

PEGASUS 42

The Journal of the University of Exeter
Dept. of Classics and Ancient History (1999)

PEGASUS 42

The Journal of the University of Exeter Dept. of Classics and Ancient History

CONTENTS

Special Supplement:
Res Gestae - compiled by David Harvey

All correspondence to:
David Harvey
53 Thornton Hill
Exeter EX4 4NR

Acknowledgements:
We should like to thank Nick Walter for his hard work as Treasurer and Circulation Manager. We also acknowledge the substantial contribution to editing made by Fiona McHardy whose computer talents have been challenged over the last five years working on *Pegasus*. This will be her fifth and final *Pegasus*. Also standing down from the committee is Jill Marrington, whose high standards in copy editing will be sorely missed.

ISSN 0308-2431

REPORT FROM THE HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

Chris Gill

Conferences and Visiting Speakers

The Department continues to be an active centre of international research conferences. In September 1998, Fiona McHardy and Eireann Marshall organized a conference, *An Alien Influence: the Role of Women in Creating Culture*, with speakers from the USA, UK and Eire. In July 1999, Richard Seaford and Lynette Mitchell are organizing a conference on *Money and Culture in Ancient Greece*. Scholars from a wide range of countries will be exploring this many-sided topic, and there will be a production of Aristophanes' *Wealth*, directed by Yana Zarifi. Further details from the organizers.

In March 2000, the Department will mark the new millennium with a conference celebrating the work of Peter Wiseman, Professor of Classics at Exeter since 1977, on the occasion of his 60th birthday. The conference is on *Myth, History and Performance in Republican Rome*, with 14 papers from scholars of Roman history, literature and archaeology from Italy, the USA, and UK. Further details from Dr. Emma Gee or Prof. Chris Gill. We expect all three conferences to lead to published volumes in due course.

Visitors to the Research Seminar this year included Sander Goldberg (UCLA) on Roman Drama, Antonis Tsakmakis (Cyprus) on Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae,* and Richard Hunter (Cambridge) on Catullus.

Publications

Alan Griffin's commentary on Ovid, *Metamorphosis 11* appeared as two volumes of the journal *Hermathena*. John Marr's edition *of Plutarch's Life of Themistocles*, with translation and commentary, was published by Aris and Phillips. *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece*, based on an earlier Exeter conference, was published by Oxford University Press, edited by Chris Gill, Norman Postlethwaite and Richard Seaford.

Other News

There have been several staff changes this year. Rev. Dr. Alan Griffin has taken early retirement after 30 years of much-valued work in the Department. He has left with our best wishes to work in the Exeter Diocese as the Assistant Priest of St. Michael's Heavitree. His replacement is Rebecca Langlands, who is completing a doctoral thesis on Valerius Maximus, and whose interests centre on Roman Literature and gender. Another new arrival is Dr. Lynette Mitchell, a Greek social historian who comes to Exeter from Australia, after completing her PhD at Durham and holding postdoctoral appointments in Durham and Oxford. Her book *Greeks Bearing Gifts* was published by Cambridge University Press in 1997. Her post is completely new, and was awarded to the Department in the light of our excellent result (5A) in the 1996 Research Assessment Exercise and our buoyant undergraduate numbers. The quota for new students for 1999 is nearly 60 students - which may be increased to 70. The arrival of three young women lecturers (including Dr. Emma Gee, appointed last year), two of them Australian, has given the Department a fresh look. Eireann Marshall, who is still teaching part-time, gave birth to her son, Emmanuel, in March of last year.

Another change is the retirement of Janet Crook, our hugely well-liked and capable secretary for over 10 years. She has been replaced by Claire Turner, who comes to us from the Student Health Centre. She will be working with the guidance of Kerensa Pearson, our continuing part-time secretary (and the power-house behind the production of several Exeter volumes).

Postgraduate research continues to develop. The scholarship generously given to the Department by the A.G.Leventis Foundation was awarded to Arlene Allan, a Canadian working on Hermes in Greek drama. Other new research students are Konstantinos Doulamis (funded by the University of Exeter) and Eleanor O'Kell (holder of a British Academy studentship). In a new development, Prof. David Braund has been awarded two postdoctoral research assistants, by the Arts and Humanities Research Board and the University of Exeter, to take forward his research on the Black Sea region.

The Department has been combined with that of Theology for administrative purposes within the University; the name of the school will be 'Classics, Ancient History and Theology' from next session; Dr. Norman Postlethwaite continues as Head of School. This *mariage de convenance* is working smoothly; the first offspring is a joint school MA in 'Ethics, Religion and Society'.

STAFF RESEARCH REPORTS

David Braund

I am currently completing a book on Greeks, Scythians and Amazons for Routledge. I am also beginning a large research project on the ancient Crimea. With John Wilkins I am preparing a volume of papers on the writings of Athenaeus.

Emma Gee

I have completed my book on *Astronomy in Ovid's Fasti* and am moving on to a commentary on Cicero's *Aratea* and a book on Greek and Roman science.

Christopher Gill

I have been working on *The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought*, to be published by OUP. My new translation of Plato's *Symposium* will be published by Penguin Classics during 1999.

David Harvey

With John Wilkins, I am currently engaged in editing *The Rivals of* Aristophanes, a volume based on the homonymous conference of 1996 and I am advising on *Tragic Fragments*, edited by Lucy Byrne, Deborah Gentry and Fiona McHardy. I am also contributing notes on classical matters to the new Oxford text of David Hume's *Essays Moral and Political.*

Rebecca Langlands

I am currently finishing my PhD dissertation which is a study of ideas about gender and heroism and virtue in Valerius Maximus' *Memorable Deeds and Words*, a collection of exemplary tales from history probably written as an resource for Roman orators, and dedicated to the emperor Tiberius.

John Marr

My edition of Plutarch's *Life of Themistocles* was published by Aris and Phillips in September 1998.

Lynette Mitchell

I am currently working on a book looking at Greek relations with non-Greeks and the development and implications of the ideology of the 'barbarian' from the archaic period to the death of Alexander (a book which will probably be called, not surprisingly, *Greeks and Barbarians*).

Norman Postlethwaite

I have recently published papers on the Shield of Achilles in *Iliad* 18, and on the role of the dying god in the religion of Bronze Age Crete. I am continuing to pursue this latter question and will publish a further paper on it this year. My main research project is now gesture and other forms of non-verbal communication in Homer.

Richard Seaford

I am currently writing a book on the cultural consequences of the introduction of money among the Greeks.

John Wilkins

I have finished my book on *Food in Greek Comedy* and am about to begin work on a commentary on Galen's *de alimentorum facultatibus.* I am working on a volume of papers on the writings of Athenaeus with Dave Braund and am editing *The Rivals of Aristophanes* with David Harvey.

Peter Wiseman

I have been working on Liber, the Roman equivalent of Dionysus; his temple and cult, shared with Ceres and "Libera" (Ariadne?), were supposedly founded in 493 BC, and according to Ovid the Liberalia (17 March) had once been a dramatic festival like the Athenian Dionysia. A lengthy article entitled "Liber: Myth, Drama and Ideology in the Roman Republic" will be appearing before too long.

DOCTORAL RESEARCH PROJECTS IN THE DEPARTMENT

Arlene Allan - Hermes in Greek Drama
Muzaffer Demir - Economic and Political Aspects of Athenian Relations with the Black Sea
Konstantinos Doulamis - The Rhetoric of Eros in the Ancient Novel
Anna Feakins - Altruism in Greek Literature
Deborah Gentry - The Female Grotesque in Art and Literature
Fiona McHardy - The Ideology of Revenge as it is Represented in Greek Literature
Alex Naylor - Logos and Self-Knowledge from Homer to Wagner
Eleanor O'Kell - Sophocles' Political Thought
Larry Shenfield - Chariots in Antiquity
Alexei Zadorojnyi - Plutarch's Literary *Paideia*

The 23rd Jackson Knight Memorial Lecture
THE ENCHANTMENTS OF CIRCE:
THE REFUSAL OF ODYSSEUS, THE CHOICE OF GRYLLUS

Marina Warner

Circe, the Homeric goddess who turns Odysseus' men into swine, is a mistress of changes of shape, and has been commonly inculpated for the degradation - the loss of self - they signify. And yet, in Books X and XII of the *Odyssey* (*fig. 1*) and in later tradition, she is also an enchantress, an expert in love and pleasure who presides over a bower of bliss. Her ambiguous figure poses a crucial dilemma, and responses to her myth reflect ideas about humanity and inhumanity, duty and pleasure, heroism and effeminacy, chastity and sensuality. But above all Circe is comic in the true sense: she can be read as embodying a denial of the importance of being earnest. She occupies the area where humour overlaps with amusement, not jokes. She does not seem so on the face of her story, because the moralizing tendency has glamorized her vice and dalliance, turning her into a terrifying witch, a serious *femme fatale.* But she represents the comic in a deeper, less uproarious sense than jesting: first, her story enjoys its own sophistication, as it conveys irony about serious, high matters, and claims lightness as a good. Secondly, her realm embodies the grotesque, another form of mordant humour, when she mocks human littleness and vanity with her transmutations of men into beasts. Milton was not sympathetic to Circe, but he caught this central trait of her literary function, when he invented a son for her and gave him the name Comus, personification of revelry and enchantment. In Milton's masque, Comus has inherited his mother's magic and, from Bacchus, his father, his wicked ways with wine, women and song. From Saint Augustine to James Joyce, male imaginations have worried at the seductions the figure of Circe exerts.[1]

Imagining transformations has provided a lively, enduring framework on which hang definitions of what it means to be human and, hence, what it means to lose human status - a comic position, when it is not tragic. Inventing faces for terrors or redrawing their features in a changed shape represents a way of coping with them, of making them familiar, of turning them into sources of pleasure and even merriment. The invention of anomalies, aliens, and whole teratological systems develops a theme and supplies characteristic visual and verbal imagery that first enter the tradition with the classical genealogies of the gods and their monstrous brethren, and, more psychologically, with the figure of Circe. Homer's witch has the power to abolish the human order and reestablish the monstrous one and she consequently offers a richly polyvalent figure for the exploration of this area of human definition. When the question of virtue seems more complicated than controlling the brutishness in human nature, then figures who have cast brutes in a different light offer a way out of the moral impasse around sexuality and greed, and they can help to redefine the passions with ironical self-knowledge, and in a lighter mood. Still, the laughter that the grotesque and the monstrous inspire often leaves a tart aftertaste.

Fig. 1: 'From Book Ten of the Story that Odysseus Tells to Alcinous' Roman marble relief (early imperial period)[2]

Circe's knowledge is 'baneful', so Homer tells us (*olophôia dênea*, *Od.* 10.246); she is *polypharmakos*, skilled at many decoctions and philtres, a fitting match for Odysseus, who is *polymetis,* of the many devices, and *polytropos*, of many shifts and turns. Her powers of enchantment are transformative, above all: she can change men's shapes. In the *Odyssey*, she turns the companions of the hero into swine, but mountain wolves and lions also roam her grounds, and in later mythographers and poets' interpretations, her zoomorphic range extends even beyond mammals: Machiavelli lined up a menagerie, including a giraffe, and the Italian cobbler savant Giambattista Gelli even included, in his *Circe* of 1548, a hare, a snake, an ostrich and an oyster in her happy zoo (*fig. 2*). This was a highly successful work, quickly translated into French and English and Spanish, and disseminating a sanguine vision of the animal state.[3]

Translations of Greek texts have generally been taken from the Penguin Classics, unless otherwise stated.

Illustrations: TM = O. Touchefeu-Meynier, *Thèmes odysséens dans l'art antique* (Paris 1968)

[1] For Homer's Circe see Heubeck in Heubeck & Hoekstra, *Commentary on the Odyssey* II (1989) 50-74. Later authors: Augustine, *City of God* 18.17 (citing Varro); James Joyce, *Ulysses* [1922], ed. H.W.Gabler et al. (1984) 350-497. See M.Y. Hughes, 'Spenser's Acrasia and the Circe of the Renaissance', *Jnl. Hist. Ideas* 4 (1943) 381-99; J. Yarnall, *Transformations of Circe* (1994); Gareth Roberts, 'The Descendants of Circe' in J. Barry et al. (eds.), *Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe* (1996) 183-206.

[2] A long-lost relief, known only from two 18th-c. reproductions until the original was discovered in Warsaw in 1951: TM no. 205 (pl. XX), with pp. 104-6.

[3] N. Machiavelli, 'L'Asino' in *Tutte le opere* (Florence 1971), 971; John Baptist Gelli, *Circe* [1548], trs. H. Layng (London 1744); first French trs. by Denis Sauvage (1550), first English trs. by Henry Iden (1557). See E. Hatzantonis, 'I geniali rimaneggiamenti dell'episodio Omerico di Circe', *Revue Belge de Phil.* 54 (1976) 5-24.



Fig. 2: 'An ostrich in the happy zoo' W. S. van Ehrenberg (1630-76), *Ulysses at the Palace of Circe*. Getty Museum, Los Angeles.

One of the earliest monumental works to depict the Circean episode of the *Odyssey* is an Etruscan sarcophagus, now in Orvieto, of the late fourth century BC (*fig. 3*). One of its sculpted ends shows the hero at the moment when he rushes on Circe with drawn sword, as the god Hermes has instructed him to do. Hermes has also given Odysseus the magic plant *moly*, with a milky flower and a black root and possessed of such mysterious protective powers that Circe is unable to harm him or change his shape.[4] When she sees that he - alone of all men - is able to resist the wave of her wand, she exclaims that he must be the promised Odysseus. She then proposes that they make love, as Hermes had predicted she would.



Fig. 3: 'The hero rushes on Circe with drawn sword' Etruscan sarcophagus, 4th c. BC. Museo Etrusco, Orvieto: TM no. 219 (pl. XVII).

On the tomb, the couple - for they will become a couple - are flanked by two of her more predictable victims: they are standing upright, but one has been metamorphosed into a tusky wild boar, the other into a horned ram; both ciphers of lustfulness and violence have retained their men's bodies. On the other end, Odysseus is shown sacrificing the ram, on Circe's instructions, in order to descend into the Underworld and commune there with the shades, unharmed. 'No doubt,' writes Richard Brilliant, 'that the representation of Odysseus, Kirke and the monstrously deformed companions on Etruscan cinerary urns reflects the Etruscans' understanding of the perils of the journey to Hades...'[5]

The hybrid character of such images departs from Homer, however, who tells us, a little later, that Circe specifically drove Odysseus' companions into pens and

[4] What was it? See Heubeck [n.1] 60-1.

[5] R. Brilliant, 'Kirke's Men' in B. Cohen (ed.), *The Distaff Side* (1995) 165-74.

Fig. 4: A comic Circe. Boeotian skyphos, late 5th c. BC. British Museum: TM no. 192 (pl. XVII).

sties like 'swine'.[6] So the man-beasts the artists represent stand in for their internal consciousness of themselves as men, which has not changed, for all their loss of memory and conscience. Homer details the metamorphoses: he tells us that the twenty-two companions were transformed in head, shape, voice and skin (he specifically mentions bristles sprouting from their flesh), 'but their minds were as human as they had been before the change' (10.239-40). He describes how the metamorphosed men now fawn, having been made servile in their bondage to the sorceress.

This is the tragic doubled condition that the images of warrior figures with animal heads convey: her victims are not sub-human, but are experiencing being trapped as humans in not-human form, unable to express themselves, only, sometimes, to weep. An arresting vase painting of the late fifth century BC in the British Museum (*fig. 4*), painted in the grotesque comic style popular in Boeotia, shows one companion, half-boar half-man, squatting by Circe's loom, vulpine, feral, yet tamed and thereby demeaned.

P.M.C. Forbes-Irving, in his excellent study *Metamorphosis in Greek myth* (Oxford 1990), has commented that beings who command ambiguous, transformational powers, like Proteus, Minos and Circe, do not take their place as full members of the divine pantheon, but remain intermediate figures, unreliable, immoral, wilful, but ultimately powerless before other, higher gods, as Circe is herself subject to Hermes' magic. 'Circe and Proteus' transformations lack the religious or moral motivation that is a basic feature of the later pantheon,' he writes (176-7). 'Their activities are somehow "inimical to gods and heroes."'

In Homer, Circe is neither an Olympian nor a mortal, but a figure in between, shaman-like in her liminal straddling between this world and another. She is daughter to Helios, the sun, and her island, Aiaia, is the abode of Eos, the dawn; she comes from a family distinguished for witchcraft, Medea being her niece.[7] The derivation of her name is not clear, but one cluster of associations is worth noting: *kirkos* means falcon, or carrion bird, and is related to the Latin *corax*, crow, and thence to Sycorax, another island queen and sorceress; Shakespeare, who knew his *Metamorphoses*, catches an echo of the Circean realm in *The Tempest*, where he dramatizes another island that returns to due - patriarchal - order through the magic of Prospero, who has supplanted the island's former ruler, Sycorax, mother of that fishy hybrid Caliban. His protagonist recalls how powerful a witch she was, who could control the moon and tides; later, in course of one of his magician's speeches, Shakespeare's good wizard takes on the phrases and the cadences of Medea, from Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and Seneca's play.

The figure of Circe the dread goddess associated with sounds and airs flits behind the shadow of Sycorax, mistress of the isle that is full of noises and sweet airs, peopled with fantastic creatures, dogs and sprites summoned by Prospero's borrowed sorcery. It also reverberates, distantly but surely, in another insular dystopia, H.G. Wells's *The Island of Doctor Moreau*, whose protagonist lives surrounded by Beast-Folk generated, in this case, by genetic engineering. Classical metamorphosis thus prefigures contemporary nightmares about possible perverse uses of scientific knowledge, from transplantation of organs to genetic engineering to mutation of cells by other means.

Apollonius of Rhodes, in *The Voyage of Argo*, written in the third century BC, describes Circe on her island surrounded by 'a number of creatures whose ill-assorted limbs declared them to be neither man nor beast...' He draws on a pastoral metaphor for Circe's relation to her menagerie: she presides, he says, 'like a shepherd over a great flock of sheep' (4.672-5). The fawning which in Homer conveys the emasculation of her victims' bewitched condition returns here as contemptible domesticity, tameness, loss of individuality, sheepishness. Apollonius' text sharpens a fear and reproach underlying the encounter with the enchantress in Homer, that the unmanned state of the creatures she has transformed returns them to a literally primitive state, coming before civilization or, rather, set apart from its higher forms. As Christine de Pizan writes in

[6] When they are restored to human form, they are described as 'swine of nine years old' (390) - that is, no longer sucking pigs, but ready for the table? Or past their prime? (Nine years sounds on the old, tough side.).

[7] For Circe's family, see Hesiod, *Theogony* 956-62; so too Apollonius of Rhodes; cf. Heubeck [n.1] 52, who also discusses her name.

her learned way, in 1400, the story teaches how Circe, 'a lady full of wantonness and idleness', places in jeopardy the manly ideals of Hector, the hero of her didactic text *L'Epitre d'Othea* (trs. S. Scrope (1904) 111-2).

For Christian humanists, the stress fell less on the animal form per se than on deformity: in his poem about Circe, *L'Asino* ('The Ass') Machiavelli described her brutes as *disfatti* -'undone'- they are missing ears and tails, jumbled like a game of consequences. The Dutch engraver who illustrated a seventeenth-century emblem book by Joost van den Vondel, inverted the noble classical prototype of the upright animal-headed hybrid, and gave one or two of Circe's victims - a pig, a bear - ungainly animal posteriors and crawling, creeping or rampant motion, beneath men's faces *(fig. 5)*.

Fig. 5: 'Ungainly animal posteriors and crawling, creeping or rampant motion' From a 17th-c. Dutch emblem book.[8]

In Circe's zoo, systems break down and labels are mixed up and mismatched; hybrids and monsters result from this mingling of species; she brings generic disorder to natural phenomena, assembling around her a freak show, a variant on the cabinets of curiosities and medical museums of biological monstrosities that were popular among the learned in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

An assemblage of parts not proper to the form - natural bricolage, combinatory synecdoche - epitomizes the condition of the monster in the Aristotelian tradition that was disseminated through Aquinas's teaching. If the transformed men had been wholly lion or hog or boar, they would not have transgressed the propriety of natural things; their singularity makes them, not individual but spare and strange, irregular and therefore accursed.

Circe's witchcraft also implies mastery of the natural properties of things, which gives her command of their perversion, too: in Homer, she puts some unspecified 'evil drugs' (*pharmaka lugra*) in the refreshing meal of cheese, barley, honey and Pramnian wine that she gives the companions of Odysseus; as supping together in myth, epic and fairytale is usually far more dangerous than sleeping together, this refreshment fatally alters their minds; they lose memory of their *patridos aiês*, their homeland, and become vulnerable to another of her magic instruments, a wand, which she waves over them, to turn them into beasts (10.234-8; see Heubeck). The wand is the *maga*'s recurrent, identifying attribute, as Prospero's staff is imbued with his 'art' in *The Tempest*.

Both these methods of enchantment - the drugs, the stroke of her wand - are interwoven with Circe's most potent gift of all: her voice, and its command of experience through language.[9] For the poet and translator of Homer, George Chapman, Circe had 'a voice divine'. Modern translators prefer to call her 'a dread goddess with a human voice'. Robert Fagles, in his recent [1996] translation of the poem, renders the lines: 'Circe / the nymph with lovely braids, an awesome power too / who can speak with human voice' (p. 234). *Audêessa*, human-voiced, is her defining epithet, and the phrase *deinê theos audêessa* is all but unique to Circe in the Homeric lexicon.[10] Sometimes translators emphasize that Circe expresses herself in language rather than sounds or music. But this unusual word *audêessa* interestingly echoes the word for the voice of the swallow, *audê*, which returns in the *Odyssey* to describe the sound of the bowstring when Odysseus takes up his great bow in challenge to the suitors; first the poem compares the action to a bard's stringing of his lyre, then follows this, to intensify the effect, with the singing of the swallow:

'And now, as easily as a musician who knows his lyre strings the cord on a new peg after looping the twisted sheep-gut at both ends, he strung the great bow without effort or haste and with his right hand proved the string, which gave a lovely sound in answer like a swallow's note (*audên*)...' (21.406-11).

In the *Odyssey*, the human-voiced, swallow-noted enchantress does not appear before us as an *image* of a beautiful woman. We do not *see* her, as we see, when Eurylochus describes it to Odysseus, her house of polished stone with its beckoning smoke, standing on open ground after the dense screen of oak scrub and forest with the drugged victims. He evokes the sight of the mountain lions and wolves are gambolling around it, fawning not fierce, unmanned by her magic. But she does not make a visible entrance into this mind-picture: she is conjured up, before us and before Eurylochus and the men, as a *sound* - she is first heard, from inside the house, as she weaves some airy delicate cloth

[8] From Joost van den Vondel, *De Vernieuwde Gulden Winckel der kunstlievenden Nederlanders* (*The Golden Shop of Art-loving Netherlanders, Revised*), Amsterdam 1622.

[9] See C.P. Segal, 'Circean temptations', *Trans. Amer. Philol. Assocn.* 99 (1968) 419-42, with his *Singers, Heroes and Gods in the Odyssey* (1994) ch.5.

[10] *Od.* 10.136, 11.8, 12.150; but also of Calypso, 12.449. Brilliant [n.4] 165 translates 'the dread goddess who talks with mortals'. *Audêessa* by itself is used of Leucothea at 5.334, and *audêentôn* of mankind in general at 6.125: see J. Clay, '*Demas* and *audê*', *Hermes* 102 (1974) 129-36, on this elusive word.

Fig. 6: 'An unapologetically sensual painting' Dosso Dossi (c.1479-c.1542), *Circe and her Lovers in a Landscape* National Gallery, Washington D.C. Excellent colour reproduction in Marina Warner, *No Go the Bogeyman* (1998), plate 28.

at her loom, 'singing sweetly', Polites, dearest of Odysseus' men, exclaims, so that (in Chapman's version) 'the pavement rings / With imitation of the tunes she sings' (10. 224-7). We are also told that she has 'lovely braids', but the poem insists far more on the quality of her voice.

Circe not only commands through language but is commanded by it; she respects its binding force, its sovereignty over the speaker's desire; though 'baneful', she does not betray her promises, perhaps cannot, since the syntax of magic lies beyond her control. Hermes tells Odysseus that after counteracting her magic with *moly,* he must impose an oath on her; when she has sworn not to harm him, she will not be able to (299-301): words here are indispensable support to magic herbs, and permanently binding.

Artists have made ingenious attempts to represent Circe's spellbinding in visual terms. The innovative and allegorical Ferrarese artist Dosso Dossi, for example, in an unapologetically sensual painting of around 1518-25, now in the National Gallery, Washington D.C. (*fig. 6*), strips Circe, twists her at the waist into an extreme contrapposto in order to display her nakedness, with only her fair tresses for drapery, and shows her writing on a chart, her lips parted as she instructs her transformed victims. She is captured in the act of singing - or speaking - with that legendary human voice, and a book lies open at her feet in the manner of a sibyl. In a sumptuous baroque painting attributed to Gerard van Honthorst, in Ludlow Castle in England, lumbering monsters are guzzling her poisoned meal, one of the mutants actually munching on a paper, inscribed with a spell, in rather the same way as St John ate the small book in the Apocalypse before starting to prophesy again - word incarnate as voice-flesh (*Revelation* 10.8-11). Or, again perhaps, how the inhabitants of Laputa thought they could learn languages. However, the beasts will lose the power of speech.

It is necessary to read Homer's text closely to see that Circe the legendary witch does not behave malignantly; after she has been disarmed by the hero's *moly,* she takes the part of a storyteller, a wise teacher, a sibyl, giving detailed, clear instructions to Odysseus about his destiny, telling him how he must descend into the Underworld and invoke Tiresias, enumerating the steps he must take to summon the old seer's shade, and stressing the prohibitions he must observe. Prohibitions are the stuff of fairytale magic, the knowledge of which Circe is mistress, and which she willingly imparts. As she is Helios' offspring and thus privy to the secrets of light, so she is an insider in the realms of darkness and can disclose the laws by which darkness operates. Her wisdom encompasses these mysteries as well as those of metamorphosis: after turning Odysseus' men and so many others into beasts, she is shown doing nothing

more than illuminating the shadows and revealing secrets, for the survival - for the good - of Odysseus.

Circe, dread goddess of the lovely voice, is well acquainted with the Sirens and their irresistible song: she warns Odysseus about them and gives him the way of becoming the first and only man to hear them and to live, when she tells him to deafen his men with wax and bind himself to the mast (12.47-54). The Sirens, contrary to popular readings of Homer, do not explicitly exercise sexual charms and overcome men through desire. Chapman overdetermined the meaning influentially when he rendered their song as 'shrill, and in sensual appetite so strong' (12.44, Homer's *ligurê)*, and made Circe warn Odysseus, 'How strong in instigation to their love / Their rapting tunes are' (elaborated from 12.52). Wildly imaginative renderings in this vein proved popular. But Homer's account of the sirens' charms rather reflects Circe's own prescience and profound magic. They, too, are not envisaged, but overheard, and they are attributed 'foreknowledge of all that is to come' (12.191). Like singers of lullabies, they soothe and charm and sing of what might be. Circe clearly enjoys this gift, too: she also foresees Odysseus' passage through Scylla and Charybdis and instructs him how to negotiate these - and further - ordeals.

Knowledge of female monstrosity and of ways to overcome or at least avoid its force belongs in the domain of Circe's expertise.[11] In later myth, her black magic, her goety, often includes carnal knowledge. Witchlike, she holds sway over the risky and polluting effluvia of the body, able to curse as well as to bless, to make monsters, to restore youth. Minos turns to Circe, for example, when he has been cursed by a jealous Pasiphae to the effect that he will ejaculate nothing but scorpions and other insects. Circe gives him a brew to reverse the spell (Apollodorus 3.15.1; Antoninus Liberalis 4.31). When Ovid makes Circe responsible for Scylla's monstrous transmogrification, he is simply stitching the associations more tightly together: Circe commands monsters because in some sense she is herself monstrous, as witches are.

Yet in Homer, the enchantress's oracular benevolence towards the hero is not limited simply to helping him defeat her own kind. She foreshadows Penelope in more ways than one: her home-making for Odysseus includes the airy webs she weaves at her loom. It is also striking that the metamorphosis her victims undergo explicitly re-invigorates them; once they are restored and free from the hog bristles that disfigured them, not only did they become men again, 'but looked younger and much handsomer and taller than before' (10.395-6). Her enchanted castle conceals a fountain of youth, it seems, and it has inspired many successive bowers of bliss where wanderers are made captive to the equivalent of her beautiful bed: the castle of Love in Apuleius' *Cupid and Psyche*; the island of Alcina; the Grotta della Sibilla near Norcia; the magic castle in *Le Serpentin vert* by Marie Catherine d'Aulnoy, the writer of fairytales.

For as everyone knows, although Odysseus and his men weep out of longing for their native land, they still delay a year in 'Circe's sacred halls, feasting on abundant flesh and sweet wine' (10.467-8). After they have been restored to human shape, the exiles still have not recovered their full *nostos*, the drive to return to the homeland. Something of her original, mind-altering drug lingers.

The Homeric adjectives - the recurrent stress on 'baneful', 'evil' - characterizing Circe's works, the weeping and laments of the men in her vicinity push hard in the narrative to convince the hearer/reader of the horrors of Circe's sorcery. But this strong conventional opposition between Circe, representative of temptation, unruliness and decadence, and Odysseus or another manly opponent, committed to the return home and all that means, this insistent and perennial interpretation of the Homeric story does not cohere with the Homeric episode, and it inspired a witty challenge. For the events that unfold in Circe's company and her conduct towards Odysseus and his men belie the terror that the traditional exclamatory, morally outraged reaction ostensibly maintains. While evoking the men in tearful and homesick disarray, Homer's story also continues to sing the sweets of Circe's sensual paradise. Any receiver of the Homeric story could hardly fail to notice the contradiction, and a story entered the legends clustering around the figures of Odysseus and Circe, to upset the conventional, patent meaning of the bestial metamorphoses her enchantments brought about.

* * * * *

Circe's powers of animal metamorphosis became the point of departure for philosophical discussion of the difference between the human and animal states. Issues of principle and definitions of virtue focussed on the loss - or gain - that the companions of Odysseus underwent in their change of shape.

Plutarch, in an essay from his *Moralia* that was once a well-known favourite, introduced a rebel: a certain Gryllus, one of Circe's victims, who refuses to be restored to human shape and to return to Greece with Odysseus. He defends his companions who, like himself, choose to stay with Circe.[12] A pig speaking fluent Greek, Gryllus engages Odysseus in a fleet-footed debate about virtue, and speaks up wittily but passionately against the assumed superiority of the human condition. Montaigne, who was deeply influenced by Plutarch, took the dialogue as an attack on human barbarity and a defence of animals; in Italy, Lorenzo Valla developed this line of argument. As Plutarch also wrote on animals' skills and intelligence, praising the swallow's nest and the nightingale's song as evidence, and furthermore advocated vegetarianism, his dialogue

[11] I am grateful to Adriana Cavarero for her thoughts about sirens' and monsters' relation to speech, in her talk 'Ondine Goes Away', delivered at Warwick University, 4 November 1996.

[12] Translated as 'On the use of reason by "irrational" animals' by Robin Waterfield in the Penguin *Plutarch: Essays* (1992) 375-99; as 'Beasts are rational' by Cherniss & Helmbold in the Loeb *Moralia* XII (1957) 489-533; and as 'Gryllus' by Donald Russell in the World's Classics *Plutarch: Selected Essays* (1993) 337-48.

about the rebel pig was taken as a ringing manifesto in the debate on animal rights. Ever since a study of 'theriophily', or the love of animals, by the classical anthropologist George Boas, the *Gryllus* is still chiefly interpreted in that light. Michel Foucault's comment, for example, that Gryllus' fate expresses 'how the soul of desiring man had become a prisoner of the beast' oddly misses the comic and subversive force of the figure.[13] This pessimistic emphasis also overlooks an accompanying tradition that listens more accurately to the ironic flippancies of Plutarch's dialogue; for the *Gryllus*, as the Essay itself came to be known, is a joke against us, against people, rather than a plea for just dealings with animals; it is an inspired early satire in the great fabric of the literature of folly. Recognizing the brute in the human can be one of the most effective ways of dealing with fear, more subtle than confronting figures of terrors in heroic combat or in aggressive mimicry, but more ambiguous, since acknowledging our kinship with monstrosity does not bring simple consolation. Gryllus illustrates the long historical relationship between comic resistance and the category of the brute. Thinking through beasts punctures pride; beasts are good to think with (to quote the famous axiom of Lévi-Strauss), especially when it comes to laughing at the very disturbance that beasts and monsters, the fairground mirrors of the human, hold up before us.

Plutarch's witty, paradoxical exchanges among Gryllus and Odysseus and Circe introduce Gryllus' defiance for the first time in written literature under the resonant title 'On the Use of Reason by "Irrational" Animals'. At the start, Circe tells Odysseus that a return to human shape will bring 'ruin' on his men. Odysseus rejoins, 'You're definitely trying to turn me into an animal now, by getting me to believe that it is disastrous to change from an animal into a human being' (985ef). Circe presses her point with catty comments about the home Odysseus is returning to, including a reminder that Penelope will be getting on, after all this time, whereas she, Circe, enjoys perpetual youth. Throughout the argument, Odysseus remains the mouthpiece - though a rather gagged one - for the superiority of human beings. But Circe summons her champion from the crowd of pigs and asses and lions and wolves surrounding her to speak up for animal virtue, reason, and natural integrity. This interlocutor is not the only one of Odysseus' companions who has refused to be restored to human shape, as the dialogue will reveal. But he is cast as the spokesman for all those who choose Circe's pleasure gardens rather than restoration to human form.

Gryllus' name itself is a joke, presented as a kind of rude, almost childish nickname, for, when Odysseus asks Circe, 'Who was he when he was human?"she replies: 'What relevance does that have? Call him Gryllus, if you like' (986b).

Gryllus was a proper name, but Plutarch is mining a pun: it sounds like the Greek *gryl-* (*grul-*) which is the stem of the verb 'to grunt'. It thus picks up the imagery of the Homeric 'swine' in Circe's 'sties', as well as returning us to that sound cluster of beastly Grrr! words, such as grin and grind and growl and grimace. *Grylos* (later *grullos*), however, is a rare word, and not the word that Homer himself uses, which is *hys*, Latin *sus*. Nor does Plutarch's Gryllus show piggish qualities of any kind: he rather engages Odysseus in urbane cut-and-thrust, and soon overwhelms him, Plutarch clearly warming to his theme and deploying his convictions with relish. Odysseus offers to take Gryllus and his fellow-victims with him when he leaves the island. He adds, magnanimously, that he will even include the non-Greeks among them. But Gryllus rejoins sharply, 'Stop right there, Odysseus. Even you are not impressing any of us!' (986c). While Circe dubs him with this jocular, disparaging name, Gryllus himself takes the high ground to defend his choice. Plutarch's Gryllus proclaims that the condition of a beast surpasses humankind in 'morality, intelligence, courage and all the other virtues'. Beasts have souls, and furthermore, 'the animal mind is better equipped by nature for the production of virtue, and is more perfect', he declares. ' I mean, without being instructed or schooled - without being sown or ploughed, as it were - it naturally produces and grows whatever kind of virtue is appropriate...' (987b).

Furthermore, animal appetites are restrained, by contrast to human, especially in the sexual sphere, since beasts mate only to propagate their species (good evolutionary biologists!); nor do they choose partners outside their species or from their own sex. Animals are more faithful, and they are temperate in eating and drinking, since they only meet their needs. Their continence extends to material things: they are not covetous of gold, or status, or power. In all these points, Plutarch is taking issue with Aristotelian arguments that animals cannot exercise justice because they lack reason and cannot therefore choose to act justly, any just act on their part being unconscious. Aristotle linked this incapacity to animals' speechlessness; naturally, Plutarch is too sly to draw attention to the difficulty that Gryllus can still talk and furthermore out-talk Odysseus, the tale-teller, the riddler. In this respect at least, his exemplary apostate belongs to that eloquent species with whom casters of spells and mistresses of voice like Circe are identified.

Models of exemplary behaviour in the animal kingdom were frequently cited in European literature, and they made their way into the lively, storytelling bestiaries of the Middle Ages and Renaissance. Gelli's Circe (n.2) later affirms natural harmony: 'This is just the case with the propensions of mere animals, under the influence of their proper nature, which can't be called force, as it acts always for the best for them, and what effectually most tends to their preservation and perfection' (p.50). In this arch extrapolation from Plutarch, Gelli even demonstrates the superiority of the oyster, whose shell

[13] Plutarch, 'The Intelligence of Animals', *Moralia* 959-85; 'On Eating Flesh', *Moralia* 993-9: see G. Boas, *The Happy Beast* (1933) and his article 'Theriophily' in P.P. Wiener (ed.), *Dict. of Hist. of Ideas* (1973) 384-9; M. Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation* (trs. R. Howard, 1965) 20.

offers impregnable natural defences as well as convenient mobile housing.

But Plutarch was being deliberately contrary and outrageous to the predominant thinking - and delightfully so. The fundamental notion that beasts were ruled by instincts and irrational passions prevailed, and was adduced to exclude even a mother's ferocious defence of her cubs from the virtuous sphere of righteous anger. In one of Plato's dialogues, the sow of Crommyon is explicitly invoked (an example cited by Gryllus, 987f): her defence of her young is used to refine the distinction between conscious and deliberate acts of courage (human) and unconscious fearlessness, experienced by 'animals and other creatures which have no fear of dangers because they are devoid of understanding...' The speaker likens them to little children (*Laches* 196e-197b).

* * * * *

At the beginning of Plutarch's dialogue, Circe announces she is withdrawing, so that it will not appear that Gryllus is influenced by her presence or a desire to please her. Nevertheless, one theme that emerges from his praise of animals concerns the particular superiority of females, especially mythical creatures and hybrid monsters: the sow of Crommyon, the Sphinx, the Pythoness, and the vixen of Teumessus, who also terrorized the countryside near Thebes. As Gryllus expands on the rational and selfless courage of beasts, he asserts the superiority of animals to humans by citing the moral and physical strength of the female of many species. Not only do females defend their brood with warrior fierceness, they do not couple after they have conceived. He also mentions Aethe, the superb racing mare given to Agamemnon at Troy in exchange for a soldier who was reluctant to fight: how much more valuable this brave mare than a cowardly man! (987f-8a)

Does this bear on the character of Circe and her spells? It seems to me revealing that Gryllus fails to observe taxonomic distinctions between creatures domestic and wild, and that he further includes mythical monsters associated with female wisdom and prophecy: the Sphinx with her riddle and puzzles, and 'the Pythoness who fought with Apollo for the oracle at Delphi'. Both could be called avatars of Circe herself, intermediate figures in the pantheon, divine but not Olympians, of neither the underworld nor the empyrean, neither good nor bad, but supernaturally adept, powerful and dangerous. They exercise their wisdom through understanding of secret languages, decipherment of hidden codes.

Swine, hog, porker, pig are words of abuse in English: the associations of Gryllus, the grunting animal's namesake, persist in spite of the Plutarchian character's cunning tongue. The related adjectives - in English - figuratively denote beastliness more strongly than words associated with other animals: hoggish, swinish, piggish; verbs describing the activities of pigs pass as metaphors of baseness, instincts and low status: to grunt, to wallow, to swill. The suitors in the *Odyssey* are referred to as swine, consuming the goods of Odysseus in his absence (cf. Horace, *Epistles* 1.2.24-31).

The hog and the dog, taken at their most negative, the one gluttonous, the other ravenous like Scylla, become emblematic of the monster and of insatiable hunger; as such they act as distorting lenses on those human drives that cause profound moral anxiety. Dante does not identify the chief glutton in Hell, a compatriot whom he knew, but dubs him simply in death as in life, *Ciacco* (Hog).[14] In medieval symbolic schemes of morality, pigs often accompany the Vices of *Luxuria,* Lust, and *Gula,* Gluttony: Lust looks at herself in the mirror of Venus in the background of Sassetta's *Ecstasy of St. Francis*, painted in 1437; and Gluttony, mounted on a hog, guzzles a meat pie in a sixteenth-century sculpture in the cloisters of Chartres cathedral. *Animal Farm*, George Orwell's famous modern fable, significantly subtitled *'A Fairy Story'*, relies on some of the pig's brutal reputation to depict the corruption of power. The vernacular still keeps another aspect of the tradition alive: high on the hog, happy as a pig in shit.

Gryllus' defiance recuperates these instincts - and pleasures - on moral grounds, by discriminating between degrees of greed and brutishness; his clever logic-chopping opens the possibilities of an ethics of pleasure. But the point of the *Gryllus* lies more with mocking human vainglory and hypocrisy than with defending sins of the flesh. Erasmus refers to the dialogue in the dedicatory preface to *In Praise of Folly*, where Dame Folly lists the frivolous and absurd topics that Homer and Virgil and Apuleius explored when they most wanted to be serious: 'for how unjust is it, if when we allow different recreations to each particular course of life, we afford no diversion to studies; especially when trifles may be a whet to more serious thoughts...' Erasmus knew that Gryllus was more than just a noble representative of his piggy kind; he had become emblematic of a certain kind of refusal, of the laughter that mocks self-righteousness, pride, portentousness and pomp: his personified Folly judges happier and wiser the swine Gryllus than the man Ulysses (ch. 35).

The enchantment Circe casts on the Odyssean crew excludes them from society, but from that vantage point, they point at human shortcomings and follies, clowning in voluntary exile from the human race. However, the episode was not usually interpreted in this playful way, but, as Gareth Roberts has mapped in a recent essay, inspired profound moral allegories. When Edmund Spenser, at the end of the sixteenth century, reintroduced Gryllus into a chivalric English landscape of enchantment in *The Faerie Queene*, he was developing, in the character of Acrasia, the Circean mistress of beasts and beastliness, and openly introducing Plutarch's character. But he set aside the mocking, tongue-in-cheek grandeur of Plutarch's creation and Gelli's imitation (both of which he knew) in favour of the medieval emblem of Vice, and staged a

[14] *Inferno*, Canto VI.52. I am grateful to Ann Lawson Lucas for recalling this use of pig imagery in Dante.

despicable and squalid brute who chooses to be a brute.[15]

In Spenser's allegory, the paragon Sir Guyon destroys the Bower of Bliss, where Acrasia, one of Circe's sister enchantresses, rules. Her name means lack of continence, and the wild beasts who throng her ruined realm are her lovers, changed into 'figures hideous / according to their minds like monstruous'. In this compressed manner, Spenser suggests that the men's metamorphoses body forth their inner natures; they are not degraded to the condition of beasts, but exposed as being beastly within, transformed according to a form of commensurate, Dantesque retribution: when these victims of her lovecraft are changed back into men, 'they stared ghastly, some for inward shame...'

Spenser then names one, '*Grille* by name, / [Who] repyned greatly', and reproached his rescuers bitterly for restoring him, 'That had from hoggish forme him brought to naturall'. The Canto's last verse sermonizes without equivocation, as Grill has his way and is allowed to go back to his grunting state :

Said Guyon, See the mind of beastly man,
That hath so soone forgot the excellence
Of his creation, when he life began,
That now he chooseth, with vile difference,
To be a beast, and lacke intelligence.

To which Guyon's guide replies, keeping up the pressure of Christian disapproval:

.... The donghill kind
Delights in filth and foule incontinence:
Let Grill be Grill, and have his hoggish mind...
(*Fairie Queene* II, Canto 21.86-7).

Spenserian and Christian equivalences of beastliness and sin prevail in the English literary tradition, and Grill or Gryllus becomes a byword for piggery: Puritans and divines and scourgers of folly seem to enjoy delivering themselves of devastating condemnations of his choice, and expatiating on Gryllus' 'lewd immodest beastliness', his 'subtile-smelling swinish snout'.[16] By extension, of course, the enchantments of Circe stand condemned as the dunghill kind: sermons against licence, temperance tracts, denunciations of women, song, carousing, feasting, and so forth routinely invoke the dread goddess with the human voice and her lure, of whose irresistible fatality Gryllus was the vivid proof.

* * * * *

Gryllus the Porker is mentioned in one other place in classical literature, in Pliny the Elder's *Natural History*, written around the same time as Plutarch's dialogue. His brief appearance there extends the meanings of the mythical man who made a great refusal of humanity and lays another, rich layer of metaphor on Gryllus' comic change of shape. It illuminates further the meaning of his vaunted swinishness, his clownish beastliness, endowing him with characteristics that install him at the heart of the history of comic fable and make him a key to one of the most versatile and durable tactics in the resistance of fear.

In his detailed section on the arts, Pliny lists a number of artists who excel in minor genres, citing a much prized specialist in lowlife subjects, for example, who singled out donkeys and barber shops - both motifs with ample salacious possibilities. Then he comes to a certain Antiphilos, who painted both humble scenes and public mythologies, among them an orgiastic *Liber Pater* (*Nat. Hist.* 35.115). This artist, 'in his comic works', writes Pliny, included 'a character called Gryllus, of a ridiculous appearance...after [him] such type of images are called grylli': *idem iocosis nomine Grylli deridiculi habitus pinxit, unde id genus picturae grylli vocantur* (114). The character Gryllus thus carried a further meaning for humanist scholars, which influenced the satirical, Erasmian view of human folly: grotesque, absurd, misshapen and hybrid figures from the margins of manuscripts came to be known as Grylli. In Dutch, the word *gril* comes to mean a caprice, whim, or freak, and the whole genus of imaginary creature begins to populate the area of nonsense, where nothing is taken seriously, not even meaning itself.

Pliny does not refer openly but only by implication to Plutarch's dialogue; nor does he connect Gryllus with the legend of Circe. But the association lingers as a scent on the breeze, since monsters of ill-assorted limbs, not only hogs, belonged in the enchantress's tradition. He gives no details of Gryllus' particular absurdities of feature, but the character is clearly not exclusively piggish. After him, the tradition awards the generic name to squat, therianthropic hybrids who, like Circe's mutated victims, have animal heads or limbs, or two- or three- or even four heads sprouting from their shoulders, or, masks on legs, have faces where their bodies should be. These have survived in most numbers as Greco-Roman phantasmagorias on antique gems from Egypt (*fig. 7*), and the language of museum cataloguers echoes the chimerical quality of these inventions: some are labelled 'cock-headed anguipedes', others 'radiate chnoubis daemons'.[17]

Classical cameos were the chief source for these humorous grotesques; they were probably used as amulets and love charms - the Circean sphere of influence. Such engraved stones were credited with manifold powers of magic and witchcraft: a mermaid with a mirror could make the wearer invisible, for example. When people in the ancient world commissioned a curious gem with a strange hybrid creature or metamorphosed beast-man cut into the stone, they were attaching to themselves the ambiguous powers of protection and fear generated from this source.

---

[15] See Hughes [n.1]; Roberts [n. 1] 200-3; Roberts, 'Circe' and S. Chaudhuri, 'Grill' in A.C.Hamilton et al.(eds.), *Spenser Encyclopaedia* (1990) 165-7, 342.

[16] '*Reactio*' in *The Poems of John Marston*, ed. Davenport (1961) 821, line 30; cf. John Davies 'Epigram Against Grillus, his Greedy Gluttony' in *The Scourge of Folly* (London 1611) and, in a lighter vein, George Alexander Stevens, 'The Birthday of Folly' in *Songs Comicall & Satyrical* (London 1788): 'Circe was a precious piece - / A plague upon the gypsey! / She dol'd out drink somewhere in Greece / And made her tenants tipsy'.

[17] J. Baltrusaitis, *Le Moyen Age fantastique* (1955) 11-53; M. Camille, *Image on the Edge* (London, 1992) 37-8; A. Furtwängler, *Die antiken Gemmen* (3 vols., 1900) I pl. XLVI nos. 33-39 with II p. 223; III p. 353, cf. 113-4, 288, 363; R. Kotansky, 'The Chnoubis gem from Tel Dor', *Israel Exploratn Jnl* 47 (1997) 257-60 [photo in 45 (1995) 32]. I am grateful to Eleni Vassilika and Penny Wilson for showing me the collection of ancient gems in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge.

Fig. 7: An assortment of grylli. From Furtwängler, *Antike Gemmen* I pl. XLVI nos. 33-39.

The full and exact character of ancient grylli has been lost, however - there are only a scant number of references; the form survives most vividly in the drolleries doodled in the margins of medieval manuscripts from the 13th century onwards. The grotesque inventions of Hieronymus Bosch were already called grilli in his own century.[18] Dutch phantasmagorists, like Arent van Bolton, for example, continued the tradition, and incorporated it into the grotesque. A visual equivalent of the nonsense rhyme, these fabricated monsters are not presented to convey meaning, but to mock it; in this they were sometimes perceived as satanic - as 'juggling fiends... That palter with us in a double sense'.[19]

The figure of Gryllus ravels up monstrous beast-men, migrating souls, caricatures, comic players, the mocking of meaning, and, by implication, truth; the thread unwinds from a pun, a chief source of dream imagery, fantasy, and the kind of nonsense that shores up anxious spirits with gaiety. Yet Plutarch and Pliny were writing in different languages, and the Greek modifies the Latin profoundly: for *grillus* is the Latin word for cricket, not pig.[20] (The consequences of this confusion can only be speculation, but I am extremely grateful to Professor Peter Wiseman, who encouraged me to continue my line of exploration, maintaining that there exists an irregular verb: 'I conjecture You hypothesize S/he speculates'.)

To pursue, therefore: pigs and crickets have very little in common, but both were associated with gluttony by the Greeks, who do not seem to have distinguished the cicada family members, confusing locusts, the plague that swarms and lays all in its path to waste, with crickets, who have rather more modest appetites. (Penelope's suitors devour Odysseus' substance like locusts as well as behaving like swine.) Both animals have a domestic character, the pig in its sty more pejoratively than the cricket in the hearth. The nineteenth-century French entomologist Jean-Henri Fabre commented, 'The cricket is extraordinary: of all the insects, he alone has a fixed home' (*Insects*, Eng. trs. 36). In terms of Odysseus' unmanned companions, this tameness matches the meaning of their ensnarement by Circe's indoor luxuries.

The surprising associations of the two creatures also prompts another line of speculation, through their characteristic sounds - both make a strongly individual noise. English 'grunt' and 'chirp' distinguish them clearly, but *gril-* catches onomatopeically the harsh grating of both. This capacity of both creatures to utter - in a manner of speaking - placed them in an ambiguous relation to the human. Aristotle, in his book about the soul, writes 'Voice is the sound produced by a creature possessing a soul'. He takes this thought further, weaving it into the very nature of consciousness and personal identity: 'Not every sound made by a living creature is a voice (for one can make a sound even with the tongue, or as in coughing), but that which even causes the impact, must have a soul, and use some imagination; for the voice is a sound that means something...' Aristotle notes that many animals 'e.g., those which are bloodless...have no voice'. Later, he singles out insects - specifically ants and bees and grubs — as lacking the imagination necessary for utterance. In his *History of Animals*, he clarifies this difference: 'Some are endowed with voice: of these latter some have articulate speech, while others are inarticulate; some are noisy, some are prone to silence; some are musical, and some unmusical; but all animals without exception exercise their power of singing or chattering chiefly in connection with the intercourse of the sexes'. The distinction interestingly shifts crickets, of the bloodless species - and the tongueless sound - into a different position in this aural taxonomy. For the cricket family is an extremely vocal exception to this rule. Elsewhere, Aristotle pauses on the nature of the soul of insects, and comments on the way crickets sing from clearly personal knowledge: 'It is by the friction against the membrane that they make their buzzing, just as boys do through reeds pierced with holes, when they have put a thin membrane over them...'

Crickets' stridulation thus marks them down, among animal species, in an in-between state, near the soulfulness and the play of vocal expression - the sound of

---

[18] Medieval drolleries: Baltrusaitis [n.20]. Bosch: Felipe de Guevara, *Comentarios de la Pintura* (c.1560-63) in Baltrusaitis 46.

[19] M. de Certeau, *The Mystic Fable*, trs. M.B. Smith (1992) I 66-7, 72: 'In the end these "disorderly" combinations rely more on proportion, (miniaturizing, hypertrophy) than hybridization (by substitution, inversion, and collage)... The aesthetics of the Garden does not consist in generating new lights for intelligibility, but in extinguishing it.'

[20] Pliny on the cricket (mostly medicinal uses): *Nat. Hist.* 29.138, 143; 30. 32, 38, 39, 49. *Grillos* does not appear in extant ancient or Hellenistic Greek sources meaning cricket, and the Greek word for hog is often spelt with one lambda only. But, intriguingly, while the stem *gril-* does still apply to pigs' grunting and related activity in modern Greek, *grillos* does now mean cricket, as in Italian *grillo*, celebrated in Josquin Desprez' chanson *El grillo è buon cantore*. See M. Davies & J. Kathirithamby, *Greek Insects* (1986) 134; more fully, I.C. Beavis, *Insects and other Invertebrates in Classical Antiquity* (1988) 62-78. An alternative word for crickets — *akris* — might derive from either a word for piping or crying, or from another root, meaning to eat. Both possibilities extend the sympathy between the otherwise odd species of animal, the hog and the cicada (Davies & Kathirithamby 135-6). Other words for members of the genus — *mantis* and *mastax* — are derived from words for chewing and eating.

[20] N. Machiavelli, 'L'Asino' in *Tutte le opere* (Florence 1971), 971; John Baptist Gelli, *Circe* [1548], trs. H. Layng (London 1744); first French trs. by Denis Sauvage (1550), first English trs. by Henry Iden (1557). See E. Hatzantonis, 'I geniali rimaneggiamenti dell'episodio Omerico di Circe', *Revue Belge de Phil.* 54 (l976) 5-24.

boys whistling - yet still exiled from it, and in that song, according to the description of Aristotle, significantly limited to sexuality: a close reflection of hybrid consciousness of the man-beast. Yet Aristotle himself was sufficiently taken with the noise of the insects to list them with nightingales, and this is where the figure of Grillus throws open another world of meaning. The cricket is a bug, but one that escapes bogey status of other bugs through its music-making, its quasi-human song.[21]

The insect was famous in fable, of course, from Plato and Aesop on. In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates tells a myth of origin which attaches cicadas by special bonds to the Muses: the insects were once men, men so besotted with song that they forgot to eat and drink (in their case, the self-forgetfulness of pleasure did not involve gluttony, but the opposite):

'When the Muses were born and song came into the world, some of the men of that age were so ravished by its sweetness that in their devotion to singing they took no thought to eat and drink, and actually died before they knew what was happening to them. From them sprang thereafter the race of cicadas, to whom the Muses granted the privilege that they should need no food, but should sing from the moment of birth till death ...and after that go to the Muses and tell how each of them is honoured on earth...' (259bc)

Aesop was himself explicitly identified as a cricket and his satiric fables perceived as cricket's songs in the popular biography of the fabulist's life as well as in La Fontaine's widely read introduction to his own celebrated and classic tales. The story of the proverbial pleasure-loving insect was chosen by La Fontaine for the opening fable, the book opening with the lines that every schoolchild used to know by heart:

La Cigale, ayant chanté
Tout l'été
Se trouva fort dépourvue
Quand la bise fut venue.
(The cricket having sung her song
all summer long
Found - when the winter winds blew free
Her cupboard bare as bare could be).

The insect embodies idleness, indulgence, gaiety, heedlessness: the epicurean improvident life, in contrast to the industrious and thrifty ant, who has stored up for the winter.

La Fontaine echoed Aesop when he closed with the ant's rebuke:

Vous chantiez? j'en suis fort aise:
Eh bien! dansez maintenant.[22]

John Newbery, translating for children in the mid eighteenth century rendered the famous lines:

Ah, cried the Ant, - ...
As then you sung - you now may dance.
In vain you here for food apply,
I'll feed no idle folks, not I.
You sang your song. How nice, my dear!
Now dance your life away.

But the ironies of these fables are multiple, as every reader has enjoyed. Hedonism does not stand consistently condemned in La Fontaine's opus, and his biography of Aesop familiarized vernacular readers with the identity of the poet as himself a blithe songster, a cricket. Interestingly, when William Godwin, the radical philosopher and children's publisher and writer, did a version of Aesop, he wrote, without a hint of scolding, 'the grasshopper is the merriest creature in the world; he sings all the summer long ...'[23]

It is significant that Aesop himself was himself explicitly identified as a cricket and his satiric fables perceived as cricket's songs in the anonymous Roman account of the fabulist's life made popular in the middle ages in the version by the Byzantine scholar Planudes (c.1255-c.1305), then translated in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and later circulated in La Fontaine's widely read introduction to his own, celebrated fables. Aesop there calls himself a cricket - the English eighteenth-century translation following the female gender of the French 'cigale'. ' I never did any one an injury...', he goes on. 'All my business is my song. You great king [Croesus], have now that innocent creature before you, there is nothing I can pretend to but my voice, which I have ever employed, in the service of mankind' (ch. 99 Perry).

Within the fabulous tradition's own account of its origins, the grillus-cricket's song thus levels the distances between the high and the low, and grounds wisdom in baseness. This kind of monstrosity correspondingly rises up the scale of values during the High Renaissance and Enlightenment, giving a new resonance to Plutarch's clever and satiric entertainment.

The cricket's song, emblem of its philosophy, figures forth poetry, lightness of spirit, refusal to be earnest, rejection of suffering as the locus of identity. The association sprang spontaneously to Keats's mind, when in the last days of 1816 Leigh Hunt challenged him to a friendly joust on the theme of 'the cheerful little grasshopper of the fireside'. Keats's resulting sonnet 'On the Grasshopper and the Cricket' - far outshining Hunt's - opens with the lines:

The poetry of earth is never dead.
When all the birds are faint with the hot sun,
And hide in cooling trees, a voice will run
From hedge to hedge about the new-mown mead,
That is the Grasshopper's - he takes lead
In summer luxury,- he has never done
With his delights...

Song, dance, summer luxury and delights, improvidence, have all been traditionally ascribed to the Circean temptress's empire of the senses.

When Gryllus opts to become one of Circe's party, against all the conventions and values of his peers, his

---

[21] Quotations from Aristotle: *De Anima* 2. 420 b5-6 (see B. Verschaffel, 'Where there's a voice, there's a body', *Theaterschrift (Theater and Music)* 9 (1995) 37-49) *Hist. Anim.*I 488a32-b2; *Youth, Old Age, Life and Death and Respiration* 476a5-21; *On Things Heard* (authenticity dubious) 804a 22-4; translations from J. Barnes, *Complete Aristotle* (1984). See Beavis [n. 23] 71-2 and Davies & Kathirithamby [n.23] 137.

[22] Aesop, *Fable* 336 Chambry = 373 Perry; La Fontaine, *Oeuvres completes* I (ed. Collinet, 1991) 31; Eng. trs. assisted by Norman Shapiro, to whom much thanks.

[23] *Abraham Aesop, Fables in Verse*, trs. J. Newbery (London 1757): my thanks to Andrea Immel for showing this version to me; Edward Baldwin [William Godwin], *Fables Ancient and Modern* (London 1805) 12

choice of an animal state not only refers to porcine greed and brutishness but may have also implied, to an audience with a Latin ear, allegiance to those aspects of Circe's enchantments that define the human condition but have been buried all too quickly by the derogatory tradition: the interdependent existence of pleasure and art, of song and language, of dance and expressiveness, of laughter and human survival. These fall under the Muses' sway, as Socrates describes in his original myth about early men who were so enchanted with song that they were turned into crickets (*Phaedrus* 259bc, above). Idleness, pleasure and the arts of language - these disparaged aspects of human existence that are embodied by the ambiguous personae of Circe, Gryllus and her transformed beastly company, subtly rise in the legend of Gryllus and its tributaries to reclaim value for themselves and the qualities they stand for. Above all, the wanton cricket represents the possibility of accepting common humanity in littleness, paltriness and ugliness.

The cricket's song, the emblem of its philosophy, figures forth poetry, defiance, hedonism. Song, dance, pleasure, improvidence have all been traditionally ascribed to the Circean domain, where the senses are not seen as the opposite of reason or necessarily the enemy of knowledge and wisdom. Circe presides over Gryllus' choice: behind the elective beast, a doubled comic mirror of humanity, stands the feared and even derided witch, herself a figure of art, with her song, her voice, her sway over mutations, combinations and metamorphoses that can challenge thought and make settled values twist and turn.

But, as a final envoi on the topic of crickets, it is worth mentioning that the fable profoundly slanders the insect: far from wanton crickets begging from worthy ants, it turns out that, in nature, it is ants that take advantage of crickets. The latter feed by piercing juicy stems of grasses, for example, and sucking on the sap; other little insects take the opportunity to follow crickets around, to eat the sap that then oozes from the plant - and ants often drive crickets away from the food supply the crickets have provided (Fabre [above] 36). This signal example of animal commensalism, or one-sided help between species, has been overlooked by the legendary defamation of the idle songster, Gryllus' namesake.

So do we discover the fallibility of ancient wisdom: maybe it is also time to reevaluate the reputed dangers of Circe and her phantasmagorias, too.

Marina Warner, novelist, historian & critic, is the author of *Alone of All her Sex*, *Joan of Arc*, *Monuments and Maidens*, and (most recently) *No Go the Bogeyman: Scaring, Lulling and Making Mock*, which includes an expanded version of the present lecture.

NEW LIGHT ON HOMER AND VIRGIL

We are grateful to Russell Shone, Secretary of the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies, for the following extracts from some recent examination papers.

Homer

Penelope was weaving a headstone for Laertes.

Athene also tells Telemachus to put away his childish things and confront those sausages. (Only after the seventh independent reading was it established - unfortunately - that the word was "savages".)

Nausicaa wishes Odysseus good luck which shows that she knows him. You would not go up to a stranger and wish him good luck. One point is that they might not need good luck; and two is that you don't know what they want good luck for. So this obviously shows that she knows Odysseus and is important evidence for the understanding of their relationship.

Of course Aeolus gives Odysseus a bag of his own special wind.

Like Calypso there is another goddess Circe who gets her pores all over Odysseus.

Odysseus would definitely be a pig today if Hermes had not appeared in the nick of time with a little herb called "molly".

Telemachus is Odysseus' sidekick in a way as is Robin to Batman (minus the tights).

Virgil

The death of Anchises was a very upsetting moment for Aeneas, especially as he has just lost a father.

The first similarity is that they are both very young soldiers when they die. The second similarity is that they don't have much experience of war through their excessive youth. The third similarity is that they both die in war at a young age.

Amata runs along with Lavinia madly hopping to postpone the wedding.

FESTIVE COMEDY: ATHENIAN GARMENTS IN ROME AND LONDON

Sally Jaine

Can stage-set and costume indicate a play's generic roots? In second-century Rome Plautus assured his spectators: 'This stage that you see before you I will change to Athens, at least while we present this play' *(Truculentus* 10-11). His productions, *comoediae palliatae,* were comedies in Greek dress; some sixteen centuries later, Shakespeare set *A Midsummer Night's Dream* at the marriage-feast of Theseus, Athens' founding father, and Oberon used the 'Athenian garments he hath on' to describe Demetrius to Puck - not knowing there was another tunic'd youth wandering in the wood that night. Is this all there is in common, a stage-set and some Greek clothing? Are there other, wider links between New Comedy, particularly the works of Plautus, and *A Midsummer Night's Dream?* It is an area where I have so far been unable to find any but the most cursory critical treatment: Robert Miola's *Shakespeare and Classical Comedy* (OUP 1994) has just four brief references to the *Dream.* This paper aims to explore whether Shakespeare had particular reason to use Athens, rather than an unspecified arcadian setting, for what seems a supremely English play, rich with reference to folk-custom and myth, as C. L. Barber has shown in *Shakespeare's Festive Comedy* (Princeton 1972) - though I should mention perhaps that Barber finds more in common with Aristophanes than with Plautus. My suggestion, however, is that though there may not be direct, easily cited sources, such as *Menaechmi* and *Amphitruo* for *A Comedy of Errors,* and Terence's *Hecyra* for *All's Well That Ends Well,* Athens is a significant marker, behind which we can discern structural similarities and generic echoes of New Comedy. Peter Holland, editor of the Oxford edition of the *Dream,* remarks that he is 'less surprised than many by the idea that Shakespeare should return to a previously used source or carry into a later play echoes or memories from a work he seems to have known well when writing an earlier play', and I pursue here my theory that the setting of the *Dream* in Athens indicates that the memories behind it are not only those of Ovid, Chaucer and English folk-myth, but also of New Comedy.

Scene from Terence, *Adelphoi*, II, 4. Miniature from the Vatican.

That Shakespeare was familiar with Plautus and Terence, both in the original Latin and in translation, is not now in doubt. George Whetstone, writing in 1578 (about twenty years before the first production of the *Dream*), commented: 'Menander, Plautus and Terence, themselves many years since intombed, by their Commedies in honour live at this daye' (*Epistle Dedicatorie to Promos and Cassandra*). The plays were central to the grammar school curriculum, and were reasonably frequently staged: the first classical production by an Oxbridge college was at King's Hall in 1510, an unknown comedy of Terence, and later statutes at both universities gave rise to regular productions of classical comedy (Miola [above] p.7). As well as the unacknowledged use of Plautus as source material, Shakespearean texts make specific reference to him as a yardstick for comic writing: Polonius commends the troupe newly arrived at the court of Denmark, for whose skills 'Seneca cannot be too heavy, nor Plautus too light' (*Hamlet* II.ii.400-1), and the Quarto edition of *Troilus and Cressida* of 1609 compares the play to the 'best commedy in Terence and Plautus'.

These plays, which arguably underpin the entire western concept of comedy, and certainly can be tracked through the *commedia dell'arte*, Goldoni and Molière to current television sitcoms, may be of Greek origin, but they owe their survival and influence to their Roman interpreters. Until this century, there was no complete extant text of Menander; his plays existed in fragments or through Roman adaptation. The *Dyskolos,* discovered in Egypt, is our treasure, not the Renaissance's. Although Plautus frequently acknowledges his sources, we do not have them: 'I wish to give you the name of our comedy. Its Greek title is *Cleru-menoe...* Diphilus wrote the play in Greek, and later Plautus, he of the barking name, gave us a fresh version of it in Latin' *(Casina* 31-4). Greek plays were on the Roman stage as part of the absorption of Greek culture into the world of the early Republic. The numerous Roman festivals, more varied than their Athenian counterparts, gave theatre its space; where the Athenians brought their dramatists and their god into the heart of their icon-city in ritualised dramatic contest, the Romans provided what the beleaguered Terence describes as street entertainment on a grand scale: 'The first act met with approval, but, on a cry that there was to be a gladiatorial show, in flocked the people with uproar and clamour and a struggle for seats, with the result that I could not hold my ground' (*Hecyra* 39-42). It seems possible that Plautus had a better relationship with his audience because of his different technique: where Terence translates, sometimes running together two plots to achieve a double story-line, Plautus adapts, bringing aspects of native Atellan farce (in which he may possibly have performed himself) to the more restrained Greek model. Atellan farce was a more or less improvised form of unsophisticated comedy, with stock characters and an expected plot-line; Plautus plays with

the farcical element, his characters accepting or rejecting the stock roles offered to them, metatheatrically self-aware, constantly breaking the dramatic illusion.

So what has this to do with a moonlit wood, peopled with resolutely English fairies? With the wood itself, very little; Plautus uses maritime passage, as in *Menaechmi* or *Rudens,* as his route to a world outside Athens where true identities can be restored after confusion and danger. But there are stock characters, and there is metatheatre. The orderly world of Theseus' court is disturbed by the entrance of Egeus, 'full of vexation ....and complaint' (1.i.22), and thrusting in front of him two reluctant young men and a stubborn daughter. We are immediately in the world of New Comedy. Without the *agelast*, the blocking figure who stands firmly in the path of true love and its successful union, there would be no comedy, at least not five acts of it. Whether he be a father who will not fund his son's purchase of an adored prostitute, as in *Pseudolus,* or a parent who plans to give his daughter to the wrong suitor, as Euclio in *Aulularia,* he must be tricked or convinced into consent. In New Comedy, the *agelast* is usually the father of sons; a woman, unless she be self-supporting *hetaira*, cannot expect to direct her own destiny and must hope that her situation is suitably resolved, so that the man she marries is - fortuitously - the father of the child already conceived.

Egeus has not got that problem to deal with; but he is determined that his daughter shall not set up the new household she desires, but rather marry according to his direction. Shakespeare presents a rebellious daughter, not a son, and offers further inversion, upending the traditional fate envisaged for the young girl whose lover might not be successful: the prospect of social shame as an unmarried mother (foreseen for Euclio's Phaedria until the god Lar takes an active part in her affairs), or sexual shame as a common prostitute in the hands of an unscrupulous pimp (Labrax' intended use for Palaestra in *Rudens*). These become instead their very opposite, the chaste world of the cloister and the livery of a nun. Egeus appears unmoved by this possible fate for his daughter; he stands with Terence's Menedemus, who in retrospect admits: 'Instead of handling the matter kindly, in the way I ought to have dealt with a stripling's lovesick heart, I took the violent line that is common with parents' *(Heaut. Tim.* 100-2).

It is this violent line that sets the plot in motion. But before the play-world moves out of Athens, Shakespeare brings on his Mechanicals, and we witness a distribution of roles strongly reminiscent of the inner play world of *Pseudolus* and *Miles Gloriosus.* The source material for *Pyramus and Thisbe,* that most lamentable comedy, may be Ovid's *Metamorphoses,* but surely it is the memory of New Comedy that suggests both Bottom's boastful exposition of his skills, and Peter Quince's anxious play-master. The figure of the braggart soldier, in his own mind God's gift both to women and the army, appears first for us in Aristophanes' Lamachus *(Acharnians),* and is still perceptible in television's *Last of the Summer Wine,* where Foggy, that finely tuned fighting machine, feels himself equal to any challenge. Unlike the classical braggarts, Bottom is redeemed by the affection of his fellows, and their certainty that they cannot proceed without him: 'If he come not, then the play is marred. It goes not forward' (IV.ii.5), but he takes the surprising devotion of the fairy queen in his stride - 'reason and love keep little company together nowadays' (III.i.136) - and is anxious to try his hand as both Hercules and a lover ('This was lofty...this is Ercles' vein, a tyrant's vein. A lover is more condoling', I.ii.34-5), the dual roles claimed by Terence's soldier Thraso and Plautus' Pyrgopolynices. Bottom plays with the qualities that they take seriously.

THE SWAN THEATRE
From the drawing of J. de Witt, *c.* 1596

This quality of play is one of the hallmarks of Plautine comedy, where characters break the dramatic illusion and themselves become playmakers and audience, commenting on the inner play they have created and appear to direct. Pseudolus, appealed to by his lovelorn master, declares the start of his 'games' and his assumption of the role of clever slave ('I do give notice, and to all my friends and acquaintances I do announce that they this day are to beware of me and trust me not!' *Pseudolus* 127-8), and then attempts to persuade the young Calidorus to take some part more purposive than the usual hopeless lover:

Pseud.: *'Concentrate on something helpful instead of letting your feelings conquer you in a crisis.'*

Cal.: *'That's all nonsense! Why, there's no fun in being a lover if you can't be foolish!....Do let me be a good-for-nothing, do please let me go!'*

Pseud.: *'I'll let you, only I must be off myself.'*

Cal.: *'Wait, wait, I'll be just what you want me to be at once.'*

Pseud.: *'Now you show sense!'* (*Pseud.* 237-40).

Here, as in the *Dream,* the plot of the inner play mirrors that of the outer play. Pseudolus becomes a playmaster, thinking on his feet, doing his best with unpromising material, and even handing his own role to another slave to fulfil: he cannot both produce and act in his own text. Peter Quince hands out parts for a play that echoes the family conflicts rehearsed by Egeus and his daughter in the previous scene, and finds, too, a certain reluctance to accept them - 'Nay, faith, let not me play a woman. I have a beard coming' (I.ii.41) - which he overrides with the suggestion that the player be masked: as were all the players of New Comedy. Later, Bottom steps firmly out of his part of Pyramus in order to deflect Theseus' attempts to direct the play himself: 'The wall methinks, being sensible, should curse again.' 'No, in truth sir, he should not. "Deceiving me" is Thisbe's cue. She is to enter now, and I am to spy her through the wall. You shall see, it will fall pat as I told you.' (V.i.180-5), and he rises promptly from his stage death to correct any misinterpretation of the conclusion. Here, as in *Pseudolus,* we find what Lionel Trilling, in his introduction to Pirandello's *Six Characters in Search of an Author,* calls 'a favourite activity of the theatre... to play with the idea of illusion itself, to mock the very thing it most tries to create'.

If Theseus, Hippolyta and the lovers are spectators of the Mechanicals' version of intractable fathers and thwarted lovers, then Oberon and Puck are eavesdroppers on the real thing. Oberon, a fairy king, takes on the role New Comedy allocates to its gods: putting straight the affairs of mortals. *Aulularia* opens with the Lar's description of his plans for the unfortunately pregnant Phaedria: marriage with the young man responsible, who has so far failed to do the decent thing. Arcturus claims responsibility for the storm and subsequent shipwreck in *Rudens*: 'I raised a blustering gale and waked the waters of the deep' (*Rudens* 69) in order to rescue Palaestra from the hands of Labrax the pimp. Similarly Oberon responds to Helena's plight, and uses Puck as his instrument to intervene; but Oberon is fairy, not god, and his intervention is tinged with mischief: Demetrius is to be made to suffer. That it all goes horribly wrong is for the same reason; Oberon is not an omniscient god, although Shakespeare allows him to take on that role and direct the progress of the plot. The lovers are led unawares into a farce of mistaken identity and confusion, their future happiness in the hands of Puck in his role of clever slave, their confusion increased by his innate desire to play, to use to the full his identity as Robin Goodfellow. A pamphlet of 1593, *Tell-truth's New Year's Gift,* describes Robin Goodfellow's concern not only to help young women with housework, but also with marriage against the wishes of authoritarian parents who 'do not match them with the mates their children's eyes have chosen, but with the men their own greedy desire have found out'. This is also the driving function of the clever slave in Plautine comedy, to take control of the plot in order to achieve the union his young master desires.

The central movement of the play charts a series of misunderstandings and misapprehensions. In an increasingly frantic movement, the lovers, in various permutations, pursue and are pursued through the wood. A recent production by the Royal Shakespeare Company had the lovers entering the stage through a choice of doors, centre back, as a visual indication of the changes of relationship between them: a stage-set standard for all productions of New Comedy, visible statement of allegiances and differences. In the *Dream,* however, confusion is created not by disguise, but by altered vision; change is quite literally in the eye of the beholder. Bottom's ass-head is gratuitous mischief, Puck gilding the lily; Titania is besotted by an ass, but this is not because he is an ass. Although disguise, voluntarily adopted, is the cause of confusion and trickery in many Plautine comedies, there are two where the farcical element grows from similarly altered perception of reality. *Menaechmi* and *Amphitruo,* Shakespeare's sources for *A Comedy of Errors,* are plays of mistaken identity; characters are believed to be that which they are not, although they remain, or try to remain, themselves. To be mistaken, when you have intended no disguise, is a disturbing affair. Alcmena in *Amphitruo,* who has already welcomed what she believed to be her returning lord, is confused by his second appearance ('Why are you making fun of me with all these greetings and salutations, as if you had not seen me a little while ago?', 681-2); but the *Groundhog Day* comedy of this unfolds into near-tragedy as she finds herself accused of adultery: 'To be branded so with shame, disloyalty, disgrace by my own husband! How he clamours to make facts no facts!' (882-4). Similarly, in *Menaechmi,* each brother is taken for the other and becomes powerless to break through this changed perception of himself. 'What does this mean? So everyone I set eyes on tries to make a fool of me?' (522-3) cries the Syracusan brother, who later feigns madness, for that seems to offer him the only security available, the adoption of a role he is believed to occupy already ('Seeing they declare I'm insane, what's better for me than to pretend I'm insane?', 830-1). Compare all this to Helena's 'Wherefore was I to this keen mockery born? When at your hands did I deserve this scorn?' (*MND* II.ii.129-30), and, later, Hermia's attempt to return Lysander to his accustomed role: 'Am I not Hermia? Are not you Lysander?' (III.ii. 273). All is the same, and yet, critically, not the same. Amphitruo appeared to be Amphitruo but was not, and one Menaechmus brother cannot understand why his already complicated life, juggling wife and mistress, has suddenly become even more so: 'Neither at home nor at my mistress's, either, do they believe a word I say!' *(Men.* 699). The trickster here is Chance, Tyche, who led one brother finally to reunion with the lost; in *Amphitruo* the trickster is Jupiter, and in the *Dream* the at first unwitting Puck, who then begins to take a clever slave-like interest in the confusion he has caused: 'And so far am I glad it did so sort, | As this their jangling I esteem a sport' (III.ii.352-3). The point in common is that Alcmena, Menaechmus 1 and Menaechmus 2 and the female lovers are perplexed by internal changes in a situation that appears to remain stable and unchanged. There is no disguise, physical

appearances are un-altered, but the world has been subtly tilted off-course by an unseen hand; there are apparently inexplicable changes of behaviour, and the characters must struggle towards denouement and explanation.


A
Midſommer nights
dreame.

As it hath beene ſundry times publikely acted, by the Right Honourable, the Lord Chamberlaine his ſeruants.

VVritten by VVilliam Shakeſpeare.

Printed by Iames Roberts, 1600.

TITLE PAGE OF THE SECOND QUARTO OF *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (1619). THIS EDITION WAS FALSELY DATED.

In fact Shakespeare's lovers are never given an explanation, but they are restored to their former selves (former former self in Demetrius' case, for he must return to his early love for Helena, before he turned his attentions to Hermia), and the play moves to pick up the theme of festival promised in the opening scene and fractured first by Egeus' stormy entrance and later by Titania's and Oberon's quarrel. This movement is for me one of the most strongly Plautine elements in the play. Theseus' initial call for Philostrate to 'stir up the Athenian youth to merriment' looks to the 'pomp, triumph and revelling' of the wedding solemnities (I.i.12,19), but Egeus' entrance sets this jangling, and the quarrel between Oberon and Titania, mirror-image of Theseus and Hippolyta, reveals a world that is far from celebration. 'No night is now with hymn or carol blessed' (II.i.101), and there can be no blessing until all is put right. Once the confusion of the central acts is resolved, we can move forward: the lovers, found lying neatly in pairs, are presumed to have been out maying, and here once again is the world of festival. To go maying was to take part in social celebration, a festive ritual, not necessarily on May morning itself, associated with fertility and the pairing of youth. We are back where we started: for Lysander first described the wood to Hermia as 'where I did meet thee once with Helena I To do observance to a morn of may' (I.i.166-7). The festival promised at the play's opening can now be staged; Oberon's role as divine protagonist, shaping the action for the lovers, has come to fruition, putting him alongside *Aulularia's* Lar, Pan of Menander's *Dyskolos,* and Arcturus in *Rudens.* Those Plautine plays which deal with the restoration of a lost child, regeneration and the subsequent establishment of a new household, have a mesh of festival references; children are lost at festivals (the Menaechmi brothers are separated at the festival at Tarentum) and rapes take place (Phaedria is raped by Lyconides at the Festival of Ceres); lost girls cling to altars (Palaestra seeking refuge from her pursuing pimp) and chaste prostitutes celebrate the festival of Venus (the Carthaginian girls in *Poenulus).* The guiding hand of the god, often made explicit in the play's prologue, ensures that these festal rituals come to their proper conclusion.

And the proper conclusion, in the *Dream,* is the pairing of the lovers as intended by Oberon, and supported by the audience, and the marriage of Theseus and Hippolyta. Egeus accepts his daughter's choice, and the way is clear for the establishment of new households - as Northrop Frye says, 'The movement of comedy is usually a movement from one kind of society to another' (*Anatomy of Criticism* [Princeton 1957], 163). This is, too, the formula we find in New Comedy: the turning of error to happy ending, the restoration of the lost in 'a happy rustle of bridal gowns and banknotes' to use Frye's felicitous phrase. Titania and Oberon, now reconciled, can become figures of blessing and fertility, no longer responsible for bringing murrain and failed harvest to the mortal world.They may be symbols of English folk-custom, the Lord and Lady of the Green come to bless the master's marriage-bed, but their close relationship with the physical world and Oberon's intervention in the lovers' affairs surely carry resonance of the gods of New Comedy, who give blessing and restitution to those they favour.

But before Titania and Oberon can make their festal progress through Theseus' palace, there is the presentation of the Mechanicals' play. Here, in the production of drama at an Athenian festival, is New Comedy in miniature. Peter Holland describes *Pyramus and Thisbe* as being closely akin to an Elizabethan jig, which in the 1590s 'acquired greater narrative complexity, becoming small-scale parodic, almost anarchic, dramas. Their subject-matter was primarily a farcical action of sexual relations' - a description which might also stand good for Atellan farce, that native South Italian form incorporated by Plautus into the fabric of

the Greek originals he adapted for Roman pleasure. The reference is strengthened by *Pyramus and Thisbe's* being a classical drama (although perhaps not in this production). Each of Terence's plays, and one of Plautus', carries a production notice stating at which festival it was first presented, and all drama in the classical world was closely linked to festal celebration and holiday. Consequently, the plays close with an appeal to the audience for prizes, for applause, for attendance at the playwright's next production. At the end of *Asinaria* the spectators are invited to save Demaenetus from a beating by the power of their applause; Pseudolus invites his audience to return tomorrow and see how his financial shenanigans progress; almost every play ends with a request for applause 'if we have pleased you and have not been boring' *(Captivi* 1035). Puck's final couplet 'Give me your hands, if we be friends, | And Robin shall restore amends' (V.i.428-9) comes straight from the matter of New Comedy. As with the other questions I have discussed, there is no specific textual source, but an echo of Plautine practice, of New Comedy's characters and plot structure. Roland Barthes refers to 'the circular memory of reading', and I would suggest that there is sufficient evidence in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* of Shakespeare's memory of New Comedy to make its Athenian setting more than mere chance. Pseudolus, poised to set his own inner play in motion, describes the poet as one who 'hunts for what is nowhere on this earth, yet finds it' (*Pseud.* 402-3); Theseus' poet who 'gives to airy nothing a local habitation and a name' (V.i.16-7) is a descendant of the same family. Shakespeare chose Athens to be the local habitation for his play, and he chose it for good reason.

Sally Jaine is an Honorary Research Fellow in the Dept. of Classics and Ancient History at Exeter.

REPLY TO MARS
or *male dictum militis*

Ernst Peters

That you are the War God how can I forget?
Oh, yes, you made certain that I would regret
all the hardships and pain I inflicted,
all the victims your orders convicted.
No more time for them in dimly lit bars,
only time to curse you: Mars.

You once showed me your drum and I thumped it,
You once taught me to blow your trumpet,
You once taught me to maim and to kill,
even though it was not my will.
No time had I for dimly lit bars,
only time to curse you: Mars.

I was neither a wimp nor was I a quaker,
just an ill-used, ignorant widow maker
even though I was only a boy
my task gave me no joy.
Too young was I for dimly lit bars
but old enough to serve and curse you: Mars.

All this was a long time ago.
How long? I no longer know,
but for years trying to forget,
and for years living with regret,
I have lived in dimly lit bars
cursing you always: Mars.

INTERVIEW WITH CHRIS PELLING

Alexei V. Zadorojnyi

The traditional opening question: how did you come to study Classics and how did you develop your interest in Plutarch?

I was at a grammar school in South Wales in the early sixties - an old-fashioned state school which liked to ape the public school ideal, or rather what the even more old-fashioned headmaster used to think of as the public school ideal. The forms were even called things like 'Upper Shell' and 'Lower Remove'. One of its flagship subjects was Classics, even though there was only a handful of people a year who did it in the sixth form - two, in my year. Everyone did Latin, though, at least for a year or so. I originally started Greek because someone told me Classics was good for Law, and I saw myself as a flourishing and very rich Welsh equivalent of Perry Mason. Then I got rather hooked. But for years I was going to use it only as a starting point for a switch to Modern History (I read Alan Bullock's book on Hitler, and discovered that he and Hugh Trevor-Roper had both moved into History after Classics: it seemed a cool thing to do). So I was given a place at university to read first Classics and then History; then I decided to finish the Classics degree and then change; I still haven't quite got around to it.

Plutarch: well, he was originally a substitute for Livy. I was a pupil of Robert Ogilvie, and did some undergraduate work on Livy with him: I liked the idea of writing a commentary, and wondered about the Punic War books - then discovered that this man Walbank was doing something rather big on Polybius, which I thought took away some of the point. In my last year as an undergraduate I got quite interested in Roman Greece, and read Plutarch's *Praecepta Rei Publicae Gerendae* for an essay for Oswyn Murray; so I thought perhaps one of the *Lives* would be a sensible choice. That also meant being supervised by Donald Russell, to whom I owe an immeasurable amount. I plumped for the *Life of Caesar* for a thesis, partly because I fancied lots of travel grants to wander round battlefields in nice parts of France. I'm going back to *Caesar* this year, after a twenty-five year gap, to produce a commentary on it for the Clarendon Ancient History series - a real nostalgia trip.

How do you select a topic for research? What are your inspirations and stimuli?

Topics tend to pick me rather than the other way round! I'm very bad at saying no when I'm asked to give papers, and almost all my recent articles started as seminar papers. The book I'm just finishing at the moment is called *Literary Texts and the Greek Historian*, and this was again an approach from Richard Stoneman at Routledge, not my own idea. I've greatly enjoyed doing it, but I tend to get very behind in deadlines, through not saying no to enough other things (like Pegasus interviews? No, not really!).

Most of your work involves discussing historiography "as literature". Where do you draw the distinction between the two?

I don't think I do: I was most surprised recently when a colleague described someone's work as "literary - not even historiographic, but literary". I don't have a very sophisticated approach to literary criticism: I always admired that English lecturer in Malcolm Bradbury's *The History Man* who said her job was reading good books and trying to say interesting things about them. If those things are setting writers into a wider tradition of history-writing, or using them to give an oblique viewpoint on their own cultures, or talking about their style or sentence-structure or anything at all, or wondering whether (say) reader response or narratology offers a different way in - that's fine: anything will do.

Personally, I have always been attracted by your approach, e.g., to Plutarch, which combines interesting yet very reasonable interpretative insights with historical and textual accuracy, thus never falling into any post-post-modern critical trends. Have you consciously developed this as a method or did it come to you naturally?

I suppose it's natural. It probably started because I was writing on Plutarch at a time when he was still sometimes regarded as a mere compiler, though Donald Russell's seminal work in the 1960s was beginning to have some effect. One didn't need to work very hard to make literary points about him which now seem obvious, but were quite contentious at the time. I've tried to take on board some critical trends, even post-modern ones, but I don't think I do theory myself very well; I try to write in a way which is theoretically informed and engaged, but I very rarely START from a particular theoretical insight or position.

Do you think that working on a specific topic or author affects a scholar's own personality?

Tricky one, that: it's certainly striking how people end up by being rather similar to their authors (Syme and Tacitus is the famous example, but I remember teasing my friend and colleague George Cawkwell by telling him he was one third Thucydides, one third Demosthenes, and one third Xenophon). But I don't know whether that's because the scholars change or because they pick congenial people in the first place.

Plutarch does portray (very skilfully, I now suspect, but it took me years to realise it!) a very attractive personality, perhaps more attractive to me than any classical author except Herodotus: there's a warmth with which he describes his heroes' personal lives - friendships, marriages, children - which I find deeply touching; there's a curiosity and a capacity to become interested in almost anything, and talk about it in a way that's infectious (that's what I like about Herodotus too); there's a moral earnestness which doesn't become too pompous; there's a generosity even to people he finds

pretty alien; and I quite like the naiveté he sometimes does as well - why SHOULDN'T we give a bit of praise and blame to public figures from time to time without thinking it's a sign of being unsophisticated? I think he'd be good company: it's not surprising that there's so much *Table Talk*, almost a whole Teubner volume of it, and he ends up talking about the weirdest things. Now I'd be delighted if anyone said any one of those things about me! I don't think many would, but I also don't think you can spend a lot of time with an author without his tastes and personality rubbing off a little.

For instance, Plutarch is so much concerned with ethics. Has your work on Plutarch made any impact on your moral life?

Yes, I think so, though the detailed cases are not ones I'd talk about publicly. It's the capacity to take moral questions seriously, especially how to react to and with other people, and not to regard (say) working life as separate from moral thought, that I find most congenial.

Plutarch is also somewhat of a classicist, too, he cares a lot about Greek historical and literary heritage. Does this find a parallel in your attitude?

Perhaps. I do like the way he finds good stories essential to talking about the past, not at all a distraction from serious study; and I also like the way that, even after studying a period in some detail and coming to know an immense lot about it, he can find it uplifting and even joyous.

To put it broadly, do you think it is relevant and, indeed, ethical to study (and to teach!) Classics today?

To answer equally broadly, why not? It teaches people how to think, and does so at least as well as other arts subjects. Most important, we can do something to approach a culture whole, not just its literature or its history or its art or its religion or its values or its philosophy, but at least try to do something on everything, and see how its different aspects interact. That is really mind-bending, and something which I don't think students of more modern disciplines can even approach doing: they've just got too much material to handle. And our stuff is really interesting: we shouldn't be ashamed of telling people so.

You have anticipated another traditional "Pegasus" question in your lecture by saying that the lost ancient text you would most like to recover is Antony's "On His Own Drunkeness". Could you explain your choice in more detail?

It would be fun (but less fun than we'd expect, doubtless). And short.

Dr. Chris Pelling is University Lecturer (CUF) in Classical Lagunages and Literature, and Praelector in Classics at University College, Oxford. He has published widely on Plutarch.

Alexei Zadorojnyi is currently completing a PhD on Plutarch in the Dept. of Classics and Ancient History at Exeter.



ACHILLES AND THE HEROIC CODE IN HOMER'S *ILIAD*

Vanessa M. Horrocks

In this essay, I shall discuss the heroic code as it appears in Homer's *Iliad,* basing my account on the work of Seth Schein, whose book gives the clearest analysis of what it means to adhere to the heroic code.[1] *The Iliad* is a poem classified under 'heroic epic' as it deals mainly with the exploits and achievements of heroes. "Always be the best and superior to others" was the counsel Achilles received from Peleus as he embarked to fight at Troy, which is a succinct summary of what is known as the 'heroic code'[2]. The hero's attitude is competitive; it is not enough merely to do well, he must do better than other men. His aim is to win *time* - honour and respect in his lifetime - and to leave behind a name which will be immortalised and celebrated in heroic epic for generations to come as his *kleos* (fame or reputation). It is in war that the competitive spirit of the heroic age finds its clearest and most typical expression. The hero must always be prepared to stake his reputation in the hope of increasing it, as Odysseus' words confirm:

> *Only cowards retreat, a man who wants honour in battle must stand fast and kill or be killed.*

The greatest honour comes where the risks are greatest and the penalty for failure most final: "Let us kill or be killed, win glory or let it go to others" Sarpedon exclaims as he launches into the battle where he will be killed (12.325-8). Success in battle is paramount, but nevertheless the hero knows that he is bound to die. This fact is fundamental for him; he lives with it all the time, and it shapes his whole experience of life. Knowing that his life might end at any time, the hero

[1] Schein.S.L. (1984), *The Mortal Hero.* London: University of California Press.

[2] Edwards, M.W. (1987), *Homer, Poet of the Iliad.* London: John Hopkins University Press, p150.

tries to create something permanent and lasting by winning glory. He wants men to honour him in his lifetime and remember his achievements even after his death, as Hector proclaims (22.304-5):

At least let me not perish without a struggle, ingloriously, but after having done something great, for future generations to learn of.

If other people did not notice his actions, all his effort would be fruitless; public recognition was essential. The Lycians publicly honoured Sarpedon and Glaucus by giving them "pride of place, the choice meats and the filled wine cups" at feasts (12.311-2). When a hero received such honour, he felt obliged, as Sarpedon did, to respect the opinions of his fellows and to live up to their high expectations. In Homer, *kleos* is to be gained in exchange for the hero's life. This is what other heroes risk in order to search and hope for the attainment of *kleos*. In a sense, Achilles is privileged in his knowledge of Fate, as he has been presented with a choice. Achilles willingly proceeds to a certain early death for a surety of immortal fame and reputation. Yet his privileged self-knowledge make his plight all the more tragic as we witness him learning throughout *The Iliad* the meaning of his choice, poignantly brought out in his great speech in Book 9. Achilles' commitment to the logic of *kleos* expresses the starkest limit that a hero can embrace in the heroic view of the world.

Time is enhanced by the possession and exercise of personal qualities like courage, strength, military/athletic skill and excellence of speech which are esteemed for their usefulness to the possessor and to their immediate *philoi* - close friends and fellow comrades. These qualities are thus rewarded by material possessions or *geras*, gifts and spoils of war. Achilles as the superior warrior even has claim to divine gifts such as his immortal horses, a gift from Poseidon, and his father's spear, as well as his divinely-crafted armour. These reflect his immense status and honour as a hero: 'the best of the Achaeans'[3] (1.244, 412; 16.274).

Honour is of supreme importance as it is the sense and confidence that a man possesses of his own worth. This in turn gives life its value. Honour is diminished by any infringement of a person's rights. It is the ultimate competitive society of display. 'To acquire more [honour] and at all events *not* [my italics] to lose any of what one has is the principal motivation of Homeric man.'[4] The worst thing imaginable for a hero is to be in a state of *atime*, whereby one loses honour, which is what happens to Achilles in Book 1, when his *time*, represented by his *geras*, is forcefully taken away from him by Agamemnon. *The Iliad* therefore raises basic questions about the coherence of human society, although the confrontation between Achilles and Agamemnon has often been confused by the notions of a military hierarchy or patriotic service. This viewpoint seems to have partially stimulated the response frequently given by scholars, as, for example, by Tasso, in a misconstruction of Achilles' behaviour which I intend to refute:

Achilles - with considerable help from Jupiter and considerable damage to the representation of Agamemnon, who had to stoop as suppliant to the irate young man.[5]

This perception is, in fact, manipulated by Odysseus, who incorporates a passage of fatherly advice, perceived to have been told by Peleus to Achilles, into his Embassy speech (9.252-9), in a substitution which places Achilles in the role of a 'headstrong youth in need of correction rather than a wronged fellow-chieftain.'[6] Tasso inverts the reality of Agamemnon's superiority and that of the presentation of Achilles. But the inversion of the roles of the two heroes, first introduced as Agamemnon "lord of men, and brilliant Achilles" (1.7), can even be observed in the text. The initial action of the first book of *The Iliad* provides a latent inversion of the expected roles of the two characters: it is the most distinguished warrior who takes the initiative and responsibility to safeguard the welfare of the army by calling an assembly to discuss the dangerous situation. But it is the 'king', or most powerful chieftain, who is demonstrating the utmost importance of accumulating *geras*, in the name of glory, even at the cost of men's lives.

Geras is far more than an item of booty, as Achilles emphasises from the start (1.123-6); it is bestowed on the heroes by the Achaean host as a whole. Agamemnon acknowledges this fact (1.135-7) and in doing so he threatens Achilles' gift on his own authority. As there seems from their silence to be no objection raised by the Achaean camp, Achilles perceives the rest of the Greeks as a party to seizing Briseis and taking her back. The basis of this society depends upon the exchange of gifts, the nature of giving and receiving in relation to one's honour and respect. It is a balanced reciprocity which cements friendship and social ties between chieftains. As critics have noted, 'no single detail in the life of the heroes receives so much attention in *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey* as gift-giving and always there is frank reference to adequacy, appropriateness, recompense.'[7] The action that underpins the tragic consequences of *The Iliad* is precisely *Agamemnon's* determination to bend the rules of this 'heroic code': not Achilles'. The quarrel between the two men can be seen as a fundamental 'crisis of reciprocity.'[8]

It has often been held against Achilles that his vindictiveness against the other Achaeans, by punishing them all for Agamemnon's offence, is simply selfish pride, just as the whole host suffered for Agamemnon's maltreatment of the priest Chryses (which in contrast, created acute *hybris*). But this is to

---

[3] Nagy.G. (1979), *The Best of the Achaeans.* London: John Hopkins University Press.

[4] Adkins, A.W.H. (1972), *Moral Values & Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece.* London: Chatto & Windus, p15.

[5] Tasso, T. (1975), *Discourses on the Heroic Poem.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, p41.

[6] Martin, R.P. (1989) *The Language of Heroes.* Comell University Press, pp80-1.

[7] Finley, M.I. (1956) *The World of Odysseus.* London: Chatto & Windus, p70.

[8] Seaford, R.A.S. (1994) *Reciprocity and Ritual.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp65-73.

underrate the political dimension of Achilles' case and equally to overrate Agamemnon's hierarchical standing as 'commander-in-chief' of the Greek army. Achilles even brings up the question of why the Achaeans are assembled at Troy for battle (1.150-1). Agamemnon and Menelaus are 'summoners who go about recruiting to help restore their damaged family *time*.'[9] The arrangement between fellow *basileis* (chieftains) and the 'summoners' is the offer of proper *time* and due esteem for participating. This generalised reciprocity, in the case of the chieftains, is motivated by the compensation of gifts 'given in order to ensure his people's [fellow chieftains, in this case] continuing loyalty.'[10] By removing Achilles' *time* in the guise of Briseis, Agamemnon is breaching the delicate contract that justifies Achilles' position at Troy. He therefore has every right to refuse to partake in the fighting as a result of this outrage. The very fact that the audience knows that he is destined never to acquire a *nostos* - to return home to his aged father - serves to make his position more unendurable and tragic. Achilles' awareness of his mortality makes him more sensitive to and more easily insulted by Agamemnon's affront than any other Greek might be. It is Agamemnon who has broken the 'heroic code' to which all the *basileis* adhere. Although Achilles can question the justification of war at 1.152-4, he has nothing to put in place of the only answer in the poem: honour and glory - an answer we discover through the course of the poem that he is unable to accept.

This may provide a partial insight into the character of Achilles' anger and frustration. Homer calls upon the Muse to sing of Achilles' wrath, *menis* - the first word of the epic and a theme which pervades the entire poem. This special denotation marks the wrath of the hero, and Achilles is consequently the only mortal who is directly associated with the word, *menis*. It is a dangerous notion and one which even the gods are concerned to be rid of: 'The association of a divine wrath with a mortal elevates that mortal outside the normal ambience of the human condition towards the sphere of the divine.'[11] This is easy to accept in the heroic character of Achilles, when we come to realise that his mother is the sea-goddess, Thetis. The gulf between Achilles and his mother is greatly emphasised by his mortality. But this divine link has the power to allow Achilles to appeal to Zeus as no other mortal can. From the succession myth referred to in Pindar (*I.* 8.26a-37) and Aeschylus (*PV*), we can begin to understand the stance Achilles is taking in the mortal world. He is not egotistical, but he has a special knowledge as to what his mortality means to Zeus, as well as to the action of *The Iliad*. This is what makes Thetis' and Achilles' grief more painfully deep. This is the subtle effect Homer applies, by not actually relating, but calling attention to the story of the prophecy of Thetis and the generational strife that it would create. This brings out in a special way Achilles' descent from Zeus, "Aiakides", though he is not his son. Instead of being the potential ruler of the universe, Achilles not only outstrips his father, Peleus, but is the greatest living mortal hero. Through his genealogy and his *menis*, Achilles' supreme power is divine in scope and outshines all the other warriors in *The Iliad*. "Achilles is the 'limiting case' of what it is to be a hero and of the validity of the normal code of values by which heroes live and die."[12]

The question to be asked here is whether *menis* can be incorporated into part of the social norms of heroic exchange, or is it an emotion that intrudes on occasions into society as a destructive force, destroying the possibility of a secure social exchange? Phoenix asserts that Achilles' *menis* is no longer acceptable, proving that to be a warrior, wrath is a driving force. But Achilles' individual, divine wrath has completely distorted his characteristics and actions. Andromache provides an earlier example of Achilles as the heroic enemy still able to provide a proper burial for her father according to the correct heroic conduct; now she witnesses a change in Achilles that does not permit him to treat Hector's corpse with any dignity. Achilles admits in Book 9 during the Embassy that his wrath prevents him acting on his agreement with Ajax and the Embassy's attempts to reinstate Achilles into the collective enterprise. But there are other factors which confer a positive view on Achilles' actions in the Embassy that have to be elucidated, since the value Achilles has attached to his existence has changed. Because his life is so short, his dishonour at the hands of Agamemnon is initially seen to be all the more important. But later, as we move into Book 9, Achilles' increased perspective on what it means to have a short

[9] Taplin, O. (1992) *Homeric Soundings*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp57-8.

[10] Zanker, G. (1998) 'Beyond Reciprocity: The Akhilleus-Priam Scene in Iliad 24', In *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece*, p76 (eds. Gill, C., Postlethwaite, N. & Seaford, R.A.S), Oxford: Clarendon Press.

[11] Watkins, C. (1977) 'On Menis': *Indo-European Studies 3*, pp694-5.

[12] Slatkin, L.M. (1991) *The Power of Thetis*. Oxford: University of California Press, p37.

life proves that honour from Agamemnon no longer has any real value or meaning for him.

Book 9 is the scene for the next 'confrontation' between Achilles and Agamemnon - represented by his delegation. There is no disputing the fact that Agamemnon lives up to the prophecy Athena gave Achilles in 1.212-4. "Wide-ruling" Agamemnon is offering the world to Achilles, and more importantly the return of an untouched Briseis. Wealth stands in a peculiar relation to honour, in that gifts are symbols of respect and that compensation for insult may be exacted or accepted in terms of material payment. Yet Achilles' response only serves to spell out more vividly the same resentments he began formulating in Book 1. This rejection is clearly controversial in regard to the 'heroic code' as Ajax points out, in that 'people are prepared to accept compensatory payment for the killing of a brother or son i.e. a much graver offence'[13] than Agamemnon's seizure of a mere girl (9.632-6). But Achilles has grasped a new complaint (9.344-5):

Now that he has deceived me and taken from my hands my prize of honour,
Let him try no more. I know him well. He will not persuade me.

Earlier Nestor proposed that Agamemnon should "...appease him with gifts and gentle words..." Agamemnon's orders do not contain such niceties, instead Odysseus is careful to withdraw Agamemnon's explicit demand to be acnowledged as the 'greater' (1.186) from his speech:

Let him yield to me, in as much as I am the kinglier
and inasmuch as I can call myself born the elder (9.160-1).

The emphasis on verbal deceit displays the failure of the words to match the 'mind' and true intent of the gift-giver. It supports the interpretation of Achilles' case as resting on the rejection of any simple and direct equation between *time* and material goods. 'In such 'gift-economies' the highest premium is placed on generosity and display; superiority in gift-giving equates to superiority in social prestige.'[14] The rejection of the merely material goods is often described by the phrase 'breaking the heroic code'. If this implies Achilles being clearly in the wrong and therefore outside the confines of his community, then this is a mistake. The gifts themselves do not represent compensation in the correct context of a change of heart on the part of the bearer's wrongdoing. Agamemnon has not dismissed his claim to be the noblest, neither does he offer any apology. 'The great value of the gifts was an indicator of Agamemnon's estimate of his own superiority.'[15] Achilles correctly interprets the meaning of the gifts and suggests that Agamemnon ought to find: "one who is to his liking and is kinglier than I am" (9.392) to marry his daughter. Any acquiescence to Agamemnon's commands, concealed through the rhetoric of Odysseus in the Embassy, would in fact constitute the failure of Achilles in his own epic: acceptance of such terms on Achilles' part would 'abort his heroic stature in *The Iliad*.'[16] If acceptance of the gifts as a return to balanced reciprocity is what it takes to conform to the heroic standards of society, then Achilles cannot accept them, as it would simply be a false act performed for public appearance's sake alone. Achilles, on the boundary of heroic and mortal limit, finds himself at society's limit through his conflict with its ideals.

The question Homer raises is what would have satisfied Achilles? Was there any way that Agamemnon could have supplied the non-material *time* that Achilles seems to demand? When Achilles rejects the Embassy, it is not yet clear to the audience that Achilles wants genuine personal regret and goodwill from Agamemnon. Just two books after the Embassy scene (11.608-9), Achilles makes it explicit to Patroklos what he wants:

now I think the Achaians will come to my knees and stay there
in supplication, for a need past endurance has come to them.

This confirms the idea that the Embassy did not come in supplication to Achilles, as Tasso claims to observe. In his own view, Achilles did not witness a supplication, therefore he is not rejecting the gifts in the guise of heroic ritual. Surely this confirms that he has not broken 'the rules'.

In the previous two examples in Books 1 and 9 we observe Achilles' reactions to an abuse of the heroic code and in rejecting a 'false' heroic ritual. In Book 24 Achilles wins praise and renown for accepting Priam's supplication (*hiketeia*) and gifts, according to the correct heroic behaviour. But here the glory is not that of a warrior, which has been a characteristic of Achilles' prowess. Since Patroklos died, Achilles' main motivation for fighting was vengeance (now stronger than his *menis*) for his *philotes* directed ostensibly at Hector, rather than the greatest glory and honour that he sought in Book 1. At the end of the poem, Achilles wins honour which is profoundly different from the *time* demanded in Book 1. In confronting Priam, Achilles, through his speech, demonstrates his exercise of self-control and will-power. "... Achilles is not changed into a new or different character"[17]; he has to motivate his actions himself and is well aware of his capacity for disobedience (24.568-570):

you must not further make my spirit move in my sorrows,
for fear, old sir, I might not let you alone in my shelter,
suppliant as you are; and be guilty before the god's orders

Scholars have observed the sharpness which Achilles uses towards the old man. But it has been agreed (to an extent) that this is primarily a response to Priam's very insistence on his wealth of gifts (no doubt reminding Achilles of Agamemnon's words in Book 19) for the urgent return of his son's body. Achilles is made to state, for all to hear, that it is mainly his decision to return Hector's corpse. "I myself, even I, intend to release Hector to you..." (24.560-2). After all, Achilles does imply that 'he may reject the god's demand

[13] Gill, C. (1996) *Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy and Philosophy.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, p145n,p165.
[14] Donlan, W. (1989) 'The Unequal Exchange Between Glaucus and Diomedes in the Light of the Homeric Gift-Economy': *Phoenix 43*, pp1-15.
[15] Postlethwaite, N. (1995) 'Agamemnon Best of Spearmen': *Phoenix 49*, p100.
[16] Whitman, C.H. (1958) *Homer and the Heroic Tradition.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp191-3.
[17] Schein, *op.cit.* p162

(24.569-70,586),'[18] thereby showing that his own wish, through his actions and words, is that his decision is independent and quite unconnected to the gifts offered by Priam as ransom. Instead of paying attention to the gifts, Achilles immerses himself in tending Hector's corpse in preparation for his burial. 'The poet's careful detailing of this ritual must be designed to stress the propriety with which Achilles now treats the body of his former enemy and his concern to avoid distressing Priam.'[19] The humility of Achilles is further accentuated by his suggestion that Priam and he share a meal, thereby raising Priam to the status of Achilles' *xenos*, another facet of the gift-exchange society, this time under the guest-host relationship - *xenia*, although there is hardly any material or practical benefit that Achilles can expect in future from this transaction of *xenia*, owing to the tragedy that underlies the epic and which is made lucid to both the reader (or audience) and the characters themselves, who know of the doom that awaits Troy, which includes both Priam and Achilles.

It is only because it takes great effort of will on Achilles' part that he is able to cancel out Apollo's account of him in 24.39ff and to live up to Zeus' commendation. Achilles is able, to a certain extent, to "re-establish his distinctive self - as a hero with the capacities for both *philotes* and *menis* -"[20] that he was at the beginning of Book 1. The sympathy he shows Priam is the same sympathy that led him to summon the assembly in 1.54 in an attempt to end the plague."[21] Although Achilles is finally reconciled to the leaders of his society, he can hardly be said, at the close, to embrace its values wholeheartedly or to dedicate himself to its goals. In fact Homer's portrayal of Achilles, through the course of the narrative, presents a hero who is indifferent to gift-exchange or gift-receipt, notably those of Agamemnon and Priam; they play no part in his decision to return to battle after Patroklos' death, or in his decision to return Hector's corpse to his grieving father.[22] The death of Patroklos has estranged Achilles forever from the belief that the honours bestowed by society truly compensate for loss of life. 'The glory won here is not one that involves inflicting and accepting a pitiless death, but by evoking and offering *eleos*, pity'[23]. Achilles is so overcome by pity that he shows himself quite indifferent (as he was to Agamemnon's gifts) to his own fame and prowess (24.540-2):

I do not care for Peleus' old age, since I sit idly here, far from my homeland bringing grief to you and your children.

In fact the return of Hector's body and the bestowal of friendship on Priam seem to take place outside the warrior society. Achilles is at pains to keep the meeting secret lest other Achaeans take the enemy king prisoner (24.650-55). Is the society Achilles questions constantly in his search for 'self-knowledge' inadequate to contain an act of pity?



The heroism of Achilles emerges as a result of his exploits; but the setting of battle only serves as an all important arena in which every choice and action becomes vital. Life is closely bound up to the lives of others and where the concept of the self comes urgently into question (episodes especially apparent to Achilles in Book 18 when he learns of Patroklos' death and Book 24 when he realises that his own immeasurable grief can be compared to old Priam's), prowess becomes peripheral to the crisis of the self, reflected in society through the crisis of the ritualistic gift-giving/dispersing by the host in Book 1. *The Iliad* demonstrates the growth of the hero, where Achilles has the opportunity to become the hero and to create the terms by which heroism will be redefined. Nevertheless, it can argued that the 'world of heroes', 'Homeric values' and the 'heroic code' are a widespread assumption of the ethics in *The Iliad* which are deemed to be clearly established and unanimously accepted by all the characters. But the modern reader can distort the values of another society by imposing conceptions and prejudices from our own time upon it. It is true that we know little about Homer's society and his audience, and even less about the heroic age which he displays in his epic. But even within the heroic context to which the poem is confined, the participant characters spend much time and energy disagreeing about their ethics and values. *The Iliad* may not necessarily provide us with an accurate record of the ideals of a heroic society, but through its questioning of the ultimate perfection of heroic standards by the greatest of its heroes, it signals the beginning of the epic's decline.

Vanessa Horrocks is a Second Year student of English and Greek & Roman Studies at the University of Exeter.

[18] Seaford, *op.cit.* p173n,p110.
[19] Richardson, N.J. (1993) *The Iliad: A Commentary (Vol 6).* Cambridge, p337.
[20] Schein, *op.cit.* p99
[21] *ibid* p162
[22] Postlethwaite, N. (1998) 'Akhilleus & Agamemnon: Generalized Reciprocity', in *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, p103.
[23] Macleod, C. (1983) *Collected Essays.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, p13.



CHARIOTS AGAIN IN THE ROMAN CIRCUS AT JERASH?

Larry Shenfield

Recently, for the first time in more than a thousand years, three horses were led into one of the arched starting gates of the monumental Roman hippodrome an hour's drive north of Amman at Jerash (*fig. 1*), now in the last phase of a spectacular reconstruction conceived and financed since 1984 by the Jordanian government.

The purpose (a fourth horse had gone lame that day) was to measure up to see whether a contemplated replica Roman *quadrigae* with charioteer, harnessed with four horses, could pass comfortably, as was hoped, through one of the three-meter-wide, eight-meter-high restored stone gateways. They can indeed. The day when once again a Roman chariot or two will parade (or possibly race) in the circus at Roman Gerasa may not be far off, if ambitious plans can be realised. The archaeologist in charge, Mr. Abed al Majeed Mujalli (seen measuring up with a tape at the left in *fig. 1*) has recently been supervising the filling-in of the robbed-out floor of the race-course (*harena*, 'sand') and grading it to its original level.[1] It is hoped that the entire restoration by his team of some 100 workers will be sufficiently advanced for an inauguration with at least one chariot and horses in time for the annual Jerash Festival in July, 2000.

Notably, this is believed to be the first virtually complete reconstruction of a Roman hippodrome attempted in recent times. Although it is one of the smallest of those surviving, being 244 by 52 meters (less than a third the size of the Circus Maximus at Rome), the Jerash *circus* (also *curriculum* in Latin) is already one of the best-known from the late Roman Empire thanks to the detailed reports of the 1931-33 excavations by an Anglo-American expedition.[2] Mr. Mujalli and his team have had over the years only those plans and the clues on the ground, but no historical records, to reveal and incorporate the many

[1] Extreme problems with dust and wheel ruts during the races in the Ben Hur film (as in Roman times: Ovid *Ars Amatoria* 3.2.4; Juvenal 8.61, 10.37) indicate that just as in antiquity, confirmed by archaeology, the foundation layers need to be finished with a thin hard layer before being covered lightly with sand (Humphrey [n.2 below] 83-4).

[2] The 1931-33 archaeological investigations by C. Kraeling, E. B. Müller and G. Horsfield are summarised in J. H. Humphrey, *Roman Circuses: Arenas for Chariot Racing* (1986) 495-504, many of whose observations on the site and chariot racing I have followed here. See also A. Hyland, *Equus: The Horse in the Roman World* (1990) 203-11; V. Olivová, *Sports and Games in the Ancient World* (1984) 175-77; F. Sear, *Roman Architecture* (1982) 37-39.

modifications made during its long use.[3] The costly rebuilding, which has had no funding from abroad, is an exemplary achievement for an emerging country of only some 4,000,000 people, nearly a third of them former refugees.



Measuring up for a *quadrigae* in a starting gate of the Roman circus at Jerash. Photo: Jeff Cullis

The 55-meter long row of ten ruined starting gates (*carceres*), curving in the customary arc,[4] is being slowly re-assembled from fallen rubble, and hundreds of missing stones quarried and shaped (*fig. 2*).

When the Roman teams were ready in position in the gates, paired timber swing-doors on pivots in each gate would have been released simultaneously at the starter's signal by an ingenious tandem mechanism of iron and twisted sinew.[5]

The idea of building authentic replica chariots that would again race, or at least parade for the public, in the restored Roman hippodrome at Jerash is the joint brain-child of Jeff Cullis, a retired Nottingham businessman with only an amateur's interest in classical Rome, and his close friend of 30 years, Stellan Lind, a Swedish management consultant with family connections in Jordan. As Chairman of the Jordanian-Swedish Medical Association, he has organised many seminars and conferences in Jordan. On his visits he became an enthusiastic admirer of Mr. Mujalli's rejuvenation of the circus at Gerasa. It was only in March 1998 that the two friends discovered over coffee in a restaurant in Uppsala that they had both entertained the same romantic notion.

To realize what might have been only a dream, Stellan on one of his routine visits to Amman proposed their idea to the heads of the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities. They accepted in principle, aware of the potential for visitors. The spectacle would have to pay its own way from admission charges additional to the price of admission to the dramatic ruins of Roman Gerasa close by. Sixty hectares of the site (143 acres) can be visited, attracting 200,000 or more people annually, three-quarters of them tourists from abroad.

The hippodrome is outside the city walls, conveniently only a short distance south-west of the South Gate, the main tourist entrance into Roman Gerasa. Originally, the *cavea* (seating area) around three sides of the circus was four meters deep with 16 rows of seats. Beneath arches below the seats were passages with long rows of shops. The seats held about 15,000 people (compared with some 150,000 in the Circus Maximus at Rome). So far, Mr. Mujalli has had stone seating rebuilt in the Jerash circus for 70 spectators, with a long-term goal of 200 or so. (*fig. 3*) Temporary seating or standing room would be no problem in any case.

Owners of the several excellent local stables have been approached to provide teams of suitable horses and purpose-built stables near by. Daring young Jordanians seem eager to be charioteers. Jeff Cullis and Stellan Lind have travelled extensively to find internationally-known experts (including a skilled charioteer in the 1958 Ben Hur film) who might give training on the spot.[6] A Jordanian firm with carriage-building know-how is developing experimental chariot prototypes to choose from.

Normally, in Roman hippodromes, the teams charged out of the gates and swerved to the right and anti-clockwise along a long, narrow barrier down the centre (the *euripus* or *spina*). This was ornamented with water basins and fountains and sometimes an obelisk, and at each end were three lofty conical pillars (*metae*) to warn charioteers of the coming 180-degree turn. The Gerasa circus, however, seems too narrow for a full-size Roman *euripus*. The classical Greek hippodrome - at Olympia for example - usually had no *euripus*.

Hence John Humphrey thinks the circus at Gerasa may have been a rebuilding in stone by Hadrian (AD 117-138) of an earlier earth-banked circus, like the

---

[3] How long the *hippodromos*, later the *circus*, was in use we do not know. The city of Gerasa, known first as Antioch-on-the-Chrysorrhoas ('golden river'), was founded in the second century BC. With the surrounding territory it was annexed to the Roman province of Syria following conquest by Pompey in 63 BC. Later it was joined to the league of free cities called the Decapolis, whereupon it gained great wealth as the western terminus of the silk route: G. Lancaster Harding *The Antiquities of Jordan* (Amman, 1959) 79-81. Decline commenced in the fourth and fifth centuries and drifting sand obliterated it until rediscovery by the German traveller Seetzen in 1806. It is considered with Palmyra and Petra to be one of the most important and best preserved Roman cities in the Near East. It was raised to the status of a *colonia* under Caracalla (AD 198-217). (Extensive information on the history and archaeology of Jordan is available on the government's Internet site: www.kinghussein.gov.jo)

[4] Curved at Gerasa and angled slightly to the right (for Greek-style racing, see text below) to give each contestant an equl-distant start *anti-clockwise* toward the *right side* of the circus and thence on to the first turn. The term carceres was apparently taken from carcer, a prison (Isodorus, *Etymologiae* 18.32, 15.2.46), presumably because the word aptly described the small enclosed space within the starting gate before the timber gates were opened at the start.

[5] Possible reconstruction plans are described by Humphrey [n.2] 157-70), based on evidence from the gates at Lepcis Magna, pictorial representations at Ravenna and a description by Dionysus of Halicarnassus in the time of Augustus. There is no solid evidence for how the starting signal was given for Roman races, although in Greek circuses it was by a trumpet (Paus. 6.13.9; S. *El.* 711).

[6] Several are accomplished in flat and harness racing or 'trotting' as it is called in America. This has become a fast and thrilling spectator sport (and staple of the betting industry) with the development of the very light carbon-fibre, chariot-like 'sulky' weighing only 26 lbs (11.8 kilos). It is popular in America (where major races are televised) and in many parts of Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. It is risky and requires consummate skill. The Canadian-born racer John Campbell has earned upwards of $125,000,000 in a 25-year career.

larger one to be seen today at Aphrodisias.[7] There may have been no *euripus* and only a single slim turning-post (*meta*) at each end, with the *harena* otherwise kept clear for the popular Greek athletic or equestrian events.[8] Although Gerasa was a typical Roman provincial town, the people were predominantly Greek-speaking throughout its long life. A late inscription naming a *hippotrophos* (horse-breeder) as victor in a horse race indicates that racing up to and during the third century AD, and quite possibly later, was in Greek style.

In Greek-style racing, also popular in Etruria and Rome from early Republican times, leading citizens entered teams in their own name and sometimes even drove them, gaining glory for themselves and their family (as Pindar's odes attest). The very different Roman races, run by fiercely competitive "factions" (*factiones*, stables), private enterprises of the aristocracy more like our football clubs or motor-racing teams, became popular in the west of the Empire from 70 BC (Pliny, *Natural History* 7.186).[9] It was then that the State began to pay horse-breeders to supply horses for the races. At first there were two, later four *factiones*, the "whites", "reds", "blues" and "greens", each entering three teams, one for each of the (usually) 12 starting gates. Loyalty of the spectators was no longer to the aristocratic owner but to the colours of one's faction (as in today's annual *Palio* horse race in Siena), to the professional charioteers, and even to the horses themselves; and noisy, cheering crowds bet liberally on the outcome.[10]

It is unlikely, Humphrey thinks, that the Jerash circus, being so narrow and with only ten gates instead of the normal twelve, was ever used for competitive racing by factions, which did not come to Alexandria (and so possibly not to Gerasa), until some date between the late third or the early fourth century AD.[11] In any case, Roman-style or Greek-style races would have featured the same light, fast chariot, the Greek differing from the Roman only in sometimes having a guard rail at the back instead of a low rail or a curved shield at the front.[12] This brings us back to the difficult and possibly controversial choice of the design of the prototypes now being built in Jordan for the Jerash circus.

October, 1988: rebuilding stone on stone, by the Jordanian Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities of the 10 monumental starting gates in the Jersah circus. Photo: Jeff Cullis

From the beginning, Jeff Cullis and Stellan Lind envisaged that the chariot to be displayed in the arena would be an *authentic* Roman *quadrigae*, although we know that races were often run with two horses (the *biga*) or sometimes with three (*trigae*).[13] As Jeff wrote in his brief for discussions with the Ministry of Tourism, "Our objective is to give the paying public at Jerash something of a spectacle to enhance their visit." But Jeff and Stellan immediately had to face an obvious problem: how to develop an impressive compromise that will look historically accurate but will also be strong enough - and safe enough, as the dangers are well known - for charioteers and spectators alike.[14] The flexible ancient body-construction of the Roman (and Greek) *racing* chariot, bent willow rails with thin struts of various woods laced with leather thongs, would need to be strengthened (invisibly if possible) and maybe underpinned with a metal chassis. But would that satisfy the public?

Both Jeff and Stellan early recognized that their public would most likely expect a Roman chariot to look like the heavy, big-wheeled, ornate, multi-coloured ones in the thrill-packed Ben Hur and similar films, and not the authentic, flimsy, dangerous Roman racing vehicle designed solely for lightness and speed pictured in the art of the sixth century BC onwards.[15]

---

[7] Humphrey [n.2] 503. Just to the south behind the starting gates (just visible in **Fig. 1**) is a well-preserved memorial triple gateway, 'Hadrian's Arch', securely dated to 129-30.

[8] Socketed stones found by archaeologists at one end may have held goal posts for polo set up by the Perslans after their invasion in AD 614. Like the bigger circus at Alexandria, it may have hosted chariot and equestrian races and games of all kinds until the Islamic conquest In 641, and even later.

[9] Whether they began earlier is disputed, despite the apparent evidence of Tacitus *Annals* 14.21: Humphrey [n.2] 137-38.

[10] Many charioteers became idols, e.g. Diocles who began at the age of 18 in AD 122, and in 24 years accumulated 1,426 wins out of 4,257 starts, 925 for the 'Reds' (*ILS* 5287). The 'charioteer inscriptions' also record the wins of horses, e.g. Pompeianus with 152 wins: Hyland [n.2] 206.

[11] Humphrey [n.2] 503. 'Factions' were possibly introduced at Alexandria by Diocletian (AD 284-305). Their first mention there is in AD 315 in two papyri from Karanis in the Fayoum: Humphrey [n.2] 511 with n.100.

[12] Greek and Roman racing chariots may have had a similar origin in Syria among the third-millenium BC Mitanni and Hatti (J.H. Crouwel & J. Morel, *Chariots . . . in Bronze Age Greece* [Amsterdam 1981] 148-9): the former via the Hittites thence into the Aegean and to Crete; the latter from the Etruscans whom legend maintained (though the question is notoriously disputed) had emigrated with pre-Mitanni chariot knowledge from west-central Turkey. The Etruscans were early influenced by Greece: thus light Greek-type racing chariots are attested on 6th-c. BC Roman painted-tomb friezes at Velletri.

[13] Trigae were not raced by the Greeks after the eighth century. A problem of authenticity for the Jerash project would be the inside third horse or trace horse (*funalis*) who was not yoked in antiquity, but only roped (or attached by a rein through a terret) to the centre yoked pair; or the two outside horses (*funales, seiraphoroi*) of a *quadrigae*, similarly attached, who for safety, as well as control on the hazardous tight turns, might all have to be put under a single extended yoke in the Jerash reconstruction.

[14] Roman charioteers often wound the reins around their waists and galloped on, exerting little real control, as we see in contemporary paintings and bas reliefs.

[15] M. Junkelmann [see *Pegasus* 33 (1990) 11], *Die Reiter Roms* (2 vols., Mainz 1992) Anhang I; J. H. Crouwel, 'Aegean Bronze Age chariots & their Near Eastern background', *BICS* 25 (1978) 174-5.

February, 1999: reconstructed east tower base and spectator seating, adjoining the starting gates of the Jerash circus. Photo Stellan Lind.

The foremost expert on ancient chariots, Professor Joost Crouwel of the University of Amsterdam,[16] who offered advice, wrote: "The reconstruction of Roman racing vehicles in the Ben Hur films is very wrong, in no way can they be described as authentic copies." He cited the experimental but technically correct, small, light Greek high-front four-horse racing chariot made and run in 1975 by J. Spruytte (Crouwel [n.16] 65 n.321 and Plate 37a-c), and the type-model drawing by M. Junkelmann [n.15] of an authentic Roman racing *quadrigae* which weighed 100 kilos or only 25 kilos for each horse. Jeff and Stellan are unwilling, however, to risk disappointment of the public at the appearance of only a strictly authentic racing vehicle which does not come up to expectations. They think they may have found a round-about solution.

Recognising that the race-course at Gerasa was in reality a Roman-style circus adapted for Greek-style games, Stellan and Jeff are considering a historical pageant, in the form of colourful parades, with chariot races included only as a long-term option. The first prototype chosen would be the Roman ceremonial chariot. The ornate Ben Hur-type chariots are, after all, only an exaggerated version of the high-fronted late Roman ceremonial chariot in which emperors rode in triumphs or parades. It was customary for the patron of the games, dressed as a triumphal general, to open the day's contests with a *pompa,* or grand processional entrance, in a sumptuous chariot of this kind. We know that the pretender Vespasian did so to inaugurate the games at Alexandria in 69, and that in 71 Titus did so there also, following his capture of Jerusalem.[17] By the fourth century AD it is conceivable that versions of the prestige Roman chariot came to be adopted and paraded by pro-consuls and rulers in the Eastern Empire, and thus perhaps at Gerasa.

The displays in the circus that Jeff Cullis and Stellan Lind have in mind would illustrate the story of Gerasa and its hippodrome with costumed scenes featuring the many peoples who lived down the centuries in the area. There might be Nabatean horsemen guarding caravans, then Canaanite, Hyksos, Hittite, Egyptian, Ptolemaic, Hellenistic, Roman, Byzantine, and finally Arab tableaux. Highlight of the show would be the replica ceremonial Roman *quadrigae* on parade. Eventually there could even be displays or races of fast light Greek and Roman vehicles. After all, Gerasa was at the centre of West Mesopotamian history, with the sites not far from the 18th Dynasty battlefields of Megiddo and Kadesh, where chariot squadrons played a deciding part. With its long and comprehensive history, the circus at Jerash would provide an ideal setting in which to realise Jeff's and Stellan's dream.

Larry Shenfield is writing a Ph.D thesis on chariots in antiquity in the Dept. of Classics and Ancient History at Exeter. He is technical consultant for the chariot project at Gerasa.

[16] Crouwel & Morel [n.12]; Crouwel, *Chariots ... in Iron Age Greece* (Amsterdam 1992).

[17] Both events are attested by papyri. For the rapturous acclamation of Vespasian in the hippodrome at Alexandria, *P.Fouad* 8; for Titus's visit to the Serapeion and the hippodrome, *P.Oxy.* 2726: both cited by Humphrey [n.2] 510-11 with expanded notes 90, 91 & 92.

CHRIS GILL'S PERSONALITY:
a review by Douglas L. Cairns

Christopher Gill, ***Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: the Self in Dialogue.*** Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. Pp. x + 510. Hardback (0-19-814676-0) £50; paperback (0-19- 815232-9) £19.99.

In this demanding, stimulating, and timely book, Christopher Gill presents his mature reflections on the psychological and ethical models of the self implicitly or explicitly employed in Greek epic, tragedy, and philosophy.[1] The central thesis is that, in contrast to modern 'subjective-individualist' conceptions of personality centred on the self-consciousness of an individual 'I' and the self-legislation of an autonomous subject, Greek thought works with an objective psychological model (in which motivation is conceived in terms of a dialogue between parts of the soul and as governed by reasons and reasoning rather than by a subjective will) and a participant ethical framework (in which debate on the good life for a human being is embedded in engagement with and reflection on one's role as a participant in shared forms of life). Despite these differences, however, ancient and modern approaches (Gill argues) focus on issues which are at least analogous, and indeed ancient views of what it is to be human offer important perspectives on the notions of selfhood and personality which can contribute to an alternative construction of these notions in objective-participant terms.

No summary could do justice to the richness and complexity of Gill's argument. He takes us from the internalized dialogue of Homeric decision-making to the ethical psychology of the philosophers. Parallels are drawn between the 'exemplary gestures' of 'problematic heroes' (e.g. Achilles, Medea), which Gill interprets as forms of (second-order) reflection on shared (first-order) norms, and philosophical forms of post-reflective virtue which build on, but modify or transform ideals acquired at the pre-reflective level. Neither the poets' problematic hero nor the philosophers' virtuous person is a subjective-individualist — the former is engaged in a form of debate on the validity of shared norms, and the latter's goal is not self-realization or self-creation but a life of dialogue and shared enquiry which requires the development of intrapersonal harmony in the context of interpersonal/reciprocal relationships. In thus involving the reshaping of first-order priorities by second-order rationality, Greek views of normative humanity may be compared to certain modern accounts of personhood, though they differ in not privileging subjectivity, autonomy, and the radical creation of the self.

Gill is as impressive in his pursuit of the big and bold idea as in his tenacity in applying that idea through detailed examination of specific contexts and problems. We should agree that Greek psychology and ethics do not privilege the abstract, impartial subject over the individual whose emotional and intellectual development is deeply embedded in mutual social relationships. Gill is also persuasive on the continuity between the explicit psychology of the philosophers and the implicit models of epic and tragedy; he is right to argue that philosophical eudaimonism is not well characterized in terms of either egoism or altruism; and shows conclusively that sharp antitheses between moral and non-moral motives, partial and impartial perspectives have no place in ancient ethics. Particularly impressive are the links he establishes between interpersonal and internalized dialogue as salient concepts in Greek thought; these greatly illuminate the philosophers' insistence on the interdependence of social and psychic harmony. Gill's approach is selective, but it is a strength that his theoretical framework can readily be applied to works, genres, and contexts which he does not discuss.

There are, however, ways in which Gill's approach is both too rigid and too flexible; and though the core of his argument is sound, there is a sense in which he claims both too much and too little for his thesis. First, there is a tendency towards over-schematization: the 'participant' account of the relation between pre- and post-reflective versions of how to live, for example, is made to apply in similar form to Homeric and tragic heroes, as well as to the ethical theories of Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus and the Stoics. But it is questionable (*a*) how closely the 'problematic heroes' of epic and tragedy represent the sort of rational reflection on society's norms that is promoted by the philosophers; and (*b*) to what extent pre- and post-reflective conceptions of virtue in the philosophers can be considered truly participant. In the first case, we can accept that the stance of a hero such as Achilles or Medea is both a reflection on the value of shared social norms and an attempt to communicate the hero's point of view; where this communication takes the form of an extreme and apparently anti-social 'exemplary gesture', we can see that there is a gulf between conventional norms and the hero's attitude towards these norms. But this need not be the case: as Gill concedes (p. 314; cf. 307), the hero's stance functions as a strategy within the categories of conventional discourse, and not at a more developed level at which ordinary conceptions of virtue are modified or transformed; his focus, accordingly, is narrower than than 'the proper goals and form of a human life' (cf. p. 238); and it is significant that the problematic post-reflective stance of an Achilles stands, in its original context, in contrast to the unproblematic re flection of a Sarpedon; there need not be the kind of

[1] A much shorter version of this review appeared in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 118 (1998); the author wishes to thank the Reviews Editor of *JHS* for permission to draw on the version published in that journal, and the Editors of *Pegasus* for permission to go on at great length.

motivational gap between poetic forms of first- and second-order reasoning that there is in the philosophical case, because poetic reflection may simply endorse conventional standards. While it may be true that epic and tragic figures demonstrate an ability to engage in both first-order and second-order reasoning, and while both forms of reasoning do manifest the 'objective-participant' model, the stronger claim that problematic heroes in particular illustrate a profound similarity between poetic and philosophical models of the relationship between pre-and post-reflective forms of virtue (as Gill claims throughout) is not thereby established. Nor can the two 'problematic heroes' whom Gill discusses in most detail be taken so easily together; for the claim that the external audience is more receptive to the ethical content of the hero's gesture (and thus more sympathetically involved with the hero's plight) than his/her interlocutors in the work itself is surely more acceptable in the case of Achilles than in that of Medea; true, her revenge is as much a gesture of protest as are Achilles' withdrawal from fighting, refusal of gifts, and threats to depart, but how open would an Athenian audience have been to the 'second-order reasoning' of a barbarian female who, out of the emotional incontinence and with the guile typical of her sex, usurps the role of the male and strikes at the heart of the institutions of marriage and the family?

In the second case, the suspicion that the participant ethical model is being pushed beyond its limits is raised particularly by the discussion of Aristotle's account of the relation between the lives of contemplation and of ethical virtue. Gill is right to argue that Aristotle sees the contemplative life as arising from, reflecting upon, and thus requiring the life of virtue, but his claim that contemplation itself conforms to the participant model is dubious. For while it is true that no contemplator will in practice be capable of leading a solitary life, and that Aristotle suspects that collaboration with others may make one a more efficient contemplator (1177a33-b1), it does not seem to be the case that contemplation is *essentially* collaborative; indeed, in so far as it is a divine activity, the more nearly it approaches its essence, the less collaborative and the more self-sufficient it will be. Nor do I buy the suggestion (pp. 371-5) that the Aristotelian contemplator manifests a participant conception of the good life in so far as he benefits others by communicating his knowledge of the superiority of the contemplative life; for (*a*) this is nowhere attested in Aristotle's text (Gill points to an argument of this sort in Plato's *Symposium* and argues for an accommodation between the claims of friendship and the grasp of pleasure as the final end in Epicureanism which would follow a similar pattern, but this is not proof), and (*b*) even if it were, the participant aspect would still be a non-essential attribute of contemplation. Thus, in maintaining a fairly rigid schema, Gill is rather too flexible in his criteria. The various forms of the 'participant' model are heterogeneous, and achieve cohesion as a group only by contrast with the alternative 'individualist' model; this may, however, tell us more about the singularity of the latter.

One suspects, too, that the thorough-going 'us/them' antithesis which is central to the book's argument is overdone. Kantian ethical theory is a constant target and (negative) point of reference, and Gill is right both to reject the radical abstraction of the Kantian approach and to stress the non-Kantian orientation of ancient ethics. But he may mislead when he attacks elements of the Kantian system — such as universalization, impartiality, the distinction between moral and non-moral motives, and the recognition that one's expectations of others must be balanced by one's expectations of oneself — which also have a less abstract application in a range of non-Kantian forms of ethical thought.[2] This may be an unintended consequence, but one does get the impression that Gill feels that such notions have no real place in ancient thought, when in fact ancient authors from Homer onwards offer copious evidence of the relevance of *some* form of these concepts to ancient ethical models.[3] Certainly, the forms of universalization observed in Greek thought are rooted in the ethics of reciprocity which operate in the context of specific relationships and communities: to recognize that one's expectations of others must be matched by one's expectations of oneself is to accept the dynamics of reciprocity in more general terms; to extend one's other-concern to an outsider in recognition of an (actually or potentially) shared predicament (as does Achilles to Priam in *Iliad* 24) is to apply the generalized reciprocity which obtains within specific relationships at another level.[4] Greek universalization is particularized by reciprocity, Kantian in quite another way, but each has an association with the notion that, if our reactive attitudes are to serve also as ethical attitudes, they must apply without partiality to ourselves as well as to others.

In a similar vein, Gill often credits his opponents with the strongest (and therefore least defensible) version of a thesis; thus the argument of Chapter 5, on the superiority of reciprocity over altruism as an interpretative model in the Greek context, works best if 'altruism' is taken in its strongest possible sense; there are, however, weaker uses of the term, and indeed some are comfortable with a notion of 'reciprocal altruism' which would be thoroughly compatible with Gill's approach (but which he might reject as a contradiction in terms).[5] Central to this chapter is a searching and revealing critique of certain assumptions underlying Terence Irwin's approach to Platonic and Aristotelian ethics. I am per

---

[2] See P.F. Strawson, 'Freedom and Resentment', esp. p.14; B. Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* 11, 60, 82-5, 92, 115; both in Gill's bibliography.

[3] See my paper in *Papers of the Leeds International Latin Seminar* 7 (1993), 155-67.

[4] See Gill 341-2; cf. his contribution in Gill, Postlethwaite & Seaford (eds), *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece* (1998) 312-13; also H. van Wees, ibid. 22; contrast G. Zanker, ibid. 72-92, who regards Achilles' response to Priam as a form of altruism which transcends [*sic*] reciprocity.

[5] For weak and strong senses of altruism, see Zanker in *Reciprocity*, 75-6; but note that Gill's insistence on the strongest sense of the term avoids the confusions which arise when the notion is diluted to include self-reference, mutual benefit, or self-interest.

suaded by Gill's argument that Irwin's interpretations (in terms of a form of individual self-realization which promotes concern for the good of others for their sake) are Kantian-inspired, but feel that occasionally his criticism is over-zealous. Regarding Plato's *Republic*, for example, Irwin is responding to salient characteristics of the work itself, especially to the the presentation of the project in terms of the challenge to disprove Thrasymachus' view that justice benefits others rather than the agent; the fundamentally other-benefiting nature of the common conception of justice and the aim of integrating the good of self and others in a true account of justice are thus embedded in the work; at times, Irwin's wholly justifiable notion of justice as a virtue which benefits others is reformulated by Gill in terms of a Kantian assumption that *morality* is fundamentally altruistic. Thus, although there is truth in Gill's critique, Irwin's approach is also more Platonic than Gill suggests.

There is also some difficulty with the claim that no Greek ethical theory is intended to function as an 'Archimedean point', i.e. as having an appeal to any rational agent whatever his/her ethical background. Irwin is taken to task for arguing the opposite with regard to both Plato and Aristotle. Gill's position has substance, given that Aristotle explicitly claims that ethical theory can only be addressed to those who have been appropriately prepared through habituation, and Plato likewise insists on proper affective training as a prerequisite for dialectical knowledge; Gill concedes that both present arguments which they believe to be true *for* anyone, but argues that they do not present them as accessible *to* anyone. The position, however, may be more complicated; for, on the face of it, Aristotle's use of the argument from man's function and Plato's presentation of his argument as a response to the Thrasymachean challenge suggest that both do attempt to found their theories on arguments that both the committed and the uncommitted would accept. Gill claims that the *ergon*-argument is not, in fact, an appeal to objective, extra-ethical factors, but represents a view from within ethical theory; but while we can accept that the *ergon*-argument is, indeed, ethicized, it is by no means clear that Aristotle himself perceives this, or that he does not intend the argument to provide external, quasi-scientific support. We might accept that the argument, in so far as it is ethicized, cannot properly be made to perform an Archimedean function, but this may be the sign of a failure on Aristotle's part, rather than of a refusal to make the attempt. Likewise, Plato seems to represent the argument of the *Republic* as having the power to convince even a moral sceptic like Thrasymachus; Gill's answer to this involves an appeal to the dialogue form — the challenge which Socrates takes up is indeed prompted by Thrasymachus, but is reformulated by Glaucon and Adeimantus, who are the recipients of the rest of the dialogue and who, unlike Thrasymachus, are presented as men of good character who are already receptive to the pull of ethical theory. Similarly, at the close of the main exposition, the remarks which purport to demonstrate the desirability of justice even for the likes of Thrasymachus are not, in fact, addressed to him, but to Glaucon (pp. 452-3). The economy of such arguments, however, varies in inverse proportion to their ingenuity.

These, then, are ways in which Gill seems to claim too much for his approach. He claims too little, it seems to me, in limiting the application of his interpretative model to Greek poetry and philosophy and their relation to modern philosophical theory; indeed, at several points (e.g. p. 459) he deliberately eschews any wider, cross-cultural or universal, application, and he is somewhat coy on the question of the extent to which he regards his thesis as true in its account of human ethical and psychological life. But this is to ignore the currency of ideas analogous to his own in many other spheres of enquiry, especially in the growing consensus of evolutionary psychology and social anthropology on the fundamental importance of reciprocity in human cooperation, and on the basis of the most distinctive features of human intellectual, ethical, and cultural life in our species' unique forms of sociality.[6] A striking indication of the currency of analogous ideas is the general retreat, both within psychoanalysis and among its critics, from Freud's radical interiorization of individual psychological development. One can understand Gill's decision to focus on post-Cartesian and post-Kantian, rather than Freudian models of the personality, both because his interests are philosophical and because the philosophical approaches he rejects have had a disproportionate influence on classical studies, but *pace* Adkins, not many of us are Kantians now, whereas Freud has provided the twentieth century with its dominant models of the personality and of psychological development. Freud's psychological model may or may not be an 'objective' one on Gill's criteria (there is dialogue between psychic parts, but also strong reason/passion dualism); but he is certainly an exponent of an 'individualist' rather than a 'participant' approach in

[6] For this approach in a classical context, cf. W. Burkert, *Creation of the Sacred* (1996) 138-55; it is reflected, but also distorted, in G. Herman's paper in *Reciprocity*, 199-226.

his insistence on phylogenetically determined patterns of psychological development that are largely independent of external social circumstances. That a post-Freudian psychoanalyst can announce that 'all life is group life' and 'the self is a thing of the past'[7] shows how far we have come.

Some readers might also feel the lack of a political dimension to Gill's work: it would be interesting to have his views on the extent to which 'objective-participant' conceptions are reflected in the organization of Athenian society or in the practices of Athenian democracy, and on how this might compare with modern social forms. There may also be room for an opinion as to whether the objective-participant theory, as a better way of thinking about the relation between individual and society in general, has a role to play in attempts to restore the notions of co-operation and community to the forefront of political debate. More generally, in thinking about relations between ancient and modern ideas, Gill confines himself to comparisons between the implicit or explicit viewpoint of ancient sources (both popular and philosophical) and the views of modern philosophers; one misses a comparison of ordinary values with ordinary values, popular sources with popular sources, the kind of perspective well provided by numerous *obiter dicta* in Dover's *Greek Popular Morality.*

This refusal to take the thesis further is a function of Gill's deliberate decision to confine himself to the realm of theory. This deliberate orientation also underlies his decision to press the argument that the Greek models under discussion represent thinking about '(what we call) personality', more specifically that Greek philosophical accounts of what it is to be human can be compared to modern theories of personhood. Gill deals in detail with criticisms which could be made of this project, as well as with criticisms which have actually been made of his earlier work on the same topic, but I remain unconvinced that he has met the fundamental objection that there is no one concept of the person, but rather a range of more or less subjective concepts founded on varying sets of criteria which are more or less arbitrary and, when translated into the real world, often repugnant. Are sufferers from Alzheimer's disease persons? Not on most of the typical criteria; modern theory is comfortable with the idea that some humans are not persons, whereas Greek theory distinguishes between well and poorly developed humans. If we find the denial of personhood repugnant in such cases it is presumably because claims to personhood are not exhausted by consideration of the individual's capacities, but must take account of his/her participation in a network of social relationships; and this 'participation', it seems to me, may be minimal in terms of the capacities exercised by the individual him/herself. Relationships persist between Alzheimer's sufferers and their friends and relatives even as the sufferer's active capacity to sustain them progressively declines; and even where, as in cases of severe mental incapacity at birth, the individual's contribution to the creation and maintenance of a meaningful social relationship is slight, the attitudes of others, who most certainly do regard the individual as a 'person' and a participant in a significant relationship, matter a great deal.

Attempts to define what it is to be a person, moreover, frequently have a moral agenda. To be a person is to enjoy certain rights to be treated in certain ways and not in others; this is very different from most ancient conceptions of what it is to be a human being, for in Greek thought the human being as such is rarely a locus of ethical significance in this way. Only the Stoics advance very far along the path of making the human being *qua* human being a locus of ethical value, while in popular contexts one's claim to be such normally rests on participation in some definite relationship or particular community. The participant ethical framework on which Gill lays such emphasis, in fact, does not favour the development of an interest in concepts such as that of the 'person'.

'Dialogue' is the book's *Leitmotiv*; it is also the key to its character and method, for Gill's work constitutes a powerful argument in favour of a historically aware dialectic between modern and ancient ideas. Gill sends one back to the ancient sources and to the intellectual traditions he scrutinizes. His work will be most rewarding to those prepared to work hard — to test his hypotheses, follow up his references, pursue the controversies in which he engages, and use his insights in other applications. This is a book with which one can do a great deal, both in applying and in modifying its thesis.

Douglas Cairns is Senior Lecturer in Classics at the University of Leeds.

[7] Adam Phillips in *Guardian Weekend*, 14 February 1998; cf. his *Terrors and Experts* (1995).

A VISIT TO ROME

Paul Scade and Duncan Howitt-Marshall

In Rome you long for the country; in the country - oh! inconstant! - you praise the distant city to the stars. Horace.

Rome has often been called the Eternal City, and for good reason. Within its bounds lies a microcosm of European culture encapsulating everything from the resting place of Caesar, to the finest works of art, to restaurants serving fantastic food at incredibly low prices. Our first port of call on arriving in the city was, as befits Ancient Historians, the forum and ancient city. We were able to see the complete story that is Rome from its very beginnings, preserved as a cluster of mud huts on the Palatine Hill. The Roman Republic was best exemplified by the striking remains of the forum, the centre of daily life at the time. It was possible to see the site of Julius Caesar's cremation as well as the rostra on which he stood to address the senate. The Imperial period was well displayed in all its decadent glory in the sprawling form of the Imperial palaces that were eventually to engulf the entire Palatine Hill. The hill saw all the Empire had to offer; Augustus, the first Emperor, paced its slopes, and the Palatine also bore silent witness to the ravings of lunatics such as Caligula and Nero. In its shadow stands the coliseum, the site of untold slaughter through the ages, although contrary to popular belief, Christians were never thrown to the lions here.

When travelling on a budget in Rome, sleeping arrangements can be something of a problem. Unless you want to splash out on a room for the night you are left with two alternatives:

1) Camp outside the city; 2) Wing it.

We went for the second option, and our first night saw us scaling a twelve foot fence topped with foot long spikes. Not an easy proposition with a rucksack on your back. We underwent this trial in order to actually sleep on the Palatine; highly illegal but a bit of a laugh. Next morning our position was compromised by an Italian workman, but he seemed to be satisfied with our explanation for being on a guarded archaeological site two hours before it opened; that we were English and could not understand the signs. We decided not to risk it again the next night, and so instead we slept in the Circus Maximus. Remember Ben Hur?

Paul Scade and Duncan Howitt-Marshall are students of Ancient History in the Dept. of Classics and Ancient History at Exeter.

DISSERTATIONS (1998)

The following dissertations were completed in the Department of Classics and Ancient History during 1998:

MA in Ancient Drama and Society

Alexia Beckerling - Transvestism in Ancient Greece
Maria Konstantoudaki - Representing the Barbarians in Athenian Tragedy
Elisabeth Tsakou - How does Greek Tragedy Represent Triangular Situations as Structural Problems of Marriage?
Eleni Pachoumi - The Tragic Poetry of Euripides and Contemporary Philosophy

MA in Roman Myth and History

Darragh Pollard - The Stories concerning the Foundation of the Roman Republic
James Willington - Virgil and the Augustan Myth

PhD

Konstantinos Niafas - Liber Pater and his Cult in Latin Literature until the End of the Augustan Period
Christos Zafiropoulos - The Ethics of Aesop's Fables

PEGASUS



5 YEAR SUBSCRIPTION TO *PEGASUS*
DELIVERED TO YOUR OWN DOOR
FOR ONLY £15 (INCLUDES P&P)!

Name.....

Address.....
.....
.....

Please make cheques payable to *Pegasus*

Send to : The Treasurer, *Pegasus*
Dept. Office
Dept. of Classics and Ancient History
University of Exeter
Exeter EX4 4QH

SOUTH-WEST BRANCH CLASSICAL ASSOCIATION

Meetings of the Classical Association have not yet been planned for the 1999-2000 programme, but there will be a range of lectures, including joint meetings with the Hellenic, Roman and Devon Archaeological Societies.

New members are very welcome!

Subscriptions to: Mrs. H. Harvey,

53 Thornton Hill, Exeter, EX4 4NR (01392 254608)

Fees: £5 p.a. (life membership £50), schools £8 p.a.