent. The importance Aristotle attaches to recognitions may be connected with the later popularity of this kind of tragedy. Thus Iphigeneia is found in Taurica and escapes by the use of intrigue, another favourite theme common to Euripides and comedy. Iphigeneia and Helen lie their way out of a foreign country, Hecuba plots the death of Polymester's children, Electra that of her mother (in Electra) and of Helen and Hermione (in Orestes). It is notable that Euripides' plotters are women; both he and Aristophanes make a point of their craftiness. A plotting but beneficent woman appears in Menander's Habrotonon in the 'Epitrepontes', - the slave girl works out a fool-proof scheme for identifying the baby's parents without hurting anyone and getting herself freed into the bargain. Otherwise his sympathetic women tend more towards Euripides other sort of women, i.e. to perfectly virtuous, such as Iphigeneia at Aulis, Macaria, Hermione of the 'Orestes'. Menander produces Myrrhine, who is hardly given a character, Glycera and the forgiving Pamphile. The arch-plotters of New Comedy are slaves rather than women; usually slave helps master to get the girl. The 'romantic love' element is comic, not tragic, but Euripides brought passion onto the tragic stage, and outraged the more strait-laced members of his audience. Menander is more conventional - his women are modest. Euripides liked marrying off his characters at the end of a play, sometimes incongruously, to round off the story: in Orestes, Electra, Melanippe Bound, Andromache.

The idea of the Euripidean prologue is taken over completely by Menander and the New comic writers; a god, hero or abstraction appears and explains the plot to the audience. This outside explanation was more necessary for the complicated plot favoured by Euripides and New Comedy as opposed to Old Comedy. The comic prologue god is detached from the action completely as Euripides' gods are not, except possibly Hermes in 'Ion'. Perhaps the trend was developed in post-Euripidean tragedy before Menander. But the other notorious Euripidean mechanism, the deus ex machina is discarded in the interest of realism and rule of lucky coincidence or human ingenuity. There is no legendary background into which the characters must be fitted.

The tendency of fourth century comedy towards realistic stories of private life is paralleled by Euripides' interest in the personal relationships of his characters. Theophrastus defines comedy as 'concerning "οἰκεια" "household matters". Aristophanes represents Euripides as claiming to bring 'οἰκεια ' into tragedy, and giving speeches to all sorts of characters "My women talk, my slaves no less; so does the master, the young girl, the old women" - like people of New Comedy. Aristophanes is probably thinking especially of philosophical and sophistic speeches; both free men and slaves use such arguments freely in New Comedy. There is significance too in another ancient statement about Euripides "He shows men as they are'. Comedy, according to Aristotle, shows men "worse than they are"; Menander, though Latin comedy has less of this tendency, presents a mixture of characters, many of which are high-principled or predominantly so. As Euripides' characterization lowered tragic standards so Menander raised comic standards and produced "realistic" characters; he "holds the mirror up to life." Not that all Euripides' plays with these "worse" characters are comic or semi-comic; he creates human tragedy by cutting the old heroes down to size and debunking them; it is the immediate forerunners of Menander who create comedy. The keynote to this tendency is characterization in later tragedy and comedy is 'humanity'; Euripides' other weak or unstable characters' struggling under the eye of capricious gods, Menander's ordinary people living their lives and extricated from their problems by lucky coincidence, not, like Aristophanes' heroes, by their own superhuman efforts. The gods have no part in Menander's plays.

The most notable difference between Menander and Euripides in point of characterization (taking into consideration the difference between tragedy and

comedy) is that Menander, as far as we can see, does not introduce incorrigible villains; everyone has something to say for himself and his wrongdoing is often due to misunderstanding. Cnemon produces the excuse that he's afraid of evil influences and admits he's taken his love of solitude too far. Polemon is enraged with Glycera due to a mistake and we are carefully told that he is not normally like that. As Menander shows there is good in all his characters and so leads them to reconciliation, Euripides shows there is bad in most of his - embittered women turn to violence in Hecuba, Electra, Heracleidae, and a grim ending results. If someone shows unexpected better points - notably Eurystheus - it is for the purpose of showing up the violence of a "sympathetic" character.

The Hippolytus is a tragedy of misunderstanding on the human plane - Theseus the father believes the wrong person and is deceived. Menander, in the Lamia, takes a similar situation as seen from the father's point of view - son is believed to have seduced wife - eliminates the tragic elements, and all ends happily.

The Alcestis, noted for its taking the position of a satyr-play, has more than one link with comedy. First there is the Greedy Heracles of mythological burlesque, toned down to a rough but good-natured man, then a tragic version of father at odds with son. And the teasing of Admetus at the end with its element of folktale perhaps belongs to the same family as the pestering of Cnemon and the reproving of Smicrines.

Euripides' Helen can hardly be classed as a tragedy. It has distinct comic elements; Menelaus, a soldier, washed up on the shore and worried about his appearance; the vanquishing of the Sacker of Troy by a female doorkeeper, Menelaus' stupefaction in the prolonged recognition scene and his general obtuseness - though this is necessary for the plot. The rivals for Helen could be compared with Polemon and Moschien in the Perikeiromene. Menelaus is not the comic stock soldier but he has some of his traits in his quickness to violent - and useless-action, combined with ignorance of cunning provided by Helen. Polemon is a soldier but not a stock soldier either - his violence is limited to his early attack on Glycera. There is something of a love plot in the Helen; Theodymenus is delighted to think Helen is persuaded to marry him, and he need no longer force her; he at once starts worrying about her grief for Menelaus. He is a typical young man, violent and impetuous but devoted to Helen.

The influence of Euripides can clearly be seen in Menander. He quotes him - lines from the 'Auge' in the Epitrepontes - he uses recognition and intrigue plots, and they share a liking for philosophical speeches and an interest in the theories of the day. How much of this was due to direct influence and how much to the taste of an age and general tendency cannot be certain.

The comedy of Menander is perhaps closer to Euripides' Helen in tone than to any other extant Greek drama. Even Plautine New Comedy goes in for broader humour; he tends more to divide characters into "good" and "bad" - for instance the comically villainous Ballio in 'Pseudolus'. Menander's comedy or light drama is designed for a fastidious audience who prefer unpleasantness to be avoided or swept away in a happy conclusion; to look on "good" heroes and heroines and see the triumph of the good.

CELIA JAMES

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In order that readers who have not a complete collection of numbers of Pegasus may have an easy reference to articles in earlier issues, Mr. T. J. Hunt and I have between us compiled an index of articles contained in Volumes I-X (June 1964- June 1968). It is intended that an index be published after every tenth issue. A complete collection of issues of Pegasus is kept in the Periodicals Reference Room in the Library.

Roman numerical figures refer to volume number and digits to page number. Figures in parentheses give the length of the article in pages. So, in the first entry, VII 5(7) indicates that the article appears in Vol. 8, pages 5-11.

R. D. NUTT
(Editor).

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