Posted by sk385
13 August 2024On the 27th of June 2024, three weeks after the elections to the European Parliament, the Centre for European Studies (CES) hosted a distinguished panel featuring four renowned European scholars to discuss the recent European Parliament elections and their broader implications for EU democracy. The panel consisted of Professor Dr Christine Reh from the Hertie School in Berlin, Professor Dr Florian Stoeckel from the University of Exeter, Professor Dr Oliver Treib from UniversitĂ€t MĂŒnster, and Professor Dr Hans-Jörg Trenz from Scuola Normale Superiore in Florence. The event was moderated by CES Director Professor Dr Sandra Kröger, University of Exeter. The event was an opportunity to discuss key aspects of the EP elections such as youth voting patterns, the influence of social media and the changing composition of EU bodies. As the EU navigates an increasingly intricate political environment, understanding these dynamics is essential for anticipating and shaping the future of EU governance.â
European Parliament 2024-2029
The Campaign
Panellists began by sharing their thoughts on the election campaign period. Asked which issues, if any, had dominated the campaign, Professor Trenz observed that âthe topics that certainly most mobilized people were a kind of populism and anti-populism divide(âŠ). You either vote because you want to punish the political establishment, or you vote against the radicals. The anti-European parties got around 40% in most countries. And then there was a clear kind of vote almost for the ârescue of democracyâ against them.â Professor Trenz added that he believed there were few concrete policy issues which gained salience. Instead, he highlighted how prominent figures such as Commission President von der Leyen would utilise lofty notions of democracy and autonomy in campaign messaging such as âitâs your ticket for the future, donât let others decide for youâ. From a tangible policy perspective these are relatively empty words.
There was general agreement among panellists that climate issues were not salient at this election despite, as Professor Reh noted, important climate legislation such as the Green Deal having been passed in the previous parliament. The performance of the Greens/European Free Alliance (G/EFA) at this election is indicative of the low salience of climate issues. The G/EFA won just 53 seats with a vote share of 7.36%, compared to 71 seats with 10.04% of the vote in 2019.
Professor Treib noted that one topic which did gain salience, especially in Germany, was the Ukraine war. âI think this issue at least in the German context was a very divisive issue. So, you had kind of mainstream middle of the road government parties and the main opposition party basically following the kind of orthodox âsupport Ukraine against Putinâ stance. But those parties that really won in the German election were the ones that campaigned with a different stance. So, that was basically the AfD, of course traditionally more pro Putin and critical of all these kind of payments to a seemingly corrupt government, but also then the newly formed alliance BĂŒndnis Sahra Wagenknecht, so the kind of renegade from the left party who also mainly campaigned on thisâ.
First vs Second Order Election?
Implicit in Professor Treibâs contribution was the belief that these elections were considered second order in Germany, offering a chance to punish the incumbent SPD-led government. A second order election is one in which voters perceive that the stakes are relatively low, and subsequently cast their vote based on domestic rather than European concerns. âI think some of the problems are common problems but others are also very much specific to individual countriesâ. Whilst âthere are important EU issues that are always on the table (âŠ) I still think, what do we have in front of us when we look at European elections? I would still say we have 27 separate elections.â
However, there was some disagreement as to whether these elections could be classified as second order. Professor Trenz argued that whilst some may be confirming or punishing national political leaders, there is a âdifferent drama driving the narrative.â He suggested that this was similar in the 2019 elections and could be described as âfirst order Eurosceptic election campaignsâ given that the debate was largely about âthe future of democracy in Europe and fundamental constitutional choicesâ. He considered that, âto understand this new drama in the election campaigns, these new divisions and polarization, I think the traditional distinction between first order and second order election campaigns no longer appliesâ.
Social Media and Misinformation
Another aspect of the campaign which the panel considered was the use of social media and the impact of misinformation. Professor Trenz remarked that social media is an opportunity for candidates to reach out to voters, especially given that the traditional media are reluctant to take up European issues and debates. However, by and large, candidates from all parties and all countries did not use the opportunity to raise policy issues and create policy debate online. The prospect of a surge in far-right support did generate some online activity, but this is not a policy issue in and of itself.
On the topic of misinformation, Professor Stoeckel noted that there was no single piercing âbig red busâ style piece of misinformation which heavily impacted the campaign. He warned that the real issue was not with individual pieces of misinformation, but rather entire worldviews, often constructed by far-right groups, going unchecked on social media such as TikTok. âThe AfD in Germany for instance can basically provide a whole worldview and people are gaining this unfiltered with no context (âŠ). It’s so much misinformation that it cannot be handled by any fact checker whatsoeverâ. He mentioned âthe claim that the German automobile industry goes bankrupt because of the EU. I guess there is probably not a sector that benefits more from the EU as much as the automobile industry in Germanyâ, noting that âthere are thousands of similar statements transported directly to people via social media without being embedded in any wider news framework.â
Leading on from this, Professor Treib highlighted just how difficult it is to ascertain where misinformation starts and where âspecifically framed types of informationâ begins. âOf course, you can fact check empirically observable things. But with regards to Florianâs example of the AfD and the German car industry, of course they have profited but you could also argue, from a certain perspective, that the heavy regulation that is going on will hit the German car industry relatively negatively if they donât catch up.â Professor Trenz added that âelection campaigns are always about making wrong promises, reporting wrong facts, making wrong accusations, attacking the political opponent in an unfair way and distorting factsâ. Emphasising his earlier point of social media being under-utilised, his âconcern here is not so much with the presence of misinformation but with the lack of information. Candidates do not inform sufficiently about the issues at stake and if this is the case, they should not also complain about misinformation. How can there be misinformation if there is no information in the first place?â
The Youth Vote
One frequent point of discussion was the youth vote. Professor Trenz outlined that young people are increasingly polarised with a new âanti-foreignerâ generation emerging against a backdrop of left-leaning and green voters. By contrast, Professor Treib thought that although polarisation among the youth vote was concerning, in general one should ânot worry too much about the young voteâ as turnout among young people is so low across the board. Most big changes to election outcomes are a result of older voters changing their voting patterns rather than the youth. After visiting schools in Berlin and speaking to teenagers, Professor Reh was unsurprised by the stark divisions in the German youth vote, due in no small part to differing stances on Gaza. However, given the extent of the divisions, she was surprised by the success of the CDU among youth voters, with the party earning the vote of more 16â26-year-olds in Germany than any other.
What do the results mean for the European Union moving forward?
On the supposed surge of the far-right, Professor Treib was quick to point out that, contrary to media expectations, there was not a large rise in the number of Eurosceptic MEPs in the current and previous parliaments. âIf you want to identify an earthquake election about Euroscepticism, it was the 2014 election where (the Eurosceptics) ended up with 28% of seats. It more or less stayed the same in 2019, went down a little bit after Brexit to 26%, and now remains at about 26% according to my kind of classification.â Rather than surging, it appears the far-right has essentially institutionalised; it is now an established political force in the European Parliament.
Looking at institutional dynamics, Professor Reh posited that the question moving forward should not be âwill there be majorities in Parliament?â, but rather âwhat will the majorities look like?â âIf you look at the coalitions, in the previous European Parliament they differed according to issues. So, for example, the centrists would win on budgets, economic and monetary affairs, foreign affairs, internal market and transport – a sort of a centrist coalition. And then you had the center right coalition which won on agriculture or on industry and trade. Then you had the center left coalition which used to win on civil liberties, on development, on gender, on diversity and crucially on many environmental laws. And that’s the coalition which will no longer be there or will need to find new members.â
There was a consensus among panellists that the greater and more interesting challenge on the horizon for the EU will be the European Commission. More right-wing governments at the national level, such as those spearheaded by Geert Wilders in the Netherlands or Giorgia Meloni in Italy, will inevitably lead to more right-wing Commission appointments. This will have a vast impact on the legislation that is proposed at the beginning of the policy-making process. Professor Treib affirmed that we would also see similar changes at the European Council and Council of Ministers level as those more radical parties that have been around for a decade or so begin moving into governmental positions and leading governments in some cases. Perhaps what we are seeing is not so much the dominance of the far-right in the European Parliament, but rather the changing politics of member states at the national level being gradually transferred to the European Union.